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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
At 7:12 pm on March 13, 2012, a man began screaming on Kenya Air-
lines fl ight 101. Two British Border Control offi cers shoved him forcefully 
into his seat, handcuffi ng him. “Mugabe will kill me!” he cried out.
The woman sitting to my left looked concerned. “Don’t worry,” an 
offi cer told her, “they always stop screaming when the fl ight lifts off.” 
The man in handcuffs heard this, and said, “I will continue screaming 
until you get me off this fl ight.” The border offi cer shook his head. “Trust 
me,” he told the woman next to me, “they always stop screaming.”
The man threatened self-harm, but nobody responded. He instead 
threatened to scream the entire fl ight, but he was ignored. Finally, as 
a last resort, he threatened to defecate in his seat. Offi cials quickly 
unlocked his handcuffs, and escorted him off the fl ight.
Everyone relaxed.
Though this event had transfi xed the passengers, a similar incident 
unfolded moments later and passed without notice. A second man, 
wearing no handcuffs, started making a low moaning noise. He was 
ignored by the border agents, who were some distance away, and was 
sitting between two unarmed civilians, one holding a clipboard, the 
other saying, “It will be fi ne.” He did not believe her, and continued to 
make the moaning noise, his voice increasing in volume, his eyes star-
ing at the seatback pocket, and his body shaking in discomfort. He was 
eventually escorted by the civilians off the fl ight.
While the screaming man on my fl ight was being deported, given 
that he was subject to considerable force, the second man was likely 
repatriating, accompanied by staff members of an organization or the 
United Nations (UN).1
Around the world, refugees often repatriate with the help of an 
organization or the UN, with millions repatriating to Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, 
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Afghanistan, and dozens of other countries between 2010 and 2018. 
Some return because they cannot access residency status, work visas, 
or social services. Others return because, if they remain, they will be 
forced into enclosed refugee camps, or detention centers where they 
are told when to eat, drink, sit, and stand. Some return because, though 
they can live outside camps or detention, they struggle to access suffi -
cient nutrition or medical care. In returning home, they are not offi cially 
deported – nobody physically forces them onto a fl ight – but they do 
fi nd their lives too diffi cult to stay, and so seek help from organiza-
tions who pay for transport, arrange travel documentation, and at times 
accompany them on the journey home.2
Such organizations struggle to determine whether they ought to help 
refugees return home. They feel they face a dilemma: On the one hand, 
helping with return is ethical because otherwise refugees will remain in 
detention, camps, or poverty. On the other hand, helping with return 
may be wrong, precisely because refugees are returning involuntarily, 
given that those who remain will be forced into detention, camps, or a 
life of poverty. It may be wrong to help with involuntary repatriation, 
especially if the risks of return are substantial.
In an attempt to better understand this dilemma, I spent a year in East 
Africa, the Middle East, and South-east Asia, interviewing 172 refugees 
and migrants who had repatriated, or were considering repatriation, from 
Israel. I chose to focus on their cases partly because non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Israel claimed to be especially ethical when 
helping with return, taking steps that differ from those of organizations 
in other countries. I wished to fi nd out if they had truly succeeded in 
ensuring an ethical return. Initially, there were reasons to believe they 
had. Unlike organizations in other countries, NGOs in Israel spent a sig-
nifi cant amount of time interviewing each refugee to ensure they were 
not coerced into returning. NGOs also had resources to travel regularly to 
countries of origin, fi nding out about the conditions refugees faced after 
returning, and relaying this information to refugees still in Israel. Impor-
tantly, they took no government funds, relying on private donors alone 
to avoid acting as an arm to the government’s immigration goals. Some 
were also active in lobbying for a more just refugee policy, and so refused 
to assist with returns that were the result of this unjust policy, such as 
helping refugees return from detention.
I quickly learned, while in South Sudan in 2012, that many refugees 
had returned to avoid detention. But even if this is true, the NGOs’ 
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actions may have been ethical. It may have been better to help them 
return than force refugees to remain in detention. A dilemma remained 
despite the NGOs’ best of intentions and resources. As such, the case 
illustrates the depth of the dilemma, and the need for a philosophical 
analysis.
This book provides this analysis, drawing upon original fi eldwork to 
understand the context of dilemmas arising in repatriation, and solv-
ing these dilemmas using the tools of analytic philosophy. In doing so, 
the book provides the fi rst rigorous set of ethical guidelines for orga-
nizations and governments helping with repatriation. In the following 
Section 1.1 I describe more precisely what repatriation is and why it 
matters. In Sections 1.2 and 1.3 I provide a brief history of repatriation 
since the Second World War (WWII), and the repatriation occurring in 
Israel since 2010. I then describe seven primary dilemmas arising in 
repatriation (Section 1.4), and the fi eldwork I conducted to understand 
their dilemmas (Section 1.5).
1.1 WHAT IS REPATRIATION?
Repatriation refers to refugees moving to the countries from which they 
or their parents fl ed. Some refugees are returning to a place they call 
home, and which they have lived in recently. Others are returning to 
a place they do not call home, having fl ed as young children decades 
prior. Some are not returning at all, moving to a country they have never 
seen, their parents having fl ed before they were born. The book refers to 
all three types of repatriation, focusing particularly on those repatriat-
ing with the help of organizations using no coercion, merely providing 
free transport, and at times providing stipends, travel documentation, 
and accompaniment on journeys.
Such repatriation is often enthusiastically embraced by governments 
hoping to avoid deportation, while still decreasing the number of refu-
gees within their borders.3 Repatriation has a ring of legitimacy, espe-
cially if organized by separate humanitarian organizations, or a separate 
wing of the government uninvolved in deportations. Those who help 
with repatriation may not agree with the government’s sentiment, but 
they argue that helping is better than doing nothing at all.
These agents have referred to their activities as “repatriation facil-
itation.”4 I adopt this term, referring to those helping with return as 
“repatriation facilitators.” They are non-armed actors, and distinguish 
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themselves from the border offi cials handcuffi ng individuals on fl ights, 
or the doctors injecting psychiatric drugs into those who resist.5 I focus 
on those holding clipboards and pens rather than guns or needles.
Some of these facilitators are part of the government, such as one 
offi cial in the Assisted Voluntary Return Unit in Israel’s Ministry of Inte-
rior. He insisted on his neutral status. “I’m not involved in deportations 
at all,” he explained, “I want them to leave Israel happy.”6 In Spain, a 
government civil servant similarly emphasized that she was unin-
volved in deportation, and merely helping refugees access a smooth 
form of repatriation.7 In addition to government offi cials, government-
employed social workers may assist unaccompanied minors return 
to their countries of origin. Judges may have a role in determining if 
an adult can repatriate, if the adult has a mental illness and lacks the 
capacity to make decisions on their own behalf.8 Sometimes private 
companies provide repatriation, as in the United States where hospitals 
pay private fi rms to facilitate the return of patients without the legal 
right to remain.9
There are also NGOs and intra-governmental organizations (IGOs) 
who help with repatriation, such as the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).10 These bodies, and many more, make repatriation 
either possible or easier, and have contributed to millions of refugees 
repatriating over the last decade alone.
These refugees repatriating raise questions overlooked in public 
dialogue on migration. One question is empirical: it is not clear what 
happens to refugees after they return home. Another question is philo-
sophical: it is not clear what repatriation facilitators ought morally to 
do. While the government acts wrongly when detaining refugees,11 per-
haps repatriation facilitators do not. An assisted coerced return seems 
better than an unassisted deportation or a life in detention. Nor is it 
clear that helping with uncoerced return is always permissible. Even if 
a refugee is returning without any coercion, it might be wrong to help a 
person take a risk to their lives, however voluntary their choice may be. 
The criteria for when repatriation is wrong are different from the criteria 
for when deportation is wrong.
This book establishes such criteria. In doing so, I shall avoid com-
mitting myself to a particular theory of whom states should not deport. 
Instead, I aim to consider whether, in cases where nearly all agree that 
deportation is wrong, helping with repatriation is right.
5857_Gerver.indd   4 04/10/18   2:53 PM
Introduction 5
Of course, there is much debate over when deportation is wrong 
and this may, by extension, impact when repatriation is wrong. I shall 
assume, for simplicity, that deportation is wrong when deportees’ lives 
will be at immediate risk in their home countries, whether from vio-
lence, extreme poverty, or a natural disaster. This claim is supported by 
a range of philosophers who, though disagreeing on who states can 
deport, agree that deporting migrants to all life-threatening conditions 
is wrong.12 States are similarly beginning to recognize that it is wrong 
to deport individuals to countries where they will likely die of hunger or 
general violence, even if they have not fl ed persecution.13 For simplicity, 
I will call all individuals “refugees” if their life will be threatened if they 
return, regardless of why. I further elaborate on this theory, and defend 
it against recent objections, in Appendix A.14
Though I assume deportations to life-threatening conditions are 
wrong, this assumption is not central to the book. Those disagreeing with 
this assumption can still accept my general conclusions. For example, in 
Chapter 2 I conclude that assisting refugees repatriate from detention 
is wrong if this causes the government to increase its use of detention. 
If you think that only those fl eeing persecution have a right to asylum, 
then this conclusion is only relevant for those fl eeing persecution. If you 
think that only those fl eeing violence have a right to asylum, then this 
conclusion is only relevant for those fl eeing violence. My goal is not to 
consider who deserves asylum but whether, if someone deserves asy-
lum, it is wrong to help them repatriate.
This question has been largely overlooked in today’s debates on 
immigration. Debates tend to focus on who states should admit, rather 
than who states should help return.15 The few academics addressing 
return assume return must always be voluntary.16 It remains unclear 
whether voluntary returns are always ethical when the risks of return 
are substantial. And it remains unclear whether involuntary returns 
should be provided if voluntary return is not possible. To address these 
questions, we must ask not only what returns are just in the abstract, 
but what particular actors ought to do when governments are pressur-
ing refugees to leave.
My focus on individual actors, though rare in discussions on immi-
gration, is not entirely unheard of. There are debates over whether 
individual smugglers ought to transport refugees across borders. There 
are debates over whether individual citizens ought to resist unjust 
immigration laws, such as by hiring those without permits. There 
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are debates over whether individual migrants ought to cross borders 
without authorization, and whether these migrants are permitted to 
use violence in the process.17 Outside of immigration ethics, there are 
debates over when individual organizations should help populations 
in need, and whether working with corrupt governments is justifi ed to 
help these populations.18 There are debates over how individual civil 
servants ought to respond when faced with diffi cult dilemmas, and how 
much discretion such civil servants should have.19 All of these debates 
shift our gaze from the state in the abstract onto concrete actors, asking 
what these actors ought to do. I take the same approach in exploring 
when repatriation assistance is ethical.
1.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REPATRIATION
This question has been especially relevant since WWII, when in 1943 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization (UNRRO) 
assisted roughly seven million individuals return home as war raged 
on. It is not clear if UNRRO acted ethically, given that refugees’ return 
may have been unsafe. Following the end of WWII 20 million refugees 
refused to repatriate, afraid to live in the Soviet-controlled Eastern Bloc, 
and UNRRO’s successor organization helped only 73,000 individuals 
return home between 1946 and 1952.20 When UNHCR was formally 
established soon after, rates of repatriation steadily rose, culminating 
in ten million individuals returning to the newly-created Bangladesh 
between 1971 and 1972. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s UNHCR 
focused on repatriation within Africa, as African governments became 
increasingly unwilling to host refugee populations.21 In 1983, for exam-
ple, UNHCR helped an estimated 35,000 Ethiopian refugees repatriate 
from Djibouti, where they could no longer access aid or work permits.22
With the end of the Cold War UNHCR announced that the “decade 
of repatriation” had begun.23 Throughout the 1990s rates of repatriation 
increased, with over twelve million refugees repatriating between 1991 
and 1997.24 One reason for the increase was refugees’ greater ability 
to return home, as when one million refugees were able to return to 
Ethiopia and Eritrea with a change in government in 1991.25 Many refu-
gees, however, struggled to access basic necessities in their countries of 
asylum, giving them little choice but to return home.
UNHCR continued helping with repatriation into the 2000s, focus-
ing particular attention on millions returning from Iran and Pakistan to 
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Afghanistan.26 It helped far fewer refugees return from 2010 onwards, 
but will likely help more in the years to come. Not only are conditions 
for refugees deteriorating in Pakistan and Iran, compelling two million 
to return between 2015 and 2018, conditions are similarly deteriorating 
in other parts of the globe.27 Over one million Somali refugees were told 
by the Kenyan government they will be required to repatriate, leading 
UNHCR to help tens of thousands to repatriate to Somalia in the last 
year alone.28 UNHCR has more recently begun planning the repatria-
tion of Syrian refugees, given that refugees are struggling to access asy-
lum in wealthier countries, and are often forced to remain in enclosed 
camps in poorer countries.29
UNHCR assists not only refugees return home, but Internally Dis-
placed Persons (IDPs). It helped IDPs returning from regions within 
Afghanistan to Kabul in 2002, IDPs returning from regions within the 
DR Congo to Ituri in 2007, and IDPs returning from regions within Sri 
Lanka to Ampara in 2009.30 Indeed, UNHCR helps far more IDPs return 
annually than refugees, as the majority of those fl eeing disasters remain 
within their home states. For example, it helped 2.9 million IDPs return 
home in 2010 and 3.2 million in 2011, while helping only 197,000 refu-
gees return in 2010 and 532,000 in 2011.31 When UNHCR helps IDPs 
repatriate, it faces similar ethical dilemmas to those arising with refu-
gee repatriation, including the dilemma of whether to assist with return 
that is involuntary and unsafe.
In addition to UNHCR, IOM helps with large-scale repatriations, 
assisting an estimated 1.3 million individuals repatriate since 1979. 
Its rates of assistance are steadily increasing, with 31,270 individuals 
returning home via IOM in 2011, 43,786 in 2014, and 98,403 in 2016.32 
Of those it helps, at least some are returning to life-threatening condi-
tions, as in 2002 when it assisted refugees repatriate from the island of 
Nauru to Afghanistan, and in 2003 when it helped refugees repatri-
ate from Belgium to Iraq.33 Importantly, IOM assists migrants repatriate 
to countries without suffi cient nutrition or healthcare. Such migrants, 
I assume, are refugees with a moral right to remain in the host state, 
even if no legal right to remain. If this is true, then when IOM helps 
them repatriate they are engaging in morally problematic assistance.
Governments often provide their own repatriation, rather than rely-
ing on UNHCR and IOM. The Israeli government began providing 
repatriation from 2012 and the UK government began providing repa-
triation from 2015. The German government’s repatriation is far older, 
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dating back to the 1970s, and was especially active in the 1990s when 
it informed Bosnian refugees they were required to return home.34 It 
will likely become increasingly active in the future, as Germany has 
announced that all Syrian refugees will be required to eventually repa-
triate.35 If this repatriation is similar to that of Bosnian refugees, refu-
gees will face a choice between deportation if they remain and a grant 
if they return.
In many cases, repatriation is not facilitated by a single organization 
or government agency. Instead, multiple organizations and agencies 
are involved in repatriation, each taking on a slightly different task. In 
Kenya wealthy donor states fund UNHCR, UNHCR interviews refu-
gees to ensure their return is informed, and the Danish Refugee Council 
facilitates the return itself.36 In Spain the government funds repatriation, 
and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) has facilitated the 
return itself.37 The European Union (EU) has a similar model, allocating 
approximately €1.7 billion to member states since 2008, and member 
states paying IOM to facilitate repatriation on their behalf. 38
Sometimes a state provides funding, a charity provides repatria-
tion, and a given government agency publicizes the repatriation. This 
occurred in the UK, where the government paid the charity Refugee 
Action to facilitate return,39 and the Home Offi ce used a controversial 
method publicizing this return: it placed billboards on vans around 
the UK, telling migrants to “Go home or face arrest.”40 Refugee Action 
condemned the billboards, they were eventually taken down,41 but the 
Home Offi ce ceased Refugee Action’s funding shortly after, providing 
repatriation itself.42
1.3 REPATRIATION FROM ISRAEL
Though repatriation is common globally, it was uncommon in Israel 
until 2010, when a small number of refugees began returning home 
to South Sudan with the help of an NGO. Most who returned knew 
little about the region they were repatriating to, having fl ed as chil-
dren during the Second Sudanese Civil War, fought mainly between the 
Sudanese government and southern Sudanese forces.43 Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s they had arrived in Egypt, where they faced xenophobic 
attacks at work and on the street, but also felt remaining was safer than 
returning. They continued living in Egypt into 2005, when southern and 
northern Sudanese forces signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
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(CPA). The CPA allowed for a referendum for an independent South 
Sudan in 2011, but they were uncertain whether independence would 
bring security, or whether independence would be established at all.
The same year as the 2005 CPA, Egyptian police opened fi re on pro-
testers sitting in front of the UN offi ces, killing fi fty-three refugees,44 
and encouraging eleven youths to pay smugglers to take them across 
the Sinai Desert and up to the border fence with Israel.45 Once there, 
they crossed through a small opening in the fence, stepped into Israeli 
territory, and were eventually granted temporary residency permits. 
Others soon followed and, though an unknown number were imme-
diately deported back to Egypt,46 hundreds were allowed to stay when 
sympathetic border soldiers refused to deport them. The soldiers instead 
drove them to the Negev Desert in the south of Israel, dropped them 
off at a bus station, and told them to fi nd organizations that assisted 
refugees.
Organizations sometimes met the refugees at the bus station, but 
so did kind strangers. Nyandeng, who arrived in Israel when she was a 
teenager in 2007, remembers her fi rst day:
At the station, an Ethiopian woman came and asked what we were 
doing there. . . . She bought me and my siblings and mother food 
and gave us money to take the bus to Jerusalem and said we should 
call her if we had no place to go and we would stay with her. We 
took a taxi and my mother told the driver to take us to a church – it 
didn’t matter which one. He took us to a guesthouse and there was 
a man there, at reception. My mother told him we needed help. 
Without thinking he gave us a room for free with food.47
Soon after, Nyandeng and her younger sister and brother began attend-
ing school, and her mother found a job at one of the dozens of hotels 
employing East African refugees as cleaners. They rented an apartment 
in Naharia, a town in the north of Israel, but as the months passed they 
failed to gain any offi cial residency status. There were 1,000 other asy-
lum seekers in the country by 2007 and, like them, Nyandeng’s mother 
could not legally work. They eventually received limited rights when, a 
year later, the High Court of Justice ordered that the government pro-
vide temporary residency status to all asylum seekers, and allow them 
to apply for refugee status. Nyandeng’s family and others received 
three-month visas, and freedom from arrest. They still never received 
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refugee status, as the government had yet to establish a Refugee Status 
Determination (RSD) procedure. Under such a procedure, common in 
developed countries, refugees undergo intensive interviews with gov-
ernment offi cials, providing evidence that they fl ed persecution due to 
their ethnic, political, religious, or social identity.
One reason that refugees like Nyandeng and her family could not 
access full residency rights was that they were not Jewish. Had they 
been Jewish, they would have qualifi ed for citizenship under Israel’s 
Law of Return. The Law, which dates back to Israel’s creation in 1948, 
aims to ensure that every Jew has a state they can call home and which 
they can turn to in need. The logic behind this law is that, because Jews 
failed to access asylum during the Holocaust, a Jewish state is necessary 
to provide protection to Jews fl eeing persecution, and ensure that Jews 
have access to a state that protects their interests. Were Israel to accept 
a signifi cant number of non-Jewish refugees, then Israel would no lon-
ger have a Jewish majority, the Jewish character of the state would be 
undermined, and the Law of Return itself would no longer be accepted. 
Indeed, this general policy of maintaining a Jewish majority is a reason 
Israel refuses to allow the return of Palestinian refugees, those who had 
fl ed territory currently under Israeli control. For example, Palestinian 
refugees who once lived in Jerusalem and fl ed to Jordan in 1948 can-
not return to Jerusalem and obtain residency permits in this city. When 
Sudanese refugees crossed into Israel, they were viewed in the same 
light as Palestinians: a threat to the Jewish majority, and so a threat to 
the Law of Return.48
This threat was dismissed by activists hoping to help refugees like 
Nyandeng. Such activists emphasized that, even if African asylum seek-
ers were given refugee status, they needn’t stay indefi nitely, but only 
until it was safe to return home. Even if they did stay indefi nitely, they 
would comprise a small  percentage of the overall population, and so 
Jews would maintain a majority. Importantly, some activists claimed this 
would have no repercussions on Palestinian refugees who wished to 
return to their former homes currently under Israeli control. Palestinian 
refugees were one issue, they stated, and African refugees another.49
These activists failed to persuade policymakers to grant full residency 
status to Sudanese refugees, but refugees still faced superior conditions 
in Israel compared to Egypt. As a result, more refugees began arriving. By 
2010 there were approximately 1,200 southern Sudanese in the country, 
and approximately 35,000 other asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan. 
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All had crossed over from Egypt since 2005, and their claims for asylum 
were never heard, their legal status remaining in limbo.50 Given their 
precarious position, in 2010 some wished to return home.
They asked an NGO in Jerusalem for help returning. The NGO, 
called the International Christian Embassy (ICE), offered southern 
Sudanese refugees free fl ights to Juba, a stipend worth $1,500, and 
the necessary documents to enter Sudanese territory.51 The organiza-
tion worked with offi cials in UNHCR and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS), a refugee rights organization.52 Several dozen refugees 
returned, fi nding jobs soon after, and the project was deemed a suc-
cess. Another NGO, Operation Blessing International (OBI), took over 
the project in 2011, still working with UNHCR and HIAS. When OBI 
took over, many Darfur refugees from northern Sudan also wished to 
repatriate. They, too, accepted OBI’s free fl ight to Juba, paying for their 
own buses or fl ights to Darfur. By 2012, OBI and HIAS had helped 900 
individuals repatriate.53
In 2011 South Sudan became an independent country. A year later 
the Israeli government announced that return to South Sudan was safe, 
as the country was no longer part of Sudan. OBI continued helping 
with return, and the Ministry of Interior also set up its own repatriation 
program, called Operation Returning Home (ORH).54 It was suppos-
edly voluntary, but the Ministry of Interior threatened to detain anyone 
who stayed. In response, South Sudanese activists organized protests, 
and raised a court petition, but it was rejected by the court and all were 
ordered into detention.55
“It was so strange,” one aid worker recalls. “When refugees found 
out they would be detained, they just stopped protesting, all at once. 
They went out, bought the nicest clothes, and boarded the fl ight back.”56 
After return, at least twenty-two individuals were killed or died of a 
disease within a year, representing at least 2 per cent of returnees.57 
When I traveled to South Sudan in December 2013, civil war broke out 
two days later, and I learned of an additional fi ve who were killed, rep-
resenting approximately 3.7 per cent of my sample of 136 returnees to 
South Sudan.58 The exact mortality rate was likely higher, as I never 
reached the most insecure areas, and most returnees were never con-
tacted by researchers or aid workers after returning.
Many of the NGO staff members helping with return were uncertain 
whether their actions were ethical. Based on the data I collected, they 
faced seven moral dilemmas, prevalent in repatriation globally.
5857_Gerver.indd   11 04/10/18   2:53 PM
12 The Ethics and Practice of Refugee Repatriation
1.4 SEVEN DILEMMAS
Below is an overview of these dilemmas, described in greater depth in 
the seven main chapters of this book.
1.4.1 Coercion
The fi rst dilemma concerns coercion. Refugees often return to avoid 
detention, destitution, deportation, or life in an enclosed camp. If refu-
gees are returning for these reasons, their returns are perhaps coerced.59 
We might suppose humanitarian organizations should not assist with 
coerced return.60 Yet organizations defend their assistance by noting 
that, if refugees do not return, they will remain indefi nitely in detention, 
destitution, or enclosed camps, and eventually be deported home.
This dilemma is especially acute in mass repatriation programs in 
developing countries, where the vast majority of repatriation takes 
place. Refugees in Pakistan and Iran often face detention, poverty, 
and police brutality, leading millions to repatriate with the help of 
UNHCR.61 Somali refugees in Kenya are often forced into enclosed 
camps and threatened with deportation if they remain.62 UNHCR has 
criticized enclosed camps and deportations, but has further expanded 
its repatriation program. It claims providing repatriation is better than 
providing no option at all.63 It is not clear it is.
In Chapter 2 I describe the global prevalence of this dilemma and 
attempt to resolve it. I conclude that organizations can permissibly help 
with coerced repatriation if they try to end coercion, do not contribute 
to coercion, and inform refugees of the risks of returning.
1.4.2 Misinformation
In Chapter 3 I address a dilemma that arises when organizations and 
states do not inform refugees of the risks of returning, because they lack 
information about these risks. It is not clear who has a duty to inform 
refugees about risks, or whether refugees themselves are responsible for 
fi nding such information. I conclude that states and organizations have 
weighty duties to fi nd information, even when the costs are high.
1.4.3 Regret
Chapter 4 addresses a dilemma relating to regret. Many refugees return-
ing are informed about the risks, but regret their decision nonetheless, 
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wishing they had remained in their country of asylum. This occurred in 
2010 when thousands of refugees returning to Iraq regretted their deci-
sions to return via UNHCR, wishing they had remained in Iran.64 In such 
cases, perhaps the UN should stop facilitating return if future return-
ees will likely feel similar regret. But this claim is controversial: deny-
ing someone transport because they might feel regret seems wrongly 
paternalistic. When I book a fl ight to an unsafe country, the airline is 
not required to consider whether I will regret my decision. In Chapter 4 
I argue that, though regret is not usually a reason to deny repatriation, 
sometimes it is.
1.4.4 Payments
In Chapter 5 I address dilemmas concerning payments. Government 
agencies often provide generous stipends to refugees agreeing to 
return home, at times using no coercion at all. We might suppose that 
such agencies are engaging in a justifi ed form of immigration control, 
assuming refugees’ choices are genuinely voluntary. Yet, perhaps such 
agencies act unethically because they are encouraging refugees to risk 
their lives in repatriating. A similar dilemma arises when UNHCR pro-
vides stipends to refugees returning home, as when it paid hundreds of 
dollars to each refugee returning to Afghanistan in the 2010s. I argue 
that government payments are justifi ed when return is safe and volun-
tary. When returns are neither safe nor voluntary, because refugees are 
forced into enclosed camps if they remain, UNHCR payments are justi-
fi ed when they do not contribute to further coercion against refugees.
1.4.5 Children
In Chapter 6 I address cases involving children. In many cases children’s 
rights will be at risk if they repatriate, but their parents seek repatriation 
nonetheless. In such cases it is not clear if parents have a right to return 
with their children. I argue that they often do not, and organizations 
and states should not provide repatriation assistance in such cases.
1.4.6 Discrimination
Chapter 7 concerns refugees whose lives will not be at risk if they repa-
triate. In a range of cases, refugees from unwanted ethnic groups are 
provided generous return assistance by governments who wish to fulfi ll 
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the racist preferences of voters. In the case of Israel, those of African 
descent were given stipends to repatriate, while non-Africans were not. 
In such cases a dilemma arises: on the one hand such payments may 
seem morally acceptable, as the government is using no coercion, and 
many migrants hope to receive money to leave. On the other hand, 
such payments may be wrong, given the racist motives of governments 
and voters. I argue that such stipends are wrong, but may still be mor-
ally permissible if refugees consent to the stipends and the stipends do 
not harm others.
1.4.7 Restitution
Chapter 8 considers the rights of refugees who have already repatri-
ated. In particular, I consider whether refugees have a right to valu-
able property restitution when others are in far greater need. It is not 
clear, for example, whether princes who fl ed Czechoslovakia had a right 
to the castles they left behind, or whether South Sudanese refugees 
who grew wealthy abroad had a right to the land confi scated during 
their displacement. I argue that such refugees do not have a right to 
the property they lost, but that states have good reason to return this 
property nonetheless.
1.5 FIELDWORK FOR PHILOSOPHY
In addressing these dilemmas, I will draw upon a range of cases around 
the globe. I shall also draw upon interviews I conducted in South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and other countries of origin, where individuals 
described to me why they arrived in Israel, their reasons for returning 
from Israel, and the conditions they faced after returning. Their stories 
serve a similar purpose to medical cases in bioethics, court judgments in 
jurisprudence, and thought experiments in moral philosophy. The cases 
serve as the dilemmas we start with which have yet to be addressed in 
philosophy and public policy.
Philosophers addressing ethical dilemmas typically draw upon cases 
found in existing empirical literature, rather than cases they learned 
about through their own fi eldwork. I will also refer to existing literature, 
citing cases of return from around the world. However, there are very 
few in-depth studies of repatriation; the few that exist tend to describe 
the aggregate experience of repatriating populations, and often only 
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before return. With some exceptions, studies rarely explore how indi-
viduals may have been subject to different injustices both before and 
after repatriation. I aim to capture this diverse range of cases with my 
own in-depth empirical research on repatriation from Israel.
A diverse range of cases is useful for normative theorizing. For 
example, in fi ctional trolley examples used in moral philosophy, a per-
son must always decide if it is just to kill one person to save fi ve, but 
the details of each example vary. In one case you see a runaway train 
about to run over fi ve workmen on a track. You can save the fi ve men by 
pushing a large bystander onto the track, stopping the train, killing him, 
but saving the fi ve lives. In another case you also see a runaway train 
about to kill fi ve workmen, but this time can only save them by pulling 
a switch, diverting the train onto another track, killing one man stand-
ing on the track but saving the fi ve workmen. Many have the intuition 
that it is morally impermissible to push the large man onto the track in 
the fi rst case, but perhaps permissible to pull the switch in the second.65 
The variation between cases highlights whether our intuitions change 
in response to new variables, helping us determine if these variables are 
normatively signifi cant. I will employ a similar approach when formu-
lating general ethical guidelines for repatriation.
To select cases that were suffi ciently varied, I drew upon varied 
sources on repatriation globally, and conducted varied fi eldwork on 
repatriation from Israel. For the latter, I conducted interviews with refu-
gees who explained to me precisely why they came to Israel, what they 
experienced in Israel, why they decided to repatriate, who helped them 
repatriate, and what their conditions were after repatriating. To ensure 
I had a broad array of cases, I traveled to multiple towns within coun-
tries, and spoke to those living in urban and rural areas, in both safe and 
unsafe regions.
My fi rst set of interviews took place between 2008 and 2010, when 
I spoke to NGO staff members in Israel who helped with return, and 
twelve refugees living in Israel, one of whom was interested in return-
ing. I later traveled to Juba, Aweil, and Wau in South Sudan in March and 
April 2012, interviewing twenty-seven individuals after they returned 
from Israel to South Sudan. When I arrived in Juba the Israeli govern-
ment announced that all were required to repatriate,66 and almost all 
remaining South Sudanese in Israel returned by 2012. I traveled to East 
Africa again to interview these new returnees, fi rst conducting fi eld-
work in Kampala and Entebbe in 2013, as many had migrated to these 
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cities shortly after returning to South Sudan. While there, I interviewed 
thirty returnees, the majority children. In August 2013 I again traveled 
to Israel to interview a government offi cial who was facilitating return,67 
and NGO staff assisting individuals’ return as of 2013.
That year I traveled to South Sudan a second time, landing on 
December 13 to interview additional individuals who had returned. 
Two days later civil war broke out, and I stayed for six more weeks, 
interviewing sixty-one returnees who stayed in Juba. Roughly half the 
individuals I interviewed were Nuer citizens forced by Dinka militias to 
fl ee their homes to UN IDP camps. In June 2014 I traveled to Ethiopia, 
interviewing nine returnees from the Nuer tribe who had fl ed or 
migrated to Gambella, a town situated along the border with South 
Sudan. In February 2018 I traveled to Nairobi, Kenya, re-interviewing a 
subject I last saw in Israel in 2009, and a subject I last saw fl eeing Juba 
in 2014. I also interviewed an additional subject who had fl ed South 
Sudan in 2013.
In total, I interviewed 128 returnees to South Sudan, including forty-
eight minors. I also learned of the conditions of eight additional return-
ees, and so could confi rm the conditions of 136 individuals in total, 
representing approximately 11 per cent of the roughly 1,200 South 
Sudanese nationals who returned between 2010 and 2014.
To select these subjects, I arrived in each country and called two 
to fi ve contacts provided to me by repatriation facilitators, volunteers, 
and friends in Israel. I then used a snowball methodology to interview 
their acquaintances, their acquaintances’ acquaintances, and so forth, 
until all links were exhausted. After each interview, I coded responses 
for subjects’ reasons for returning, including detention or threats to 
deportation in Israel. I also coded the interviews for properties related 
to post-return conditions, including whether they had access to food, 
income, medical care, education, and shelter, and whether they were 
again displaced. Finally, I recorded the number of subjects who died 
from illness, ethnic-based killings, or crossfi re after returning.
I could not obtain a full list of phone numbers of those who returned 
and, even if I had, I would not have been able to interview a random 
sample of this list, as I could not access extremely remote areas. None-
theless, I strived to interview a diverse range of subjects. I specifi cally 
strived to counteract survivorship bias, which arose because I was less 
able to learn about those who were killed or returned to insecure areas 
I could not reach. To counteract this bias, I traveled extensively within 
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each town, and the surrounding rural areas, to meet with returnees who 
did not have access to secure healthcare, a cell phone, or a close tarmac 
road. During the war, I also conducted interviews in and around both 
UN IDP camps in Juba, including one in the Jebel neighborhood, where 
ethnic cleansing and fi ghting were especially widespread. And though 
I could not interview those who were killed, I attempted to establish a 
mortality rate. When I learned of a subject who was killed, and who I 
would have met had they survived, I included them in the sample of 136 
subjects whose conditions I could confi rm.68
In addition to interviewing South Sudanese subjects who returned, 
I interviewed a smaller sample of other refugees and migrants who 
repatriated via a distinct NGO called the Center for International 
Migration and Integration (CIMI). This NGO worked with IOM and 
a special Voluntary Return unit set up in the Ministry of Interior.69 
The sample included a family of four who had repatriated in 2012 
to Sudan, and then fl ed to Ethiopia; two Eritrean refugees who had 
accepted money to resettle to Ethiopia; a father and his eight-year-old 
daughter who repatriated to Ethiopia; and three migrants who repatri-
ated to Nigeria, two to Guinea, one to the Philippines, and fourteen to 
Thailand. I additionally interviewed a family of four intending to repa-
triate to Colombia who later changed their mind and remained in 
Israel. All of these cases are in many ways different than the cases of 
repatriation to South Sudan, but have certain important similarities 
– most notably the level of misinformation they received – and so pro-
vide useful comparisons.
One might suppose that we cannot rely on the responses of those 
who returned. They may have misrepresented how much they were 
coerced to return, how misinformed they were, and how diffi cult their 
conditions were after returning, especially if they were not satisfi ed with 
their choice. My method of sampling strived to mitigate this possibility. 
Because I interviewed individuals living in a diverse range of countries 
and regions, a signifi cant portion were very satisfi ed with their return, 
but still recall being misinformed or coerced into returning, later fl eeing 
their homes. If even these individuals recall similar challenges to those 
who regretted repatriating, this provides stronger evidence as to the 
accuracy of such testimonials. I also witnessed conditions described by 
respondents, such as overcrowding, unhygienic latrines, lack of food, 
and soldiers fi ring into IDP camps. As such, I could corroborate the 
responses of many interviewees regarding these conditions.
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This original data on repatriation from Israel is central to this book. 
However, I situate it within the broader range of repatriation cases. The 
case of Israel is not unique because of the dilemmas repatriation facili-
tators faced. What was unique was the NGOs’ greater fi nancial invest-
ment to avoid these dilemmas. If such extraordinary measures failed to 
succeed, this highlights the depth of the problem and the need for an 
ethical analysis.
Such ethical analysis is central to this book, which is both philosophi-
cal and practical. It is philosophical because it addresses broader ques-
tions concerning consent, assistance, and discrimination, questions of 
interest for philosophers outside the fi eld of immigration. It is practical 
because these broader questions are relevant for refugees around the 
world who, though living dramatically different lives, raise similar dilem-
mas for the agents helping them repatriate. The book describes refu-
gees returning from Pakistan and Myanmar who, though experiencing 
different types of repatriation, raise similar dilemmas concerning how 
organizations should respond when coercion is rife. The book describes 
refugees returning from Norway and Iran who, though facing different 
types of misinformation, raise similar dilemmas concerning how orga-
nizations should respond when misinformation is rife. In focusing on 
these and other dilemmas, the book moves beyond asking how refugees 
have been wronged, and asks who is responsible for these wrongs. It 
moves beyond asking what principles governments should follow, and 
asks how these principles ought to be applied in practice. It asks not 
only what practices will protect refugees’ safety, but what practices will 
respect refugees’ rights when safety cannot be ensured. In doing so, the 
book provides a comprehensive set of guidelines for those helping refu-
gees, helping create more ethical and informed repatriation.
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COERCION
George was followed home. As he reached for his keys to his apartment 
in Tel Aviv, he was startled by a voice from behind.
“Pack your belongings,” a policeman ordered, informing him he had 
a week to return to South Sudan or be detained indefi nitely in Israel.
George had originally fl ed South Sudan for Egypt during the Second 
Sudanese Civil War in the 1980s. He failed to fi nd secure protection in 
Egypt and so crossed the Sinai Desert in 2008, entering Israeli territory 
with the help of smugglers. Like 60,000 other asylum seekers who had 
crossed over, George could not apply for refugee status or legally work 
as of 2012.1
As the policeman drove away, George called OBI. He asked for help 
returning to South Sudan, and was given a free fl ight home and travel 
documentation. By 2012, nearly all South Sudanese in Israel had repa-
triated via similar means.
It is against international law to indefi nitely detain asylum seekers 
without fi rst establishing if they are refugees.2 What is less obvious is 
whether organizations like OBI should help individuals return to avoid 
such detention.
The UN claims it should.3 Over the last three decades, it has assisted 
over ten million refugees repatriate, many from detention, and many 
more from enclosed camps.4 It helps because, even if governments 
detain refugees or force them into enclosed camps,5 the UN is using 
no coercion itself, and is helping refugees obtain freedom through 
repatriation.6 It is analogous, one could claim, to civil servants clandes-
tinely helping individuals fl ee persecuting regimes. During the Rwan-
dan Genocide and the Holocaust, such civil servants were celebrated as 
helping individuals escape injustices.7 Of course those who fl ed were 
coerced; that is why it was commendable to help them.
5857_Gerver.indd   26 04/10/18   2:53 PM
Coercion 27
Yet, unlike fl eeing from danger to safety, refugees who return home 
may be trading one injustice for another. In this case, “repatriation 
facilitators,” including NGOs and UN agencies, cannot normally justify 
their actions by appealing to the outcomes of return. In this eventuality, 
NGOs have justifi ed their assistance by reference to refugees’ consent. 
But it is unclear if there is consent, given the presence of coercion.
In the following section I will describe one version of this dilemma, 
which I call the “Coercion Dilemma.” Coercion Dilemmas occur when 
facilitators help with coerced returns without causally contributing to 
the coercion. In Section 2.2 I will then address “Causation Dilemmas,” 
where facilitating return does causally contribute to coercion.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to precisely state the aims and 
clarify the assumptions of this chapter to avoid misunderstanding about 
the highly contentious questions addressed.
I shall consider whether facilitators are morally permitted to assist 
with return, rather than whether they are legally permitted to do so.8 
The refugees under consideration are primarily those who the UN 
claims should not be forcibly returned, but instead given asylum or the 
opportunity to apply for refugee status. These are individuals whose 
lives will likely be at risk from persecution if they return. Using the UN 
defi nition permits discussion of the UN’s dilemmas according to the 
UN’s own standards. In a similar vein, I use the defi nition of coercion 
provided by IOM, a major global repatriation facilitator. According to 
IOM, coercion occurs when one is repatriating to avoid detention, but 
also when one lacks basic necessities if they stay, such as food or shelter.9 
More specifi cally, I assume states unjustly coerce refugees to leave if 
they have the capacity to provide basic services to refugees within their 
territory, but refuse to provide such services.10
Though I mostly focus on refugees who fl ed persecution in their 
home countries, and are repatriating to such persecution, I will at times 
discuss individuals who fl ed general violence, food insecurity, and a 
lack of medical care. As noted in the introduction, I assume that coerc-
ing such “survival migrants”11 to return home is morally impermissi-
ble. At the very least, it is impermissible if the state has the capacity to 
accept such individuals, and if accepting these migrants is the only way 
to ensure that they obtain basic human rights. This claim is supported 
not only by philosophers who believe in open borders, such as Joseph 
Carens,12 but also by those who defend states’ right to exclude immi-
grants, such as David Miller, Matthew Gibney, and even some states 
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themselves.13 As such, it serves as a “minimal ethical standard,” deter-
mining who the state should not deport,14 while leaving open the ques-
tion of who repatriation facilitators should help return. I will therefore 
refer to individuals as “refugees” even if their return is unsafe for reasons 
related to general violence or food insecurity, rather than persecution.
Though I make the above assumptions throughout the chapter, one 
may accept my general conclusions, while still disagreeing on who 
deserves asylum. My goal is not to settle the debate about who states 
should protect, but to resolve the dilemma of who should be helped to 
return by the aforementioned organizations, if governments are coerc-
ing individuals to leave.
2.1 THE DILEMMA OF INVOLUNTARY RETURN
Coercion Dilemmas occur when humanitarian organizations are faced 
with a choice. They can either help with return, or watch refugees face 
confi nement in camps and detention, or an inability to access basic 
necessities. I will fi rst describe this dilemma, and then consider how it 
might be resolved.
2.1.1 Describing the Dilemma
In 1991 two million Kurdish refugees fl ed Iraq, most hoping to reach 
Turkey. They reached a mountainous area separating the two countries, 
but Turkish offi cials refused to grant them entrance. NGOs active in the 
area had a choice. They could do nothing, forcing refugees to stay in the 
mountains, or help them return to Iraq, and risk being killed.
Within four days, 1,500 died from exposure, the rest uncertain what 
would happen if they remained. As in Israel, no NGOs claimed that the 
Turkish government’s response was morally permissible. But helping 
with return seemed preferable, because the Turkish government refused 
to change its policy regardless.15
This same dilemma arose ten years later, in 2001, when three and 
a half million Afghan refugees faced regular detention, deportation 
threats, and extortion in Pakistan and Iran.16 These continue today, as 
one refugee in Pakistan testifi ed in 2017:
In early August . . . the police came to our house . . . [at] about 
4:30 a.m. They entered our house without asking, pushed all the 
women to one side and took all of the men, including me, to the 
5857_Gerver.indd   28 04/10/18   2:53 PM
Coercion 29
police station . . . They held us there all day and did not give us 
water or let us go to the toilet. Our relatives came and paid to 
get us out. In early October, I saw in a newspaper that the police 
would do more search operations and that they were going to put 
Afghans in prison. So we knew we had to leave.17
To leave he turned to UNHCR, and the agency provided him transport 
to Afghanistan, joining hundreds of thousands of refugees similarly 
compelled to repatriate.18 It is not clear whether such refugees ought 
to have been assisted with repatriation. Their choices were involuntary, 
but perhaps an involuntary choice is better than no choice at all.
A similar dilemma is found when states lack the capacity to accept 
refugees. In such cases, states may both deny refugees the right to 
work, and also lack the means to provide them aid to survive. This was 
the case between 1982 and 1984 when Djibouti denied refugees work 
visas and rations, and refugees felt compelled to return to Ethiopia 
with the help of UNHCR.19 In 2014 the Tanzanian government gave 
refugees the choice between living in camps or returning to Burundi 
without access to basic necessities.20 More recently, the Ugandan gov-
ernment has struggled to provide suffi cient food for refugees, compel-
ling some to repatriate home.21 In such cases, we may feel that poor 
states are not blameworthy for failing to provide aid to refugees, but 
there is still a background injustice if wealthier countries could provide 
this aid to poorer states, and refuse to, compelling refugees to leave.22 
In such cases, it remains unclear whether NGOs and the UN should 
help with return.
This dilemma has been especially pronounced in Kenya, where 
refugees confi ned to enclosed camps often seek return to Somalia to 
regain their freedom, despite the risks involved. These refugees evoke 
the Somali proverb laba kala daran mid dooro, which means “choosing 
the best of two bad situations.” As one refugee explained in the early 
2000s: “The confl ict we fl ed [in Somalia] at least we could get out, we 
could move around even if a bullet hits you. And now we miss that . . . 
now we cannot move around. You just sit around.”23
This refugee sought assistance returning from UNHCR, but UNHCR 
had yet to set up a repatriation program. It fi nally did in 2013 when the 
Kenyan government announced that refugee camps would be closed, 
and stern action taken against refugees remaining.24 UNHCR created 
“help desks,” asking refugees whether and why they wished to return 
and, if their choice seemed voluntary, they were given transport back 
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to Somalia.25 In reality, their choices were often involuntary, but per-
haps UNHCR acted ethically if their lives in Kenya would be unlikely 
to improve.
One might suppose that Coercion Dilemmas are not relevant when 
claims for asylum are heard in wealthier countries, where genuine refu-
gees are given residency rights and freedom. Yet, even when claims are 
heard, strict evaluation criteria mean many refugees are denied refugee 
status, especially those fl eeing life-threatening poverty.26 They are then 
detained and wish to repatriate. Some do, with the help of organiza-
tions, and end up again displaced or killed after return.27 Even if one 
believes that states have acted legally according to a strict defi nition of 
international law, it seems unlikely they are acting ethically, and so it 
remains unclear whether organizations should assist with such returns.
Consider, for example, the case of Habibullah, a refugee from 
Afghanistan who boarded a boat in an attempt to reach Australia in 
2001. His boat was intercepted by an Australian naval ship and, accord-
ing to Habibullah and a witness, a naval offi cer placed a gun to his head 
and pulled the trigger, never telling him the gun was not loaded. He 
was traumatized, taken to a detention center, and given a heavy dose of 
sleeping pills rather than psychological care. His condition deteriorated, 
his application for asylum was rejected, and he remained in the camp, 
eventually accepting an IOM fl ight to his home village in Afghanistan. 
Once home he was threatened by a villager who claimed he was a 
Taliban spy, and fl ed to Pakistan shortly after.28 Assuming Habibullah 
was a refugee when attempting to reach Australia, and that he wanted 
to return because of trauma and detention, it was not clear if IOM 
ought to have helped him return. Perhaps IOM made the right decision, 
given the deteriorating conditions he experienced in detention. Perhaps 
it made the wrong decision, given the involuntary nature of his choice.
The Coercion Dilemma is not limited to cases of refugees returning 
home. It is also relevant for IDPs returning from one region to another. 
In 2014 over 2,000 individuals living in the Kiwanja IDP camp in DR 
Congo were left homeless when government offi cials burned their 
shelters to the ground, telling them they must return home. UNHCR 
faced a choice: it could help these IDPs return to their home villages, 
knowing their choices were involuntary and unsafe, or do nothing at all, 
forcing them to live without shelter and security.29 A similar dilemma 
arose in South Africa in 2008 when forty-three refugees and migrants 
were killed by anti-immigrant mobs, thousands more injured, and 
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20,000 displaced by the week’s end. Those who were displaced strug-
gled to access basic necessities. All were classifi ed as IDPs by UNHCR, 
which was unable to provide them safe accommodation where they 
were, but could offer them assistance returning to the neighborhoods 
from which they fl ed. Those choosing to return often had little choice, 
as they needed to return to access life-sustaining businesses.30 It is not 
clear if UNHCR ought to have helped them return, given that their 
choices were involuntary.
The above Coercion Dilemmas have been largely overlooked in dis-
cussions on immigration. Such discussions focus almost entirely on 
state injustices, rather than the dilemmas of organizations providing 
repatriation.31 The few scholars discussing the ethics of UNHCR and 
IOM tend to assume that assisting with a coerced return is, by defi ni-
tion, impermissible.32 Their position is that UNHCR and IOM have a 
“repatriation culture” and use a distorted defi nition of “voluntariness,” 
where a refugee in detention or destitution is considered suffi ciently 
free to consent to return.33 This critique is incomplete. Though the defi -
nition of voluntariness is skewed and the culture of repatriation prob-
lematic, UNHCR and IOM may be helping with involuntary returns 
because doing nothing is worse.
When OBI began its repatriation program in 2010, the Israeli gov-
ernment had yet to detain a signifi cant number of refugees, and had 
yet to prevent them from working, but OBI was still facing a Coercion 
Dilemma. At the time, refugees were denied legal residency, a small 
number were detained, and all were uncertain whether they would be 
deported in the near future.34 They could not apply for refugee status 
and, even if they could, their claims would likely be denied, as Israel 
provides refugee status to only 0.25 per cent of applicants.35
Though conditions were diffi cult in Israel, most did not wish to 
return to South Sudan. The country was part of Sudan until 2011, and 
had only recently emerged from a war which began in 1983, fought 
mainly between southern Sudanese opposition forces, and the ruling 
northern Sudanese forces.36 From 1991, the southern Sudanese forces 
had split into two opposing groups, one mainly from the Dinka ethnic 
group, and the other mainly from the Nuer ethnic group.37 When South 
Sudan achieved independence from northern Sudan in 2011, a coali-
tion government was formed in Juba comprising both Nuer and Dinka 
citizens, but the president stifl ed dissenting voices,38 and inter-ethnic 
violence continued into 2012. That year alone thousands of civilians 
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were killed.39 As a result of the instability, the country lacked basic ser-
vices, including food security and healthcare.40
Given conditions in South Sudan, and given that Israel let South 
Sudanese work in 2011, many refuges stayed in Israel. Vanessa, one 
such refugee, explained why she had initially left South Sudan, and why 
she did not accept OBI’s help to return from Israel in 2011:
I am from Unity State, and we fl ed the war to Khartoum when I 
was a young girl . . . I married there, had four kids, and crossed 
into Israel via Egypt in 2007. [In Israel] I was in prison for half a 
year, but then released, so decided to stay. It was good. I worked, 
at fi rst, in the Renaissance hotel in Tel Aviv. The kids went to 
school.41
But others wished to return, such as Joseph:
My state is Lega State . . . I was born in Khartoum in 1982, but 
came back to South Sudan from 1995 until 2000, so I was familiar 
with Juba. I went to Egypt in 2000, and in 8 August 2005 I went 
to Israel . . . I went to prison for one year, and after one year they 
released us. I worked in a hotel, but could not get an ID, or legally 
start a business. So I saved $20,000. I was in touch with my family 
in Juba, and so asked for help returning.42
Joseph was one of the fi rst refugees to return with the help of OBI. 
At the time, many human rights organizations opposed OBI’s assis-
tance, claiming Joseph and others had few rights, and so their return 
was involuntary.43 In response, OBI hired a refugee rights organization, 
HIAS, to interview each refugee, asking them, “Why do you want to 
return?” If an individual said they were only returning to avoid deten-
tion, their return was viewed as involuntary and not supported.
In total, OBI helped roughly 900 individuals return between 2009 
and 2012.44 Once an asylum seeker left Israel they could not re-enter 
Israeli territory.45 But OBI was convinced that this choice, though irre-
versible, was entirely voluntary.
OBI’s intentions seemed genuinely humanitarian. It was a Chris-
tian humanitarian organization with a strong history of providing food, 
shelter, and medical assistance to all denominations in developing 
countries.46 It had never, until 2010, been involved in repatriation. Nor 
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had HIAS, a humanitarian organization founded in 1881 to assist Jews 
fl eeing pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe, and which later focused 
on helping 3,600 non-Jewish refugees resettle from Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos into the United States.47 HIAS said it opposed repatriation in 
other contexts, refusing to assist with repatriation from Kenya to Soma-
lia due to risks involved.48 In Israel it made an exception, as it could 
conduct individual interviews to ensure there was no coercion.
HIAS and OBI had succeeded to an extent. Of the 128 subjects I 
interviewed, sixty-nine returned because they thought life was better 
in South Sudan, rather than only to avoid diffi cult conditions in Israel. 
However, there was a marked distinction between those who returned 
prior to and after 2012.
That year, thousands of Israeli citizens marched through the streets 
of Tel Aviv, calling for the expulsion of African asylum seekers, described 
by the prime minister as “fl ooding the country”49 and by one politician 
as a “cancer to the body.”50 Legislation was passed to detain asylum 
seekers,51 and all South Sudanese were told they must return or face 
imprisonment.52 Only those with severe medical problems were per-
mitted to remain. Vanessa describes life during this period, and why she 
changed her mind about staying in Israel:
Every day started with a mess. You go outside and they tell you, 
“Go back to your country! Why are you here? Your country has 
money! Go home!” In June they took my husband’s visa and said, 
“We will not give you a new visa.” We were left without work for 
two months. I said, “What? What will I do . . .?” So I thought, 
“I will say thank you to God that we are healthy and go back.”
Vanessa called OBI, which eventually agreed to help her return.53 Hun-
dreds of others soon followed. Of those I interviewed, thirty-seven 
returned to avoid detention, and thirty-six returned partially or wholly 
because they could no longer work, fearing they would lack basic neces-
sities if they stayed. Fourteen left because they feared deportation.
It is not immediately clear whether OBI’s fi rst policy of refusing to 
help with coerced return was better than its second policy of support-
ing such return. Neither was more principled than the other. It may 
seem principled to only help with voluntary returns, but this would 
force refugees to stay in detention. The case demonstrates that the 
dilemmas of repatriation cannot easily be avoided even when working 
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independently from the government, and even with the best of inten-
tions and resources.
2.1.2 Resolving the Dilemma
To resolve the Coercion Dilemma, we must address a pressing ques-
tion: can refugees truly give their consent when faced with coercion? 
In many cases outside the sphere of repatriation, consent may very well 
be valid even if there are only injurious alternatives. A patient is per-
fectly capable of giving consent to life-saving surgery, even though the 
alternative to surgery is death. As such, some philosophers argue that 
cases of “third party coercion” are also cases of valid consent.54 Imagine 
that Abbey threatens to shoot Babu if he does not buy Cathy’s watch. 
Cathy sells Babu her watch because she does not want him shot by 
Abbey. Babu’s consent seems valid for Cathy, even if not for Abbey. Of 
course, Cathy would have an obligation to later give back the money to 
Babu once the threat has subsided, but Cathy has not wronged Babu 
at the time of the transaction and, if she cannot later undo the trans-
action, then she has not wronged Babu even though his consent was 
under duress. One could similarly argue that refugees’ consent is valid 
for repatriation facilitators, even if it is not valid for the government.
However, according to a number of theories, consent would be 
invalid for Cathy if she could easily persuade Abbey to put her gun 
down.55 Cathy should do this, instead of selling her watch. In other 
words, Cathy’s duty is to get Abbey to stop threatening Babu, and there-
fore Babu’s consent is not valid for Cathy. This approach is consistent 
with the Good Samaritan principle, which holds that agents should 
help those in great need, if they easily can. If there is nothing that Cathy 
can do, then Babu’s consent is perfectly valid for her, but not if she can 
easily stop Abbey’s violent threat.
With repatriation to dangerous countries, we may ask if a facilita-
tor can easily raise money for basic necessities and legal aid to avoid 
coercive conditions. If instead it raises money for repatriation, then it 
fails to honor the Good Samaritan principle. Of course, basic necessities 
may be an ongoing cost, while repatriation is a one-off. But if a refugee 
lacks necessities after they have returned, it is unclear if the repatria-
tion facilitator can simply ignore their needs. If they owed them this aid 
before return, an action absolving them of this duty without alleviating 
the need seems unethical.
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In addition to Good Samaritan duties, organizations may have cost-
lier duties. Humanitarian organizations in particular were created to 
protect vulnerable populations, and so should be held to a higher stan-
dard in protecting these populations. They may be morally required to 
lobby for policy changes, provide legal aid, and raise money for neces-
sities. Demanding costly duties from Cathy, by contrast, could infringe 
on her right to a personal life. While organizational staff also have a 
personal life, they have voluntarily agreed to allocate an insulated por-
tion of their lives to the goals of the organization, so their personal lives 
are not infringed.
Some may claim that, though organizations like OBI and HIAS have 
weightier duties to help refugees, semi-governmental organizations do 
not. Such organizations are created to help refugees and governments. 
IOM, for example, states that it is “dedicated to promoting humane and 
orderly migration for the benefi t of all,” including governments hoping 
to decrease the number of refugees within their borders.56 We might 
suppose IOM, when allocating its time and resources, should weigh the 
benefi ts for refugees against the benefi ts for governments. This might 
involve, for example, spending some resources and time lobbying for 
better conditions for refugees, but ensuring there are ample resources 
and time to facilitate returns, even if this comes at the expense of lob-
bying. UNHCR may have similar duties, given that it is funded by states 
and purports to represent states as a UN agency.
Though IOM and UNHCR were created partly to help states, they 
were created to only help in a certain manner. UNHCR was created 
to help states fulfi ll their duties towards refugees fl eeing persecution 
because of their ethnicity, religion, social identity, or political opinion. 
It would be contrary to UNHCR’s mandate if it physically coerced such 
refugees back to a country where they would face persecution, even if this 
advanced states’ interests. By extension, it would be contrary to UNHCR’s 
mandate to help these refugees with repatriation without also helping 
end coercion, even if this would advance states’ interests. A similar claim 
is relevant for IOM, which claims to advance the interests of states in a 
manner consistent with the legal rights of migrants.57 Some migrants are 
refugees according to international law, and so IOM’s mandate requires 
it to try to end the coercive conditions these refugees face.
Many refugees, of course, are not fl eeing persecution, but fl eeing 
general violence, extreme poverty, or natural disasters. UNHCR’s and 
IOM’s offi cial mandates do not require them to prevent their coerced 
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return. Nonetheless, UNHCR and IOM may still have a special duty 
to help prevent their coerced return. This is because agents can have a 
duty to help individuals when they have signifi cant power.58 When an 
agent has power, it has a greater ability to help others, and so may have 
greater duties to help.59 For example, a doctor on a fl ight may have a 
duty to save a life, because she can more easily do so, even if the doctor 
never recited the Hippocratic Oath, and never claimed to be undergo-
ing medical training to help all those in need. If repatriation facilitators 
have a greater ability to lobby for the rights of all refugees – including 
those fl eeing general violence and poverty – they should do so, even if 
this is not in their mandate. At the very least, they ought to work harder 
to protect the rights of refugees than an individual like Cathy, a private 
citizen with less power.
There are situations where repatriation facilitators – whether 
UNHCR, IOM, or NGOs – do work hard to end coercive conditions, 
but fail to create any change. In such cases, assisting with return may be 
legitimate. For example, when Kurdish refugees were trapped between 
Iraq and Turkey, NGOs tried and failed to persuade the Turkish govern-
ment to provide them with asylum. More refugees were likely to die 
from exposure, and so NGOs acted ethically when helping with their 
return. Similarly, had OBI and HIAS worked hard to end detention, but 
failed, perhaps helping with return would have been legitimate, so long 
as South Sudanese nationals were aware of the risks.
This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that helping with 
repatriation does not itself cause governments to expand their use of 
coercion. If there is such a causative link, then further considerations 
become relevant, which I will now address.
2.2 THE CAUSATION DILEMMA
Causation Dilemmas occur when an organization helps refugees repatri-
ate, and this contributes to government coercion. There are four types of 
such dilemmas and, in all four, return should generally not be facilitated, 
with some exceptions.
2.2.1 Simple Counterfactual Causation
In “Simple Counterfactual Causation” an agent causes an event if, had 
the agent not acted as she had, the event would not have occurred 
and, in acting as she did, the outcome did occur.60 In other words, 
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A causes B if A’s actions were necessary for B to occur, and B did in 
fact occur.
If the government is detaining refugees to encourage return, and an 
organization makes return possible, this can motivate the government to 
detain more refugees than it otherwise would. IOM is an example of an 
organization that may have such an impact. Globally, the organization 
visits survival migrants in detention, writes down their details, and tries 
to secure their passports so they can repatriate.61 If governments are only 
detaining refugees so that they repatriate, and refugees are only repatri-
ating because of IOM, then IOM is causally contributing to detention, in 
the sense that its actions are necessary for the detention to occur.
UNHCR may contribute to coercive policies in a similar manner. In 
1994 and 1995 UNHCR began facilitating the repatriation of Rohingya 
refugees from Bangladesh back to Burma. Soon after, the Bangladeshi 
government increased its pressure on refugees to return precisely 
because return was now possible, as it was being funded by UNHCR.62 
Similarly, in 2012, one Israeli Knesset report stated that OBI had estab-
lished that repatriation for South Sudanese was possible, and the gov-
ernment should endorse a more aggressive return policy for those who 
had not yet returned.63
The case of Israel raises an additional complication, overlooked in 
the examples above. OBI was not the only agent facilitating return. The 
government began its own repatriation program in 2012, eventually 
returning thousands of asylum seekers.64 In other countries, UN agen-
cies, multiple private charities, and refugees themselves pay for transport 
home. When there are multiple agents helping with repatriation, then 
one agent pulling out will not stop repatriation, nor stop the coercive 
conditions which lead to repatriation. If existing bodies have the capac-
ity to repatriate all refugees, a single organization may very well not 
causally contribute to coercion. For were it to discontinue its repatriation 
services, refugees would still be able to repatriate at the same rate, via a 
different facilitator. Even in such cases, a given facilitator might still be 
necessary for coercion if other facilitators are incapable of facilitating all 
repatriation. OBI may have increased the number of refugees who could 
return from detention compared to a world where only the government 
provided repatriation. If the government was detaining refugees so more 
would return, and more could return because of OBI, OBI’s actions may 
have been necessary for the government’s rate of detention.
When humanitarian organizations are necessary for coercive poli-
cies – either because they make repatriation possible for all or more 
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refugees – then coercion is not a mere background condition, but is 
dependent on repatriation. This leads to a simple argument for discon-
tinuing repatriation services, related to the Good Samaritan principle. 
Refraining from helping with return is costless. If this costless act of 
omission helps refugees avoid detention, then, as organizations created 
to help others, they should exploit this omission to effi ciently achieve 
their goals.
We might argue that, in some cases, causally contributing to coercion 
does not harm refugees. In my sample, some refugees did not particu-
larly mind that the government threatened to detain them or revoke their 
visas, because they would have returned regardless, for reasons unrelated 
to coercion. Some missed their families, or wished to contribute to the 
development of their country.
Even for these cases, it may be wrong for humanitarian organiza-
tions to help with return, because it is wrong to causally contribute to 
coercive policies, even if those subject to coercion do not feel subjec-
tively worse off. For example, imagine again that Abbey puts a gun to 
Babu’s head, telling him to buy Cathy’s watch, but Babu wanted to buy 
the watch regardless. When Cathy sells her watch, she may be making 
Babu’s life better in some ways, but she is also causally contributing to 
Abbey’s act of raising a gun to another person’s head. In such cases, 
Cathy should refuse to sell Babu her watch if she knows that this refusal 
will make Abbey put her gun down. She should wait until Abbey does 
this, and only then sell Babu her watch.
In a similar way, humanitarian organizations should avoid encourag-
ing governments to detain refugees, as the act of detention is especially 
unjust, even if many refugees would have returned regardless. Repatria-
tion facilitators should wait until the government ends detention, and 
only then agree to help with return.
2.2.2 Causation as Influence
There are instances where an organization, in helping with return, 
is not necessary for coercion, and so does not cause coercion in the 
counterfactual sense. For example, in 1985 UNHCR was considering 
whether to help over 100,000 Tigrayan refugees repatriate from Sudan. 
At the time, the Relief Society of Tigray and the Sudanese Offi ce of the 
Commissioner for Refugees were already helping all wishing to repa-
triate, and so had UNHCR provided repatriation this would have been 
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unlikely to impact the rates of return, or the extent of coercive policies.65 
Similarly, by 2013 the Israeli government had the capacity to repatri-
ate all South Sudanese refugees who wished to return home, and so 
had OBI continued with repatriation this would have been unlikely to 
impact the rate of return nor the government’s coercive policies.
In such cases, facilitators may still be acting wrongly according to 
other criteria. Sometimes, a person acts wrongly by infl uencing an event, 
even if their actions were not necessary for the general event to occur.66
For an example of such a phenomenon, imagine there is an assassin, 
and she pulls her trigger, leading the bullet to shoot out of her barrel 
into the heart of a victim, unjustly killing him on the spot. She also has 
a thousand backup assassins, who are all working independently from 
her, and who would have killed the victim, had she not killed him fi rst. 
As such, she was not necessary for his death, or even almost necessary 
for his death. She still causally contributed to his death if she infl uenced 
the particular way the death transpired.67 This would be the case if, in 
a world without her, the bullet would have fl own in a slightly differ-
ent direction, piercing the victim’s heart in a different place, while in a 
world without other assassins, her bullet would have still fl own in the 
same direction as it really did, piercing the victim’s heart in the same 
way. She causally contributed to the event by being necessary for the 
way the event transpired, even though she was not necessary for the 
general event to occur.
In such cases, even if the assassin causally contributed to the event 
by infl uencing it, we might still claim that she did not infl uence it in 
a way that harmed the victim; he would have been killed regardless. 
Nonetheless, as noted above, we have duties to avoid causally contrib-
uting to injustice, even if the victims are made no worse off from the 
causal contribution. If infl uence is a form of causation, then the assassin 
may be acting wrongly by infl uencing the injustice of killing another 
human being, regardless of whether the victim is worse off compared to 
a world where the assassin does not pull her trigger. In a similar sense, 
a single organization may be wrongly causing an unjust event by infl u-
encing it, even if the general injustice would still have occurred had it 
not provided repatriation.
In cases where we causally contribute to injustice by infl uencing the 
event, such causal infl uence may still be justifi ed if the infl uence is sig-
nifi cantly helpful for the victim. The assassin, for example, may know 
she can more accurately shoot the victim directly at the center mass of 
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his body, leading to a quicker death compared to the backup assassins. If 
the assassin is in no way responsible for the presence of other assassins, 
and is shooting the victim only to reduce suffering, pulling the trigger 
may be morally justifi ed. In a similar manner, an organization can jus-
tifi ably help with repatriation in cases where, though the help causally 
contributes to unjust coercion, it can also ensure a much safer return 
than would otherwise take place. For example, an organization may be 
justifi ed in helping Ethiopians repatriate from Saudi Arabia, given that 
Ethiopians attempting to repatriate on their own often rely on unsafe 
smugglers.68 It remains the case that, unless an organization is quite 
certain that its actions signifi cantly help refugees, it should avoid help-
ing with repatriation, to avoid causally contributing to injustice.
2.2.3 Uncertainty
In some cases, a given organization has essentially no infl uence. It is nei-
ther necessary for coercion, nor does it infl uence coercion or the safety 
of return. This may be the case if there are multiple organizations, each 
one providing equally safe repatriation, such that if one pulled out, the 
coercion and safety of return would be the same. Similarly, there may be 
only one organization, but the government is detaining refugees both 
to encourage return, and also to placate anti-refugee protesters, or to 
deter new refugees from arriving in the country. We might suppose that 
an organization assisting with return here does not causally contribute 
to coercive policies. For had it not helped with repatriation, there would 
still be other decisive reasons for the government to detain refugees in 
the exact same manner. In such cases, an organization may still have a 
strong reason to avoid helping with return.
An agent has a reason to avoid an act if she subjectively suspects 
that her act may increase the probability of a harmful event occurring, 
even if she is not ultimately necessary for the outcome nor infl uencing 
the outcome. Imagine two assassins pull their triggers at the same time, 
both bullets fl ying out their barrels simultaneously, piercing the vic-
tim’s heart in the same location at the same moment, such that neither 
assassin infl uenced his death.69 One reason that each assassin acted 
wrongly is that, at the time she pulled her trigger, she could never be 
100 per cent certain the other would pull her trigger too. In choosing to 
pull her own trigger, she increased the probability, in her mind, of the 
death occurring.
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When there are multiple facilitators helping with return, then each 
can never be 100 per cent certain that the others will make return 
possible. In choosing to help with repatriation, they risk increasing 
the chances of repatriation occurring, and so the chances of coercion 
occurring. Similarly, when the government has multiple reasons for 
using coercive policies, an organization can never know for certain that 
the government will still detain refugees in the event that repatriation 
is no longer a possibility. As such, repatriation should be discontinued, 
so that organizations are certain they are not causally contributing to 
injustice.
Nonetheless, an exception may be made if the government has a 
large number of reasons for detaining refugees, such that detention 
would almost certainly continue even if repatriation ceased. Helping 
with such coerced returns is not ideal, but may be morally permissible, 
as the causal impact on coercion is unlikely, and the benefi ts signifi cant 
if the return is safer than alternatives.
We have, as such, reached a general conclusion: Coerced repatriation 
should generally only be facilitated if it does not signifi cantly contribute 
to coercive policies, and if all efforts have been made to fi rst stop the 
coercive policies. Such repatriation is permissible on balance, assuming 
refugees are aware of the risks. When they are not aware of the risks, a 
distinct dilemma arises, to be addressed in the next chapter.
2.2.4 Causing Coercion of Others
There is a fi nal version of the Causation Dilemma. In many cases 
organizations helping particular refugees repatriate do not contribute 
to the detention of these particular refugees, but contribute to the 
detention of other refugees. In 1994 when UNHCR helped Rohingya 
refugees repatriate from camps, the assistance encouraged the Ban-
gladesh government to force other refugees into enclosed camps, 
but the assistance did not harm the actual refugees repatriating; they 
would likely still be in camps had they remained.70 UNHCR therefore 
faced a dilemma: it could discontinue repatriation, forcing refugees 
currently in the country to remain in camps, or help these refugees 
repatriate, encouraging the Bangladesh government to force other 
refugees into camps. In the UK, IOM faced a similar dilemma when, 
in assisting with repatriation from detention, it may have legitimized 
the UK asylum policy, encouraging the detention of other refugees.71 
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Though it may have encouraged the detention of other refugees, 
refusing to help with repatriation would harm the refugees who were 
already detained.
OBI fi rst faced this dilemma in 2012 when it helped the fi rst ref-
ugee repatriate from detention. Once OBI helped him repatriate, the 
government likely detained a new refugee, fi lling the prison cells to 
maximum capacity. In this case, OBI faced a choice: it could do nothing, 
forcing refugees currently in detention to remain in detention, or help 
these refugees repatriate, freeing up detention cells, contributing to the 
detention of other refugees.
In Israel, human rights organizations argued that OBI ought to do 
nothing. Helping with repatriation set back the interests of refugees as 
a whole, even if particular refugees were better off in returning home. 
OBI responded that doing nothing would use refugees as pawns for 
the larger aims of refugee rights, and it was wrong to use individuals 
as pawns for these ends. They argued that a refugee who wished to 
repatriate had a right to do so, and to deny them this right would be 
inconsistent with the values of humanitarian assistance.72 Humanitar-
ian assistance ought not to simply calculate the aggregate benefi t for 
refugees, but ought to treat each refugee as ends in themselves, even if 
doing so contributes to injustices towards others.
This same dilemma arises in the fi ctional case of Cathy. Imagine, as 
before, that Abbey puts a gun to Babu’s head, telling him to buy Cathy’s 
watch. If Cathy sells her watch, Abbey will then threaten hundreds of 
others in the same manner, many of whom will lack the funds to buy 
her watch, and potentially be shot themselves. It is not clear whether 
Cathy should protect Babu by selling her watch, or protect all future 
potential victims by refusing to sell him her watch.
While we cannot entirely resolve this variant of the Causation 
Dilemma, one guiding consideration is the role that various agents 
hold. Some agents hold the role of general advocates. General advocates 
strive to help all members of a group. If Cathy were a member of an 
organization aiming to help the victims of Abbey’s gun-wielding tac-
tics, then Cathy would be a general advocate, and ought to take actions 
which mitigate Abbey’s coercion against all, rather than only Babu. If 
Cathy were certain that Abbey would threaten others if she sold Babu 
her watch, then Cathy would have one reason to refrain from selling 
Babu her watch.
In contrast to general advocates, some agents claim to be acting as per-
sonal advocates. A personal advocate helps particular individuals obtain 
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rights. They are morally permitted to prioritize the rights of those they 
represent over others. A lawyer is a personal advocate, and permitted 
to prioritize her wrongfully accused client even if, in doing so, she frees 
her client and another individual is wrongfully accused instead. She is 
permitted to represent her client partly because the client is permitted to 
advocate for himself. Given that the client is unable to advocate for him-
self, having little knowledge of the law, he has outsourced this task to the 
lawyer, and the lawyer is acting permissibly in prioritizing his interests. 
If Cathy is a personal advocate for Babu, she is permitted to prioritize his 
interests over the interests of others. Just as we feel Babu has a right to 
protect himself from the fulfi llment of Abbey’s threat, he has a right to 
Cathy’s assistance to avoid the fulfi llment of Abbey’s threat.
Though a personal advocate is permitted to prioritize the interests of 
those they represent, this prioritization is not absolute. If a lawyer will 
certainly contribute to wrongful accusations against dozens of others, 
she has a weighty reason to refrain from representing those wrong-
fully accused. If Cathy is certain that Abbey will continue her coercion 
against thousands of others, then Cathy ought to think twice about 
helping Babu.
Many repatriation facilitators are general advocates. UNHCR has an 
explicit mandate to help all forced to fl ee their homes due to persecu-
tion, and tends to extend assistance to those fl eeing famine, natural 
disasters, and general violence.73 General advocates like UNHCR ought 
to avoid assisting particular refugees at the expense of other equally 
vulnerable refugees. This is because, by its own standards, it claims to 
be instituting policies which can best protect all, rather than particular 
refugees. If UNHCR is a general advocate, it failed in its duties in 1994 
when it helped some Rohingya refugees repatriate from detention, 
contributing to the detention of others. It ought not to have provided 
relief to some at the expense of others.
In contrast to UNHCR, OBI presented itself as a personal advo-
cate serving the particular refugees seeking repatriation. If OBI was 
a personal advocate it was permitted to offer a given refugee repa-
triation even if another refugee would likely be detained as a result. 
This permission was nonetheless not absolute: were it to learn that 
a signifi cant number of other refugees would be detained as a result 
of its assistance to some refugees, it would have a weighty reason to 
discontinue repatriation assistance.
IOM, to a lesser extent, also presents itself as a personal advo-
cate, helping particular asylum seekers repatriate. IOM has defended 
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its repatriation by appealing to the interests of individuals: it helps 
particular individuals repatriate because this is what these particu-
lar individuals desire. Indeed, historically IOM has been dismissed 
as a “travel agency.”74 Just as a travel agency arranges fl ights for one’s 
customers, and does not claim to be improving mobility for all, IOM 
arranges return fl ights for refugees, rather than improving rights for 
all. If a travel agency has a right to sell tickets to individuals wishing 
to return home, even if this contributes to the detention of others, 
perhaps IOM has a right to give tickets to refugees wishing to return 
home, even if this contributes to the detention of others. As with OBI, 
however, IOM is not morally permitted to be a personal advocate 
regardless of its effects on others. If it learns that helping some indi-
viduals repatriate contributes to a major increase in the detention of 
others, it ought to reconsider its repatriation policies.
2.3 CONCLUSION
When a refugee is detained, her choices are far from voluntary. Given 
that this is the case, humanitarian organizations have two options, 
neither ideal. They can help with an unsafe return, and free refugees 
from detention, or refuse to help, forcing refugees to stay. In reality, this 
dilemma comes in two forms, requiring two distinct policies.
In some cases, the government will arrest refugees, force them into 
detention, or deny them visas regardless of whether they return. In 
these cases humanitarian organizations should lobby for an end to such 
policies, and appeal to donors to provide food security and shelter. If 
they fail, it may be ethical to facilitate return, so long as refugees are 
aware of the risks.
In other cases, repatriation causes coercion. Facilitators are not mere 
third parties, as their actions impact government policies, intentionally 
or not. The more refugees are able to repatriate, the more the govern-
ment will try coercing them to repatriate. In such cases, organizations 
should not help with return, unless their assistance has only a small 
impact on coercion, and ensures a much safer return than would oth-
erwise take place. When assistance contributes to the coercion of other 
refugees, rather than the refugees returning home, then organizations 
who claim to be general advocates should discontinue their assistance, 
while those working as personal advocates should ensure their impact 
on others is minimal.
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In light of these conclusions, repatriation facilitators ought to 
change their current policies and practices. Today, facilitators spend 
little of their budget on lobbying for the end of coercive conditions, 
and more on fl ights, stipends, and coordinating return. This is partly 
because humanitarian organizations often rely on government grants, 
at times competing with other organizations to repatriate refugees at 
the lowest possible cost, at the fastest possible rate. But even organiza-
tions who raise their own funds, such as OBI, continue allocating their 
entire budget to repatriation, feeling pressure from refugees who want 
to return as quickly as possible to avoid detention. Though refugees 
have good reason to return quickly, repatriation facilitators have good 
reasons to slow down return, freeing up resources for lobbying, and 
dissuading governments from detaining refugees. Such a policy shift for 
organizations may mean fewer refugees can return, but fewer may want 
to, if conditions improve in the host country.
When George called OBI in 2012, it might have implemented a dif-
ferent policy in light of these conclusions. It might have attempted to 
persuade the government to provide George residency rights, or to pro-
vide greater residency rights for South Sudanese nationals in general. 
OBI could also have waited to facilitate his return, to see whether the 
government would eventually free him from detention, seeing that he 
had no way of going back.
For George, and millions of others, immigration control involves 
not just force, but assistance. How organizations provide assistance can 
impact how governments respond, and how refugees react. If we are to 
have a fuller picture of what an ethical refugee policy entails, we must 
shift our focus away from the policeman who followed George home, 
and onto NGOs who sit in small offi ces, answering calls from refugees 
who feel they need help returning, and quickly. While the urgency is 
clear, the best policy is not.
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Chapter 3
MISINFORMATION
In 2009 the director of OBI landed in Juba and met with ministers in 
the South Sudanese parliament. She then traveled to secondary towns, 
taking photographs of clinics, markets, and schools along the way. After 
several weeks she fl ew back to Israel and showed these images on 
PowerPoint slides to South Sudanese refugees in a community center, 
informing them that South Sudan had housing, security, free schools, 
universal healthcare, and income-generating opportunities.1
By 2011 several dozen families accepted OBI’s assistance to repa-
triate. After return, most were without reliable shelter, medical care, 
regular meals, or school. Most notably, they lacked clean water, and 
had to drink from contaminated rural wells in villages, or streams that 
fl ow through mounds of waste in Juba. Some lived off the unreliable 
charity of distant relatives, or the occasional kind stranger in teashops 
that dot the streets of South Sudan. While a small number started 
small businesses, they mostly failed. An unknown number died from 
illness or ethnic-based violence, and the majority were displaced 
within two years.2
It is widely acknowledged that, if an agent provides a high-risk offer, 
she must disclose the known risks of this offer. A surgeon must disclose 
known risks about surgery, a fi reworks manufacturer must disclose 
known risks about fi reworks, and the military must disclose known 
risks of joining the military. But though known risks must be disclosed, 
it is not clear what risks must be known. OBI did disclose what it knew, 
but perhaps it ought to have known more, conducting more rigorous 
research while in South Sudan.
To establish if this is true, we must establish when agents providing 
high-risk offers have duties to learn the risks of their offers. In some 
cases, it seems agents have no such duties. If I book a fl ight to Somalia, 
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my airline needn’t tell me the risks of traveling to Somalia. While some 
agents do have responsibilities to learn about risks, it is not clear when 
such responsibilities arise.
This ambiguity has serious implications for repatriation, and has 
been largely overlooked in broader debates on immigration. These 
debates overwhelmingly focus on when it is wrong to deport or detain 
immigrants, rather than on when it is wrong to misinform immi-
grants.3 But misinforming immigrants, including refugees, has been 
common practice throughout the past three decades, as seen in the 
return of refugees to Uganda, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.4 In 
these cases, individuals returned who would have stayed had they 
known the risks. It remains unclear who had a responsibility to dis-
close the risks, if anyone.
In Section 3.1 I describe “Misinformation Cases.” These are cases 
where repatriation facilitators provide false information on countries 
of origin. In Section 3.2 I argue that, when certain conditions are met, 
facilitators are culpable for the resulting misinformed repatriation. In 
Section 3.3 I discuss “Omission Cases,” where facilitators omit informa-
tion, rather than explicitly misinform. I will argue that omitting informa-
tion is generally wrong in the same sorts of cases where misinforming is 
wrong. In Section 3.4 I will describe “Relevancy Cases,” where facilita-
tors fail to disclose the risks of repatriating, but where refugees claim 
they would have repatriated regardless. In some such cases facilitators 
still wrong those they fail to inform. Finally, there is an “intent question” 
which cuts across the above three cases. If facilitators are unaware they 
are misinforming refugees, it seems they are not intentionally misin-
forming refugees. If there is no intent, perhaps there is no wrong. I shall 
address this question in Section 3.5 before concluding in Section 3.6.
Before I begin, a brief note on my approach.
I shall primarily focus on whether repatriation facilitators – including 
members of governmental and non-governmental bodies – are culpa-
ble for misinforming refugees. I shall assume an individual is culpable if 
she has failed to fulfi ll duties and does so intentionally. An agent does 
something intentionally if she is aware of what she does,5 has control 
over what she does,6 and uses this control to bring about certain desired 
aims.7 For example, if I am aware that I take a watch that I have a duty 
to not take, and I have control over my hand as it picks up the watch, 
and I pick it up with the aim of wearing a new accessory, then I have the 
relevant awareness, control, and aim for intent. In Sections 3.1–3.4, my 
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focus will be on establishing whether facilitators failed to fulfi ll duties to 
fi nd information. I shall assume that, if they failed in their duties, they 
had the relevant intent for culpability. Only in Section 3.5 do I consider 
the objection that, even if they failed to disclose information, they did 
not intend such a failure, and so were not culpable.
In focusing on culpability for misinformation, the subject of coercion 
is relevant. I wish to explore whether, if coercing someone to accept a 
service is impermissible, there is an obligation to fi nd information on 
the risks of the service. Of course, there is disagreement over when 
coercing refugees to repatriate is impermissible, and by extension there 
may be disagreement over when informing refugees is obligatory. Some 
believe states should only avoid deporting those fl eeing persecution, 
others believe states should avoid deporting anyone whose life will be 
at risk, and still others believe states should avoid deporting anyone at 
all.8 As in the last chapter, I assume states should not deport anyone 
fl eeing life-threatening circumstances, so long as states have the capac-
ity to accept such individuals. As before, my general theory on misin-
formation is compatible with other theories, including the stance that 
only those fl eeing persecution should not be deported, and the stance 
that nobody should be deported. My focus is not on when coercion is 
wrong but whether, if coercion is wrong due to risks, information on 
these risks should be disclosed.
3.1 MISINFORMING REFUGEES
Misinformation cases arise when facilitators fail to gather data to deter-
mine risks of repatriation. As a result, they provide false information to 
refugees, and these refugees believe a falsehood they otherwise would 
not, accepting repatriation they otherwise would not.
Such was the case in 1997 when the German government told 
Bosnian refugees they would receive housing, employment, and other 
services upon return, none of which materialized.9 In 2001 Russian 
offi cials persuaded IDPs in Ingushetia that returning to Chechnya was 
safe, and many returned to insecurity and homelessness, with at least 
one man shot dead soon after arrival.10 Two years later UNHCR told 
Afghan refugees living in Iran that it was safe to return, and refugees 
returned in light of this information, immediately facing violent attacks 
on the border.11 Soon after IOM in Norway told Iraqi refugees that there 
were income-generating activities in Iraq. They returned as a result, 
and found few job opportunities, many lacking food and shelter a year 
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later.12 In Israel, the Ministry of Interior set up a repatriation program in 
2012, helping roughly 6,000 asylum seekers repatriate either to Sudan 
and Eritrea, or accept resettlement to Rwanda or Uganda. It told refu-
gees they would receive asylum in Rwanda and Uganda, but they never 
did.13 More recently, in 2017 aid agencies in Kenya told refugees they 
would receive healthcare, education, and food aid upon returning to 
Somalia, none of which materialized.14 They also promised security, as 
a father of fi ve Ali Haji testifi es: 
As opposed to what we were told, what we found here is all 
about insecurity incidents during the day and gangs preying into 
our camps to rob us of the little things we were given before.15
Individuals like Ali Haji demonstrate that, even if refugees are return-
ing to their own countries of origin, they do not necessarily know a 
great deal about these countries. This is especially true for refugees who 
have lived their entire adult lives abroad. Such was the case for Somali 
refugees living in Kenya, and South Sudanese refugees living in Sudan, 
Egypt, and Israel. Of the South Sudanese refugees I interviewed who 
returned from Israel, seven subjects were from Unity State, a region 
they had last lived in as small children, and a region they knew little 
about. While some were aware that approximately 140,000 had been 
displaced in Unity State the year they returned in 2012,16 an estimated 
death toll has never been publicized in this region.17 I also interviewed 
twenty-three subjects who returned to Upper Nile, three to Abyei, and 
one to Warap State. All were returning to areas where tens of thousands 
had been displaced a year prior, and at least hundreds had been killed, 
but the precise number of displaced and killed remained unknown.18 
Ten returning were from Jonglei, an area with slightly more complete 
data, but still sparse. One estimate states that 200,000 were displaced in 
Jonglei, and at least 2,700 civilians killed in 2011 to 2012, but the precise 
number of deaths was never confi rmed.19 Seven returnees were from 
the town of Akobo in Jonglei, where between 250 and 1,000 civilians 
were killed between 2011 and 2012, but the precise number never con-
fi rmed. Importantly, the total populations of Jonglei and Akobo have 
never been counted in a reliable census, so an individual refugee could 
not have known the odds of being killed after returning.20
It was not just information on mortality rates that was missing when 
refugees returned from Israel. The World Bank and the International 
Labor Organization offered no unemployment statistics on South 
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Sudan when most returned,21 and Médecins Sans Frontières could not 
provide precise locations of health clinics in South Sudan.
Given how little information was available about risks, I asked sub-
jects why they returned. Most responded that it was precisely because 
they did not know the risks that they returned, feeling unknown risks 
of returning were preferable to known risks of remaining. As Vanessa 
explains on her return to Juba:
I was in prison for six months in Israel. I didn’t like it. If I don’t 
know what it’s like in South Sudan, but I know I hated prison in 
Israel, I would prefer to go to South Sudan . . . it might have been 
worse, but it might have been better.22
Vanessa is from the Dinka tribe, but grew up among Nuer, and speaks 
the languages of both tribes fl uently. Two years after her return, Dinka 
militias came to her home, believing she was Nuer. She fl ed, returning 
two days later to fi nd her furniture and clothes stolen. “When we come 
home,” she explains, “people on the street look at us. They don’t ask 
questions. They don’t know what tribe I’m from.” Today, she does not 
regret returning, but others do, wishing they had stayed in Israel, even 
if this meant being detained. They felt life in South Sudan was far more 
diffi cult than expected.
When the OBI director began helping South Sudanese repatriate, 
she was aware that some might be uninformed. She felt the same when 
helping Sudanese refugees repatriate, paying for their fl ights to Juba, 
and allowing them to travel onwards to Khartoum and Darfur. The 
government of Sudan has a policy of detaining and executing those 
who have been to Israel, and many may not have been aware of the 
risks of execution.23 The OBI director also felt that she should not be the 
agent determining if refugees were informed of risks, as she had a con-
fl ict of interest: She wanted to impress donors by demonstrating that a 
large number of refugees were returning, and this may have impacted 
her ability to objectively determine informed consent. She hired HIAS 
instead. Because HIAS had a history of lobbying for refugee rights, she 
felt it could be trusted to critically evaluate if a refugee knew little about 
Sudan or South Sudan. HIAS interviewed each refugee, and if it felt a 
refugee knew little about their rights in Israel, and little about Sudan or 
South Sudan, it would tell this to OBI, who would then refuse to help 
them repatriate.24
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This policy was ultimately ineffective, as HIAS staff appeared to know 
little about Sudan or South Sudan, and so largely failed to determine 
if individuals were uninformed about the risks of returning. The staff’s 
training manual has only a very short page on the history of Sudan 
and South Sudan, and some information seems to lack any sources. 
For example, the manual states, “Although South Sudan . . . might not 
have the same services as we have in Israel, their family is a signifi cant 
factor for positive mental health.” It was not clear this was the case. 
Many I interviewed after return found their extended family unhelpful, 
and often emotionally harmful, largely ignoring them on the road and 
in their homes. The manual also states, “Many applicants might not be 
aware of the entire situation in Sudan. Instead, they might only know 
about the circumstances in their village. This is OK.” In reality, this was 
often not OK, as information about urban centers was essential for ref-
ugees unable to fi nd employment or basic services in their rural villages.
To learn about the extent and content of misinformation, I asked 
refugees who had already returned what information they recalled 
having prior to their return. I also asked them how they had this 
knowledge, and whether they felt the information was true after 
returning. I then coded interviews for general categories of misinfor-
mation and the sources of this information.
Table 3.1 describes the fi ndings from these interviews. The rows 
describe different pieces of information provided to refugees, and the 
columns describe the sources of this information, including the police, 
NGOs, the media, and so forth. As noted, thirty-six of 128 respondents 
recall being told they would be detained indefi nitely if they stayed, 
when this was unlikely for small children and mothers.25 Sixty-eight 
subjects recall being told that South Sudan was a safe country. The 
majority learned this from the media or friends and family, but nine 
said they were told this by OBI or the UN, neither of which mentioned 
continuous ethnic-based fi ghting.26
When interviewing subjects, I was aware that some respondents 
may be misrepresenting what they were told prior to returning, because 
they were disappointed with their return. While this was a possibility, 
it is likely that most were telling the truth, as those who were satis-
fi ed with their return recalled being told very similar misinformation 
to those who were disappointed with their return. Furthermore, to 
confi rm the accuracy of responses, I also interviewed the repatriation 
facilitators themselves, asking staff members what they recall telling 
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refugees prior to returning. Though most recall saying nothing, in line 
with the policy of asking refugees to fi nd information themselves, the 
OBI director recalled telling parents that their children would be able 
to access free healthcare,27 when reliable healthcare was rarely found 
in secondary towns. This was possibly the most problematic of the 
misinformation, as post-return illnesses were the most likely cause of 
death in the fi rst two years, with at least seven dying of malaria within 
the fi rst three months.28 Of the forty-eight children whose conditions 
I could confi rm, three died from illnesses, representing over 6 per cent 
of my sample. The total percentage who died was likely higher, given 
that I was unable to reach the most remote areas with even poorer 
healthcare.
In addition to telling refugees there was healthcare, OBI told refu-
gees there was security and food. By 2014, I learned of one returnee 
killed in crossfi re during the war, and four killed because of their eth-
nicity, including two children, aged three and fi ve, shot at gunpoint. 
There were most likely more I never heard about, due to survivorship 
bias in my sample. Displacement was also common, and of the 136 
returnees whose conditions I could confi rm,29 thirty-two were of the 
Nuer ethnic group, and all from this group had fl ed militias from the 
Dinka ethnic group. We might suppose that the war was unpredict-
able ahead of time, but twenty-four of these individuals suffered less 
from the war than the general poverty in South Sudan, having no 
income or family support before fl eeing to IDP camps. All lived off 
one meal per day, mostly consisting of corn meal, failing to obtain 
the basic nutrients necessary for survival according to World Health 
Organization standards.30 As of 2014, thirty-seven individuals were 
still living in South Sudan and not displaced, but nineteen had no 
income and lacked food security. Twenty-fi ve subjects had left South 
Sudan, and all except for two were without employment, basic medi-
cal care, or food security.
For comparison, I also conducted interviews with individuals who 
returned, or were about to return, to Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, 
Colombia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Their return had been partly 
facilitated by IOM, which provided me their contact details.31 As with 
South Sudanese who returned, I asked respondents what they recall 
being told prior to returning, who told them this information, and 
whether this information seemed true after they returned. I then coded 
the interviews for the types of misinformation, the sources of informa-
tion, and post-return conditions.
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When comparing the data from all groups, including the South Suda-
nese returnees, I found that those groups which faced the poorest infor-
mation prior to returning also faced the most risks after returning. As 
noted in Table 3.2, a large number of South Sudanese were misinformed 
prior to returning, and a large number died or were living in extreme pov-
erty after returning. Those returning to Ethiopia, Nigeria, Guinea, Togo, 
and Colombia were slightly less likely to be misinformed, and less at risk 
of displacement and being killed. Those returning to Thailand and the 
Philippines were never misinformed, and never displaced or killed. Due 
to the small sample, there is a limit to how much we can conclude from 
this comparison, but even within South Sudan there was a similar cor-
relation between poor information and the risks faced after returning. 
Those returning with more information, especially from family members 
who had never left South Sudan, were the least likely to be displaced or 
without a job once they arrived in their hometowns or villages.
It is not clear why South Sudanese were less informed, but one obvi-
ous reason is that South Sudan is a more volatile country compared to 
other countries of origin. Due to this volatility, it would have been dif-
fi cult before 2013 to predict the future of South Sudan, and so diffi cult 
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to gain accurate information. However, as noted above, most of the 
respondents were misinformed not about unexpected events, such as 
war, but about general poverty, food insecurity, and lack of healthcare, 
all ongoing prior to 2013.
A more likely explanation for why South Sudanese were less 
informed is that there was less available information on South Sudan, 
precisely because it was risky to conduct research in the country. Even 
in my own research, I was far less likely to visit unsafe and remote areas, 
such as Bor, where ethnic cleansing was especially widespread in 2011 
and 2012, limiting my research to the capital and safer secondary towns.
Given that refugees were given inaccurate information prior to 
returning, it remains unclear if repatriation facilitators ought to have 
found more information. Perhaps not; refugees should be the agents 
responsible for gathering information. But maybe repatriation facilita-
tors have some responsibilities to gather information. Whether they do 
depends on a number of considerations.
3.2 WHEN MUST FACILITATORS DISCLOSE RISKS?
Whether facilitators have a duty to know about risks is dependent, 
fi rstly, on costs. If fi nding information is costless, then facilitators ought 
to fi nd this information. This is obvious, but important to state, as 
NGOs like OBI could have easily disclosed public data on health statis-
tics and education in South Sudan.32 Similarly, UNHCR in Kenya could 
have easily presented refugees with its own reports on the conditions 
in Somalia, helping ensure refugees like Ali Haji were more informed 
before returning.33
When information is not available on countries of origin, govern-
ments could permit refugees to spend time in their home countries 
before returning. This might involve permitting refugees to repatriate 
for a year or two, and then allowing them to return to the host country 
if they fail to access security and other basic necessities. For example, 
in the 1990s Sweden, France, and the UK helped refugees return to 
Bosnia, and allowed them to re-enter their territories in the event of 
an emergency.34 This ensured that, even if refugees were misinformed 
about risks in Bosnia, they had a way of mitigating risks by returning 
to host states. On a more limited scale the UN provided refugees in 
Tanzania transport to Burundi to see what conditions were like, later 
re-entering Tanzania to report on these conditions to other refugees.35 
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Informally, Lebanon sometimes permits Syrian refugees who returned 
home to again re-enter Lebanon. One such refugee describes his expe-
rience with such a return:
From the Lebanese border to Aleppo [Syria], I had to pay a $100 
bribe . . . I had packed a food bag for my sister: tea, coffee, pow-
dered milk, and so on. But once I arrived at Aleppo, my suitcase 
was empty because at every checkpoint on the road they took 
something. Our apartment could be rehabilitated with some 
work, but it is too expensive and there is almost no electricity. 
Our shop was destroyed and looted.
After seeing that his shop was destroyed and looted, this refugee decided 
to re-enter Lebanon where he and his family could access employment, 
school, and a stipend from UNHCR.36
Unfortunately, permitting refugees to visit is often impossible or 
ineffective. It is impossible when humanitarian organizations are the 
ones facilitating return, and unable to persuade governments to per-
mit refugees to visit. Even when governments permit refugees to visit, 
this is ineffective when refugees’ lives will be at risk even during these 
short visits, and governments lack information to disclose the risks of 
short visits. Importantly, short visits are often poor replacements for 
information on long-term risks. In such cases, it is not clear whether 
governments and organizations have a duty to fi nd information, given 
the high costs of obtaining it.
We might suppose organizations do have such a duty, derived from 
their duty of care. As argued in the previous chapter, NGOs, IOM, and 
UNHCR were created precisely to help vulnerable populations, and so 
should do more than what is costless. But governments may claim to 
have no such duty of care, and merely a responsibility to protect those 
who choose to stay. This is because governments, unlike many humani-
tarian organizations, were not created specifi cally to protect vulnerable 
populations. They were created, some might claim, to help those within 
their borders. This merely requires them to treat refugees the same way 
they treat citizens, providing them with visas, freedom from detention, 
and equal rights before the law. Just as governments needn’t gather and 
disclose information to residents every time they fl y abroad, governments 
needn’t disclose information to refugees every time they repatriate.
Even if governments do not have a substantial duty of care towards 
refugees in the manner of humanitarian organizations, they may still 
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have a duty to fi nd information for three additional reasons. The fi rst 
two are relatively weak, but the last is strong.
3.2.1 Harm
One reason concerns harm. If one is able to fi nd information and does 
not, and this causes harm, perhaps one is culpable for the resultant 
harm.37 If I buy fi sh from a store that buys from a producer that uses 
slave labor, and buying the fi sh reinforces slavery, and I could have 
found this out, then I am partly blameworthy for my ignorance. Offi cials 
may similarly be causing harm through their ignorance, misinforming 
refugees and causing them to repatriate to unsafe countries.
But it is not clear that we are culpable whenever we fail to fi nd infor-
mation we are able to fi nd, if fi nding information is very diffi cult. If I 
purchase fi sh, I may have a duty to read available research on labor 
conditions in foreign countries, but it is not clear that I must fl y to these 
countries in the absence of full data, and conduct my own in-depth 
study. It is not enough to establish that misinformation causes harm. It 
is also necessary to establish whether we have a duty to fi nd informa-
tion to prevent harm.
There is another reason we might suppose governments have a duty 
to fi nd information.
3.2.2 Ability
In the broader philosophical literature on consent, it is largely presumed 
that, if information is costly and there is no duty of care, then agents 
may still have a duty to disclose relevant information they know.38 If I am 
selling you my car, and I know it has faulty brakes, I should tell you this, 
because I have this information and you do not. In the cases of repatria-
tion, there is no such asymmetry of information – all know little about 
countries of origin – but there is an asymmetry in the ability to obtain 
new information. Governments have greater resources than refugees, 
and are more able to fi nd information in areas that are diffi cult to reach.
This consideration may be relevant, but it would require demonstrat-
ing that agents really do have greater duties to fi nd information when it 
is easier for them to fi nd it. It is not clear they do. If I am a car mechanic 
selling you a car, and could run a test you are not able to run, it seems 
unfair to claim that I have a duty to run this test while another car seller, 
who is not a mechanic, does not. Even if asymmetric knowledge creates 
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a duty to disclose what one knows, it does not follow that asymmetric 
ability to obtain knowledge creates a duty to know.
There is a more plausible reason why governments have duties to 
fi nd and disclose information.
3.2.3 General Duties
Sometimes we have a duty to know information in order to fulfi ll more 
general duties. Drivers, for example, have duties to look in their rear-
view mirrors to know if anyone is behind them, fulfi lling their general 
duties to avoid collisions.39 Drivers might also have duties to inspect 
their car brakes annually, similarly to avoid collisions with other cars or 
pedestrians. Sometimes, when we have a duty to know information to 
fulfi ll general duties, this information must be disclosed to others. If I 
have a duty to know whether my car brakes are faulty, and I want to sell 
you my car, I should tell you if the brakes are faulty. It is not that I must 
know about the faulty brakes in order to tell you. Rather, I must know 
about the brakes because I have a duty to avoid collisions, and once I 
know this information, I have a duty to disclose it in a subsequent sale.40 
If I am negligent, and fail to have my brakes inspected, and then sell you 
my car without telling you the brakes are faulty, I am partly blamewor-
thy for your decision to buy my car without full information. It would 
seem a poor excuse to tell you, “I didn’t know about the brakes!” if I had 
a previous duty to know about the brakes.
We may apply similar reasoning to repatriation. Governments have 
general duties to know about ethnic cleansing and genocides in foreign 
countries, derived from their “Responsibility to Protect” others from 
great harm, as outlined in the 2005 UN World Summit.41 States also 
must know about suffering in other countries to help alleviate global 
suffering more generally, at least to an extent. For example, govern-
ments have a duty to know about famine in South Sudan, because only 
by knowing about famine can they take efforts to stop it, fulfi lling their 
duties to stop famine. If governments have duties to know information 
to prevent suffering, and have a duty to disclose what they know, then 
governments are blameworthy for failing to tell refugees about suffer-
ing in their home countries. It is not an excuse for them to claim they 
did not know about the suffering, for they ought to have known, due to 
their other general duties.
A government ministry in charge of immigration may also have 
duties to know about countries of origin to establish who is a refugee. 
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The Israeli Ministry of Interior, for example, had a duty to fi nd infor-
mation about South Sudan to establish which South Sudanese asylum 
seekers were refugees, in order to grant them refugee status in Israel. If 
the ministry failed to fi nd information to determine who was a refugee, 
its ignorance was a poor excuse for its failure to disclose risks to refu-
gees wanting to return. It ought to have known the risks, for reasons 
related to its other duties.
To clarify this point: I am not claiming we have a duty to know infor-
mation derived from our duties to ensure that others give their informed 
consent. For it is unclear when we have a duty to ensure informed con-
sent, when fi nding accurate information is costly. Rather, I am claiming 
that, when we have duties to know derived from duties unrelated to 
informed consent, we ought to disclose this knowledge when it will 
help ensure informed consent. If we don’t have this knowledge, we are 
acting wrongly towards those we fail to inform.
Furthermore, I am not claiming we should disclose all information 
we have a duty to know to anyone who wants this information. If my 
jealous neighbor asks about the brakes of my Lamborghini, but has no 
interest in buying it, I have not wronged her when I tell her the brakes 
are not faulty when they are. For were I to know my brakes were faulty, 
I would have no duty to tell my neighbor this fact. Rather, my argument 
is that, when we have a duty to disclose information we know, it is not 
an excuse to say we didn’t know if we ought to have known.
This reasoning implies there are limits to information that must be 
sought. State offi cials have no duty to research ethnic cleansing abroad 
if such research places their own lives at risk, and so do not wrong 
refugees if they fail to inform them. In such cases, it may be enough for 
offi cials to merely provide a disclaimer, informing refugees that there is 
insuffi cient information to know the full risks of returning, because it is 
too dangerous to conduct research in their home countries. But when 
it is merely diffi cult to fi nd information, but safe, offi cials have a duty to 
fi nd information, and so misinforming is wrong.
3.3 OMITTING INFORMATION
This raises the question of whether omitting information is permissible. In 
2008 the Norwegian government helped Iraqi nationals repatriate, never 
misinforming them, but never warning them of food insecurity in Iraq.42 
In 2010 the government of Denmark helped Iraqi refugees repatriate, also 
never misinforming them, but never disclosing risks of violence.43 More 
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recently, the UK government helped refugees return to Sierra Leone with-
out disclosing the risks of homelessness, common after return, and never 
warning refugees returning to Sri Lanka about security concerns, with 
many arrested, detained, and tortured after returning.44
In Israel, staff members from OBI and HIAS never told refugees they 
could not re-enter Israel once they left, as staff assumed refugees had 
this information.45 Staff also assumed refugees had information about 
South Sudan from families, or from their own memories. For this reason, 
they never disclosed information about violence in Unity State, Jonglei, 
and other areas,46 or information on healthcare and food insecurity.47
It was not completely unreasonable that OBI and HIAS assumed 
refugees could rely on their families for information. Amongst those 
I interviewed, family members were the best sources of information 
compared to other sources, such as the media, government offi cials, 
and NGOs. Of the nine I interviewed who found full employment after 
returning, eight had been told by family members that there were jobs. 
However, it was also the case that, of the nineteen who were told by 
family that there were jobs, eleven found no employment, and lacked 
reliable shelter. Though families were the best sources of information, 
they were not very good sources in absolute terms.
One reason we might suppose repatriation facilitators have an obli-
gation to disclose risks is that information can be costly to obtain, but 
free to disclose. When facilitators have duties to know about conditions 
in other countries, they may as well disclose this information to refu-
gees, given that the act of disclosing is costless.
But facilitators might respond that failing to provide information 
is not wrong, or at least less wrong than actively misinforming.48 To 
defend this claim, they might raise three arguments.
3.3.1 Causation
The fi rst argument relates to causation. We might suppose acts are 
especially wrong if they are necessary and suffi cient for harmful out-
comes. If an agent misinforms a recipient of a service, and as a result 
the recipient believes a falsehood only because of this misinformation, 
the misinformation is necessary and suffi cient for the recipient’s false 
belief. For example, if I falsely tell you it is safe to go skydiving, and you 
think it safe because of what I say, and would have otherwise thought it 
unsafe, my misinformation would be necessary and suffi cient for your 
believing it safe to go skydiving. If you then proceed to go skydiving as 
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a result, the misinformation would also be necessary for your choice 
to take a major risk. Omissions, in contrast, are less likely to be neces-
sary and suffi cient for false beliefs. If I never bother telling you that 
skydiving is unsafe, and you continue to think it safe, then my omitting 
information is not suffi cient for your false belief: you partly think it safe 
because someone else told you it was, or because you inferred that it 
was from other sources of information. The same could be said about 
repatriation. If a government tells a refugee it is safe to repatriate, and 
the refugee thinks it safe as a result, and would have otherwise thought 
it unsafe, the misinformation is necessary and suffi cient for the refugee 
believing it is safe to go home. If the refugee then proceeds to go home 
as a result, the misinformation would also be necessary for the choice 
to take a major risk. In contrast, if a government omits information to a 
refugee, and as a result the refugee continues to hold false beliefs about 
her home country, the omission is not suffi cient for her false beliefs; 
her other poor sources of information – such as family members, or the 
media – are also necessary.
I do not believe this distinction is sound, because the act of misin-
forming is also not suffi cient for false beliefs. If I tell you skydiving is 
safe when it is not, and you hold a false belief as a result, one reason you 
hold the false belief is that nobody else provided alternative informa-
tion to correct your false belief. As such, your false belief is the result of 
both the misinformation I gave you, and information omissions from 
other sources. Similarly, if a government tells a refugee it is safe to go 
home when it is not, and the refugee holds a false belief as a result, one 
reason she holds the false belief is that nobody else provided alterna-
tive information to correct her false belief. As such, her false belief is the 
result of both the misinformation from the government, and informa-
tion omissions from other sources. Misinforming, in this sense, can be 
similar to omitting information. Just as omitting information only leads 
to false beliefs when another source is misinforming, misinforming 
only leads to false beliefs when another source is omitting information. 
Omitting information, therefore, can be causally responsible in a similar 
manner to misinforming.
3.3.2 Positive versus Negative Acts
There is a second reason misinforming may be more wrong than omit-
ting information. It may be that a “positive act” is more wrong than a 
“negative act.” Examples of positive acts include injecting arsenic into a 
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patient or stealing money from an elderly man. They seem more wrong 
than negative acts, such as letting a person die of arsenic injected by 
someone else, or failing to return the money that an elderly man lost. 
Perhaps misinforming is a positive act and so more wrong, while omit-
ting information is a negative act and so less wrong.
To establish if misinforming is a positive act and omitting informa-
tion a negative act, we must have plausible defi nitions of what positive 
and negative acts are. Some argue that positive acts are more causally 
related to outcomes,49 but, as noted, acts of omission can have the same 
causal impact as positive acts. Jonathan Bennett provides a more plau-
sible defi nition of the positive/negative distinction. He argues that an 
agent’s act is positive if most of the other actions she could have taken 
would not have led to the same outcome, and an act is negative if most 
of the actions an agent could have taken would have still led to the 
same outcome.50 If a doctor injects arsenic into a healthy patient, most 
of the other acts the doctor could have taken – stayed at home, gone for 
a stroll, read a book, danced a jig, and so forth – would not have led to 
the patient dying. As such, she committed a positive act. In contrast, if 
the doctor failed to treat an ill patient, then most of the acts she could 
have done – also stayed at home, gone for a stroll, and so forth – would 
still have led to the patient dying.
Some have critiqued this conceptualization, raising a counter-example: 
Martha is preparing to assassinate a man named Victor. Martha knows 
that a second assassin is waiting across the street and will kill Victor if she 
does not. She could kill the second assassin, and let Victor live, but she 
doesn’t, instead shooting Victor. Bennett’s theory would seem to implau-
sibly hold that Martha merely lets Victor die in a negative act, because 
most of the other acts she could have done – gone for stroll, read a book, 
danced a jig, and so forth – would have led to the same outcome of 
Victor dying, this time from the second assassin. This seems odd: surely, 
if Martha pulled her trigger and killed Victor, she is guilty of a positive act, 
rather than a mere omission.51
I do not believe this counter-example undermines Bennett’s theory. 
Though Martha could commit many other actions that would still result 
in Victor dying, she could not commit many other actions that would 
result in the increased probability, in her mind, of Victor dying. When 
she pulled the trigger, she could not have known for certain that the 
second assassin would have pulled his trigger had she not pulled hers 
fi rst. In this sense, had she not pulled the trigger, and instead gone 
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for a stroll, read a book, or danced a jig, then the outcome would have 
been different in her mind. It would have been a world with a lower 
probability of Victor dying. Similarly, an agent misinforming the recipi-
ent of a service increases the perceived probability that the recipient 
will be misinformed, because she cannot know that someone else will 
provide misinformation if she does not. If so, then misinformation is a 
positive act, because most of the acts the misinformer could have done 
– walked, read, danced, and so forth – would not have led to the per-
ceived increased probability of the recipient holding a false belief. In 
contrast, if an agent omits information, then most of the other acts she 
could have done – walked, read, danced – would have still lead to the 
same probability of a misinformed recipient.
While the above explains the distinction between positive and 
negative acts, it does not imply that misinforming is always a posi-
tive act and omitting information a negative act. Sometimes omitting 
information can be a positive act. HIAS kept records of the inter-
views it conducted, which it provided to me. There are moments in 
the transcripts where a refugee says she is returning to South Sudan 
to access education, and it is not clear if HIAS responded that access 
to education was unlikely. If HIAS never responded, and instead 
remained silent, this moment of silence could be interpreted as a 
communicative act, signaling to the refugee that her beliefs are cor-
rect. Had HIAS not sat in silence and listened attentively, and instead 
never spoken to the refugee at all, then the refugee may have sought 
out further information. If this is true, then HIAS’s silence would be a 
positive act: Most of the acts HIAS could have done instead, includ-
ing going for a walk or dancing a jig, would not have led to the out-
come of a false belief. Its attentive and silent listening would be a 
form of information omission that serves as a positive act, and as 
egregious as misinforming.
3.3.3 Easy versus Hard
Repatriation facilitators might present a fi nal defense of the claim that 
omitting information is not as wrong as misinforming. Some acts are 
especially wrong because they are easy to avoid, and other acts are 
less wrong because they are hard to avoid. It is especially wrong to 
inject arsenic into a patient because it is easy to avoid doing this: just 
keep the arsenic at home. It is less wrong to fail to cure a patient 
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of arsenic poisoning: avoiding this omission requires treating the 
patient. The same can be said regarding information. It is especially 
wrong for facilitators to misinform refugees because it is easy to avoid 
misinforming: they can simply keep their mouths shut. In contrast, it 
is less wrong to omit information because it is hard to avoid omitting 
information: this requires fi nding information. For this reason, omit-
ting information is less wrong.
Though it is often hard to avoid omitting information, because it is 
hard to fi nd information, this is not always the case. Sometimes informa-
tion is not hard to fi nd. When HIAS failed to tell refugees about ethnic-
based killings in Unity State and Jonglei, it could have easily changed 
its actions by searching the internet for “death toll in Unity State” and 
“death toll in Jonglei,” relaying this information without great effort. 
Importantly, even if providing accurate information would have been 
diffi cult, HIAS could be blameworthy for the acts that, though costly to 
avoid, would be a cost expected of them to bear, given their unique posi-
tion, or their commitment to ensure informed returns. More generally, if 
governments and organizations ought to have information, and ought 
to disclose information they know, then we can expect them to bear the 
costs of fi nding information. If they don’t, they may be acting wrongly, 
even if slightly less wrongly than actively misinforming.
3.4 RELEVANCY
Until now, the examples I raised concerned facilitators failing to inform, 
leading refugees to return when they would have otherwise stayed. 
There are instances where facilitators fail to inform, but refugees would 
have repatriated even if better informed. In such cases, the misinforma-
tion seems irrelevant, and so perhaps not wrong.
Consider the case of Stephen, a father of three living in Tel Aviv. He 
wished to repatriate, and was told by the government that South Sudan 
was safe. He knew this was not true, having lived in South Sudan rel-
atively recently, but returned nonetheless, boarding a fl ight for Juba 
with his wife and children shortly after. Within a year he had opened 
a cleaning and maintenance company, and one day in December 2013 
went to work cleaning at the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement’s 
(SPLM) annual congress.
Towards the evening, he heard gunshots from soldiers who had 
opened fi re on each other. He dropped to the ground, crawled to the 
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entrance, and ran home. The next morning, peering out his window at 
sunrise, he saw eleven small children and two young men taken out of 
their houses by soldiers, lined up, and shot. He told his wife and chil-
dren to exit with him through their back door, and they ran to the UN 
IDP camp. He later went back to his home to rescue his two dogs and 
equipment, worth tens of thousands of dollars. His dogs were there 
but his equipment was not. He returned to the camp, sat down in his 
tent, and managed to tap into the UN’s electricity source, creating an 
impromptu phone-charging station for other camp residents. The resi-
dents were paying him a few pounds a day for the service in 2014, but 
the money was barely enough to survive.52
Even after losing his business and fl eeing to the camp, Stephen said 
the Israeli government’s ignorance of South Sudan did not bother him, 
because he himself knew the risks, and returned regardless. He does 
not regret his choice and so, perhaps by chance, the government is not 
guilty of the wrong of misinformation.
Consider, also, the case of Yasmin. Unlike Stephen, she had no accu-
rate information before she returned, and upon reaching her home 
village in Aweil she was surprised and disappointed to fi nd no reli-
able clean water, education, or safety for her children. She says that she 
would have returned even if she had been given more information. She 
runs a restaurant today, and is happy to be close to her family.53
There are two reasons we might suppose that neither Stephen nor 
Yasmin were wronged.
3.4.1 Moral Luck
In both of these cases, there is a question concerning moral luck. On 
the one hand, we might believe that repatriation facilitators – the gov-
ernment in Stephen’s case and OBI in Yasmin’s case – failed to ensure 
informed consent because they failed to provide accurate information. 
Even if Stephen and Yasmin would have returned regardless, neither 
facilitator knew this, and so the facilitators should have worked harder 
to fi nd and disclose risks. But though it seems the facilitators should 
have acted differently, we might believe in moral luck. Moral luck is the 
idea that, if an agent acts in a manner expected to cause harm, but by 
luck does not, she is off the hook: by luck she did no wrong. Imagine, 
for example, that I sell you my car without telling you the brakes are 
faulty, but by chance you do not care about the faulty brakes, fi xing 
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them promptly yourself. By luck I did no wrong. Though I did not pro-
vide you full information, you gave your informed consent, as the infor-
mation I failed to provide was irrelevant to your decision. In the case 
of repatriation from Israel, by luck facilitators did no wrong because 
Stephen happened to know about the risks and Yasmin happened to 
not care. Though Stephen and Yasmin were not given full information, 
they gave their informed consent.
Even if we believe in moral luck, there are reasons to believe that 
Yasmin, in particular, was wronged. She says today she would have 
returned, but this may be because she cannot change her past decision, 
and so feels she may as well be happy. Had Yasmin been told informa-
tion while still in Israel, she may not have returned even if, today, she 
says she would. This is because, more generally, individuals are some-
times happy with past decisions they cannot escape,54 as when someone 
is happy in their current town they cannot leave, or happy they bought a 
car that cannot be returned. As such, our current happiness for our past 
decisions are not good indicators of whether we would have consented 
in the past, had we been better informed in the past. This is less of a con-
cern for Stephen, because we know that he would have returned even if 
the government had given him more information, because he had this 
information and still returned.
3.4.2 Hypothetical Consent
Let us say, though, that we trust Yasmin. She says she would have 
returned even if she had been informed, and so we should assume 
she really would have returned even if she had been informed. If 
this is true, we might claim she was not wronged. For she gave 
“hypothetical consent” at the time she returned. Hypothetical con-
sent is provided when someone would have consented had she been 
aware of risks. Such consent is often suffi cient for an intervention to 
be permissible. For example, a coma patient is not wronged if she 
undergoes treatment, so long as she would have consented to the 
treatment had she capacity and awareness of risks. Even if actual 
consent is preferable, hypothetical consent still indicates a lesser 
wrong, or no wrong, because at least the intervention promoted 
the aims of those who would have consented.55 When Yasmin gave 
her hypothetical consent, her aims of being close to her family were 
reached, and so she experienced no wrong.
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There are two responses to this reasoning. The fi rst response begins 
with the premise that taking away someone’s control is wrong even if 
this promotes her aims. Imagine a doctor asks a patient if she consents 
to surgery, and the patient tells the doctor she does not. The doctor 
then thinks for a few hours, returns to the patient, and tells her, “After 
thorough deliberation, I have taken into account what you prefer, and 
also taken into account the risks of surgery, and concluded that I will 
not force you to undergo surgery.” Such an attitude seems wrong, as the 
doctor is in control of the fi nal decision.56 A similar phenomenon occurs 
with misinformation. Imagine the doctor never warns a patient of the 
risks. Even if the patient would have consented to surgery regardless, 
the patient lacked control when accepting surgery without full informa-
tion. This is because, if she did not know about the risks of the surgery, 
she could not weigh the risks against the benefi ts, and so could not 
come to a decision herself. If she lacked control when misinformed, 
she was wronged even if this had no impact on whether the surgery 
occurred. The same can be said about Yasmin: When OBI failed to warn 
her about the risks, she lacked control over her decision, given that she 
could not weigh the costs and benefi ts herself. She lacked control even 
if she would have chosen repatriation regardless, and even if repatria-
tion helped her reach her aims.
Some may reject this line of reasoning, claiming individuals do not 
lack control if their choices are consistent with their desires and aims. At 
the very least, a lesser wrong has occurred. Even if this is true, and hypo-
thetical consent indicates no wrong or a lesser wrong, there is reason to 
believe that Yasmin did not even give her hypothetical consent.
When considering if a person would have hypothetically consented, 
it is necessary to establish an appropriate counterfactual world. To do so 
we must consider what we value. I assume we value information, and 
so if a person is in a coma, we ask what they would have consented 
to in a counterfactual world where they were both conscious and fully 
informed. But if we value information, we don’t only value information 
on a given service, such as a given medical treatment. We also value 
information on the character of the service provider. When I consent 
to surgery, I want to know both about the risks of the surgery, and to 
know my surgeon is informed about the risks herself. If my surgeon 
tells me an operation has no risks, and after the operation I learned it 
did, I would feel wronged. I would think, “Had I known the surgeon 
was providing me misinformation, I would have chosen a surgeon more 
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forthcoming about risks, even if I still would have chosen to undergo 
the same operation.”
If so, then the relevant counterfactual in hypothetical consent is a 
world where a person is both informed and aware others are misinform-
ing them. For example, if my grandmother is in a coma, and I know her 
surgeon is poorly informed about surgery, I might ask, “Would grandma 
have consented to surgery with this poorly-informed surgeon?” If she 
would not, then she failed to give her hypothetical consent, even if she 
would have consented to surgery with a different surgeon. This test for 
hypothetical consent captures the range of information she likely val-
ues: the information on the risks of the surgery itself, and information 
on the type of agent the surgeon is. We care about the type of agent a 
service provider is because we want to know if they are fulfi lling their 
responsibilities, and whether they are the sorts of individuals we want 
to support. If my grandmother were awake she would likely want to 
signal to others the incompetence of her surgeon, and so she would not 
have consented to surgery with this surgeon.
This has implications for Yasmin. Even if Yasmin would have 
returned had she been fully informed, this does not mean she would 
have returned via OBI had she known OBI was misinformed. Indeed, 
some refugees refused to return via OBI precisely because they were 
upset about the misinformation provided. A man name Bok, frustrated 
by OBI’s PowerPoint slides, paid for his own fl ight and managed his 
own logistics. He did not want to support an NGO that failed to warn 
about risks.57
In Stephen’s case, we needn’t ask what he would have done had 
he known he was misinformed. In reality, he knew he was being mis-
informed, and this did not bother him enough to refuse the gov-
ernment’s repatriation services. In Yasmin’s case, we do not know if 
she would have returned had she known that OBI was misinforming 
her. She may say today that she would have returned, but we cannot 
know what she would have truly done at the time. We must take her 
memories at face value for this consideration as well. And the more 
we rely on memories, the less we are certain that information really 
was irrelevant.
In general, we cannot travel back in time to a counterfactual world 
and see how refugees would have acted had they been informed. As 
such, it is diffi cult to establish what information was irrelevant. To be 
safe, repatriation facilitators should ensure information is available to 
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all, and should be held accountable for failing to provide information 
that may have been irrelevant.
3.5 INTENT
When repatriation facilitators speak with refugees, they rarely know 
they are misinforming. If they are not aware they are misinforming, and 
awareness is necessary for intent, they do not intend to misinform. If 
intent is necessary for blameworthiness, they are not blameworthy for 
misinformed repatriation.
This is not to claim that all agree that intent is important for blame-
worthiness. According to some philosophers, an agent can be blamed 
for lacking morally important motives if this leads to harmful outcomes, 
even if she is not aware of these harmful outcomes, and so does not 
intend these outcomes.58 If I lack a motivation to help the poor, and 
so fail to help them, I may be blameworthy for my failure to help them 
even if I am not aware of the poor and so not intending to fail to help 
them. Similarly, if offi cials lack a desire to help refugees, and so misin-
form them of risks, they may be blameworthy for misinforming them 
even if they are not aware they misinform them, and so do not intend 
to misinform. Other philosophers argue that intent is not necessary for 
blameworthiness because only foreseeability matters. Foreseeability 
refers to the likelihood that one’s actions will causally contribute to an 
outcome, regardless of whether one intended this outcome.59 A repa-
triation facilitator is blameworthy if a reasonable person could foresee 
that failing to fi nd information would increase the probability of an 
uninformed repatriation.
But many philosophers do view intent as necessary for blamewor-
thiness, or at least increasing blameworthiness. To have intent, certain 
conditions must be met, including having control over one’s actions,60 
and being aware of what one is doing. For example, for me to intention-
ally steal a watch I must be aware I am picking up a watch that is not 
my own; were I to pick up a watch I thought was my own, I would lack 
the necessary awareness for intent. In cases where one lacks awareness 
of information and then misinforms as a result, one is not aware one 
is misinforming, and so one is not intentionally misinforming. Another 
condition for intent is having a particular aim in mind.61 If one intends 
to omit information by keeping one’s mouth closed, one has the aim 
of not uttering this information. It is not clear repatriation facilitators 
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have any such aims when keeping their mouths closed, and so do not 
intentionally fail to inform.
Such was potentially the case for HIAS staff members in Israel. 
Staff members were not aware they were misinforming or omitting 
information, and had no particular aim in their actions. A similar 
claim could be made about UNHCR. When UNHCR helped Afghan 
refugees in Iran return home in the 2000s, it never warned refugees 
about the risks, and soon after return refugees faced regular attacks 
from warlords and Taliban resurgent groups.62 The UN agency was 
not aware of these risks, because it never interviewed those who 
returned,63 and so was not intentionally failing to inform refugees of 
the risks. When UNHCR offi cials in Kenya handed out pamphlets to 
Somali refugees, pamphlets that had not been updated for years,64 
UN offi cials were perhaps not aware that the information was out 
of date, and did not aim to misinform refugees. When the German 
government told Bosnian refugees they would receive housing upon 
return, it did not know it was misinforming refugees because it never 
conducted post-return evaluations. While governments may be act-
ing wrongly when unintentionally misinforming, perhaps they act 
more wrongly when intentionally misinforming. The latter is a form 
of deception or recklessness, rather than a mere oversight.
Even when facilitators do not intentionally misinform, they may still 
be blameworthy. This is because an agent can be blameworthy for unin-
tentionally misinforming, if they are misinforming because of an earlier 
intentional act. A doctor can be blamed for unintentionally failing to 
disclose risks if the reason she did not know the risks was because, ear-
lier, she intentionally failed to read the latest medical journals.65 When I 
asked the director of HIAS in Israel why he never disclosed all risks, he 
responded that he was not aware of all risks because he never conducted 
research on South Sudan, as he assumed refugees already had suffi -
cient information.66 He therefore unintentionally omitted risks because 
he intentionally did not fi nd out about these risks. The government 
also founded a repatriation program in 2012 and, as noted above, it had 
helped over 6,000 refugees depart Israel by 2015.67 The Israeli civil ser-
vant heading the scheme never warned refugees of the risks of repatria-
tion and resettlement, such as the risks of homelessness, displacement, 
and execution by Sudanese authorities. This was because he, like HIAS, 
was not aware there were risks to disclose. He was not aware there were 
risks because he intentionally never bothered to learn about risks, feeling 
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this would be “patronizing”68 to refugees who were capable of inform-
ing themselves. As with HIAS, he unintentionally omitted information 
because he earlier intentionally never found information.
Some might claim that, even if the HIAS director and the civil ser-
vant intentionally failed to fi nd information, they were not blamewor-
thy if their intentions were good or neutral. The HIAS director failed to 
fi nd information merely because he thought refugees were capable of 
fi nding information themselves. The civil servant failed to fi nd informa-
tion merely because he thought this was patronizing. Neither intended 
to encourage an uninformed return.
Even if both facilitators had good intentions when failing to fi nd 
information, their good intentions could potentially be traced back to 
even earlier acts, both with wrongful intentions. The HIAS director 
believed refugees had their own access to information, but he inten-
tionally never validated his belief: he never bothered to fi nd out if it was 
true that refugees had access to accurate information. And we do not 
know why he failed to fi nd out if his belief was valid. If his intentions 
were to encourage return, then his ultimate intentions were wrongful, 
and his omitting information blameworthy.
Unlike the HIAS director, the civil servant’s intentions were not nec-
essarily based on false beliefs about refugees’ knowledge. Many refu-
gees really may have felt patronized if they learned that the government 
was gathering information on their country, rather than relying on refu-
gees’ own knowledge. If the civil servant’s intentions were not based on 
false beliefs, he cannot be blamed for intentionally failing to fi nd out 
if his beliefs were correct. But even if his reasons were to avoid being 
patronizing, reasons can be derived from other reasons. His reasons for 
avoiding being patronizing may have been to facilitate unsafe returns, 
so that more would return. If so, then his ultimate intention was not to 
avoid being patronizing, but to encourage unsafe returns.
The above analysis is limited by the fact that we cannot know the 
intentions of other agents. It is impossible to read the minds of NGO 
directors and civil servants to learn about their reasons for actions. 
Nonetheless, we can still fi nd evidence of wrongful intent, if not deci-
sive certainty. The policy of the Israeli government was to promote 
civil servants based on how many refugees left the country under their 
watch. As such, the civil servant had an interest in more refugees repa-
triating, to meet his annual targets. OBI similarly had such an interest 
in more returning to impress donors who expected their donations to 
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contribute to repatriation. HIAS may have seemed more neutral, but it 
received money from OBI for its work, and may have felt pressure from 
OBI to claim a refugee was informed to meet OBI’s targets. Even if we 
cannot know the intentions of staff members and civil servants, we can 
at least conclude that no annual targets should be established, remov-
ing one reason to intentionally misinform.
3.6 CONCLUSION
When the director of OBI traveled throughout South Sudan and took 
photographs along the way, she could have read independent reports 
on the country, and interviewed more refugees who had already 
returned. Had she done this, she could have told refugees in Israel that 
there were few clinics, schools, or reliable policemen in South Sudan. 
Instead, she assured her audience that the South Sudanese govern-
ment was prepared to help them, and that conditions were stable. 
When organizations like OBI unknowingly misinform, they may be 
acting impermissibly if they have a duty to work hard to disclose accu-
rate information. They have such a duty if they were created to help 
vulnerable populations, and can better help them by fi nding accurate 
information.
This much is obvious. What is less obvious is whether governments 
have duties to fi nd information if they have no special duties to help 
vulnerable populations. To address this question, I addressed a broader 
question of when and whether agents must disclose information to 
others. I argued that, even if agents have no duties to fi nd information 
to ensure informed consent, they must still disclose relevant informa-
tion they already know. And if there is information they ought to know, 
based on their other duties, they risk wronging those they fail to inform. 
If I ought to know my car brakes are faulty to avoid collisions, and fail 
to know my brakes are faulty, and so sell you my car without telling 
you they are faulty, I commit a wrong. This is because the information 
I omitted was the sort I would have needed to disclose had I known 
it, and I ought to have known it. If states have general duties to help 
prevent poverty and atrocities abroad, and have a duty to determine 
who is a refugee, they have a duty to gather information on poverty and 
atrocities abroad. If states have a duty to know about atrocities abroad, 
then failing to know about the atrocities is a poor excuse for failing to 
warn refugees repatriating home.
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In some cases, refugees are misinformed and return, but say they 
would have returned even if better informed. In such cases, it is not 
clear if refugees were wronged, because the misinformation was irrel-
evant for their decisions to return. To determine if misinformation really 
was irrelevant, it is not enough to consider if refugees would have con-
sented had they been informed; we must consider if they would have 
consented had they known they were being misinformed at the time of 
the service. This is because, when we consent to a high-risk service, we 
have a right to know if the service providers are ignorant of key facts, 
to know if we can trust them. Of course, some refugees may claim they 
would have returned even if they knew facilitators were ignorant of key 
facts. But these refugees may be happy with their decision because they 
cannot change their current circumstances. If they failed to give their 
informed consent prior to returning, then they were wronged even if 
they do not mind today.
In many such cases, repatriation facilitators are unaware of the risks 
of repatriation, and do not intentionally provide false or no information. 
OBI genuinely believed that repatriation was safe. Even if facilitators 
do not intentionally fail to inform refugees of risks, they may still be 
blameworthy for intentionally failing to gather information on risks.
To avoid misinformed repatriation, facilitators should institute a 
number of policy changes. They should ensure that resources are avail-
able for more rigorous research on the consequences of repatriating. 
This would entail learning about the conditions of refugees who have 
already returned. Today, UNHCR lacks the capacity to conduct such 
post-return research, as does IOM.69 This may be because UNHCR and 
IOM earmark their budgets for repatriation itself, paying for the trans-
port of hundreds of thousands of refugees annually. They should focus 
less on maximizing the number who return and more on maximizing 
information before return. This would involve interviewing a substan-
tial sample of past returnees, selected as randomly as possible, to deter-
mine how many were likely displaced, killed, or unable to access basic 
necessities after repatriating.
Such research should not only include a large number of subjects, 
but should account for survivorship bias. It is not enough to call refu-
gees and interview those who answer their phones, because those who 
are killed will not answer, and those who fl ed are less likely to answer. 
To counteract such bias, facilitators should interview friends and family 
members of returnees to fi nd out if they have been killed. Facilitators 
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should also interview returnees without cell phone access in refugee 
camps and rural areas, ensuring that those who fl ed are included in 
the sample. They should then communicate their fi ndings to refugees 
considering returning.
In communicating such fi ndings, facilitators should clarify the limita-
tions of their research, including survivorship bias that is diffi cult to com-
pletely mitigate. For example, if an organization explains that 2 per cent 
of returnees in a sample were killed, it should explain that the mortality 
rate amongst this sample is likely lower than amongst the total popula-
tion of returnees. In addition to communicating biased sampling, facili-
tators should avoid biased communicating. Today, when organizations 
provide information on their websites, they publish attractive images 
of refugees’ countries of origin, and photographs of smiling returnees 
alongside stories of their success.70 Organizations rarely describe details 
of those less successful, instead using vague phrases such as, “People 
in Afghanistan have reported concerns about security.”71 To encourage 
refugees to consider all information, facilitators should resist including 
stories of only successful refugees, and include stories and statistics on 
those displaced or killed. More generally, facilitators should spend more 
time warning refugees of potential problems, rather than opportunities. 
Given that repatriation is generally irreversible and potentially unsafe, 
precaution should be a primary goal.
One of the reasons that facilitators fail to fi nd information is that 
some have an interest in more returning. In general, agents fi nding 
information on services should not be the agents with interests in 
more accepting these services. Within medicine, for example, research-
ers running trials to know the risks of a treatment should not be the 
same researchers profi ting from this treatment. Similarly, civil servants 
researching the risks of repatriation should not be those promoted 
based on how many repatriate. Nor should humanitarian organizations 
researching the risks of repatriation be the organizations who receive 
funding for repatriation. If there is to be a method of promoting or 
funding, it should be based on how satisfi ed refugees feel after return-
ing to their countries of origin.
Repatriation facilitators have yet to adopt the above policies. As 
a result, many refugees returning soon regret their choice, fi nding 
themselves again displaced, or without reliable food, water, or asylum. 
Just as preventing coerced returns is essential, so is ensuring informed 
returns.
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REGRET
As Mol boarded his fi ght in 2012, he was fully informed of risks, but by 
2013 he regretted taking them. That year, nine days before Christmas, 
six armed men followed him home. As he reached his front gate to his 
Juba home, they approached him from the side.
“What tribe are you?” they asked him.
“Why are you asking me?” he responded.
One of them grabbed him, but he managed to pull away, and ran to a 
UN IDP camp nearby.1
Twenty-nine years earlier, Mol was a young boy studying in an ele-
mentary school in Maiwut, a small town in southern Sudan. One morn-
ing, militias arrived at his school and he fl ed out the back door, later 
taking a bus to Khartoum, a train to Wadi Halfa, a boat to Egypt, and a 
Jeep to Israel. He settled in Tel Aviv and was given temporary protection 
from deportation, but no work visa. Though he managed to survive by 
fi nding a job on the black market, in 2012 he was nervous he would be 
detained, and so asked OBI for help returning, undergoing an interview 
with HIAS shortly after. Unlike some refugees, he was warned by HIAS 
that there was food insecurity and violence in South Sudan.2 He also 
knew that most past returnees regretted their decision to return home, 
and that he might feel regret as well.
He nonetheless accepted OBI’s free fl ight and $1,500, arriving in 
Juba shortly after. He opened a small shop, made a decent income, and 
was happy with his decision to return until, nine days before Christmas, 
six men forced him from his home. As of 2014 he still lived in an IDP 
camp near a military base, where soldiers occasionally fi red at camp 
residents. He had no access to food, as the camp only provided food 
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aid to children, and he feared venturing outside because his ethnicity is 
clear from Nuer tribal scars on his forehead. When I visited him, latrines 
in the camp were overfl owing, dysentery spreading, and Médecins Sans 
Frontières evacuating.3 Today, if Mol could, he would go back in time, 
reject the help of OBI, and instead live in Israel, even if this meant living 
in detention.
The case of Mol is distinct from the cases I have addressed thus far. 
Though Mol was coerced to return, there is little evidence that OBI 
or HIAS could do anything to improve his circumstances in Israel by 
the time he left. Moreover, he was well-informed prior to his return, 
aware not only of the risks in South Sudan, but of the risks of regretting 
his choice. His case raises the distinct question of whether repatria-
tion should continue if regret is widespread. While we might suppose it 
should, so long as refugees are informed of risks, perhaps it should not, 
to prevent future refugees from feeling similar regret.
This dilemma was prevalent in Israel. Of the twenty-eight who returned 
from Israel prior to 2012, eight of the twenty adults regretted their deci-
sion to return. Of the sixty adults I interviewed who returned during or 
after 2012, a total of thirty-fi ve regretted their decision. Nineteen said this 
was because they lacked basic necessities, twelve because of ethnic-based 
killings, and four because of general violence. Many of these individuals 
were not informed about risks, but some were. Samuel described such 
regret in vivid detail:
I knew about the fi ghting in South Sudan, but was afraid of being 
in prison in Israel, and returned in 2012. I was at home in Juba, on 
Monday, when soldiers started shooting at 10:00 pm. They shot at 
my friends who stayed with me. Two were killed. I put on a pair 
of shoes – any shoes, it did not matter – and ran to the IDP camp. 
Today, I cannot leave, as I am in a prison. I think, “in Israel prison 
would have been better because my enemy is not outside of the 
prison doors.”
The regret felt by refugees returning from Israel is similar to the regret 
found in other parts of the world. In 2010 thousands of refugees return-
ing to Iraq regretted their decisions to return via UNHCR, wishing 
they had remained in Iran.4 In 2001 IDPs returning from Ingushetia to 
Chechnya regretted their return home, as did refugees returning from 
Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2015 and from Kenya to Somalia in 2017.5 
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More recently, some refugees returning from Lebanon to Syria have 
expressed regret, such as Dr. Hassan Ammar:
I worked as a doctor in Arsal [Lebanon] . . . Jabhat al-Nusra was 
the main opposition group operating in Arsal . . . They didn’t 
really protect us from the menace of the Lebanese army and 
Hezbollah . . . So I am here in Idlib [Syria] now, miserable . . . 
[It was a mistake coming here to Idlib, there is no work.] I lost 
everything and the ride in the bus was from hell.6
If most refugees feel similar to how Dr. Ammar felt, and this predicts 
regret amongst future returnees, it is not clear if repatriation should be 
provided
To address whether repatriation should be provided when regret is 
widespread, we must consider the broader question of whether regret is 
relevant in determining what services are provided. Imagine, for exam-
ple, that a hospital found that most patients regretted accepting a given 
treatment, or a sports team learned that most athletes regretted joining 
a team, or a university learned that most students regretted beginning 
a Ph.D. program. The hospital, team, and university may be able to pre-
dict that future patients, athletes, and students will feel similar regret. 
It is not clear whether they should deny their services to prevent this 
future regret.
In this chapter I shall address the question of whether, both in cases 
of repatriation and beyond, regret is a reason to deny a service. When 
I write “service” I refer to a resource, action, or opportunity provided 
by one agent to another, where no coercion is used, and the point 
of the service is to give someone an option she otherwise would not 
have. When I write “reason” I mean a weighty pro tanto moral rea-
son. A “pro tanto reason” provides partial justifi cation for an act. For 
example, if most people who I teach skydiving to regret their decision, 
and I can predict that future recipients will feel similar regret, this likely 
regret provides partial justifi cation for denying you my skydiving les-
sons. Though there is partial justifi cation, it might still be permissible 
if there were countervailing considerations, such as you desperately 
wanting to skydive and being aware of the risks. In certain contexts a 
pro tanto reason can turn into a decisive reason. When an agent has 
a decisive reason to do X, then she ought to do X. Imagine I cannot 
decide whether to help you skydive: on the one hand I know skydiving 
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is fun, on the other hand it is risky. If I know that you will likely regret 
your decision, the likely regret may be a decisive reason to deny you 
the lessons. In other words, a decisive reason is a deciding factor when 
we are otherwise uncertain what to do.
The claim that regret can be a reason to deny a service is controversial. 
When we predict an individual will feel regret, we are predicting they 
will experience a reduction in wellbeing. It is these outcomes alone, we 
might suppose, that give us reason to deny a service, regardless of regret. 
Mol’s likely displacement was reason enough to deny him repatriation. 
Section 4.1 refutes this claim: Regret can be an independent reason to 
deny a service, separate from reasons related to welfare-reduction.
Section 4.2 argues that regret is a particularly weighty reason to deny 
a service when certain properties are present. In Section 4.3 I address 
cases where refugees are likely to regret both returning and remaining, 
so it is not clear whether repatriation should continue.
Before I begin, a brief description of what I mean by “regret.”
Regret, as I defi ne it, is the feeling that one no longer endorses one’s 
earlier decision because one feels the outcome from the decision is less 
preferable than what would have occurred otherwise. I put aside cases 
where individuals regret their decision but not the outcome. A soldier 
might regret his decision to kill an innocent person to save two inno-
cent lives, feeling this was morally wrong, but not regret the outcome 
due to the lives saved. I also put aside cases where individuals regret the 
outcome but not their decision, as when a refugee says it’s regrettable 
civil war broke out in South Sudan, but not regretting her decision to 
return home because she feels civil war was preferable to life in Israel. 
In all of the cases I raise, individuals regret their decision and the out-
come. We can predict such regret as likely when the vast majority of 
past recipients of a service regret their choice because of the outcome, 
and there is reason to believe this regret will likely arise in the future. 
If, for example, 80 per cent of past recipients of a choice wish they had 
chosen otherwise, because they prefer the life they would have likely 
lived, and future recipients hold similar characteristics to past recipi-
ents, we can often predict there is an 80 per cent chance that any given 
future recipient will later feel similar regret. My focus is on the moral 
status of this future regret.
In focusing on future regret, I focus on individuals experiencing no 
coercion from the service provider, and who are informed about the 
risks from the service provider. I put aside cases where individuals are 
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forced to accept a service they regret, or are not told about risks and so 
regret their decision. Recipients, in all of my examples, are fully aware 
of the risks, including the risks of regretting their choices.
Why would individuals make choices they know they will likely 
regret? One reason is that the potential pay-offs are substantial, as with 
the lottery. Another reason is that recipients cannot quite imagine what 
it would feel like experiencing this regret, and so take the plunge, later 
wishing they had not. Individuals may also accept services that take an 
extended amount of time such that, for every day that lapses, accepting 
the service is rational and regret unlikely. I might accept a box of choco-
lates every day, because one box on one day will have minimal harm, 
and give me joy as I bite into each praline, until I later suffer from health 
complications, regretting my accumulative decisions. 7
Finally, a person may accept a service they know they will regret 
if they have preferences now which they know will change. I might 
accept tequila at 8:00 pm, knowing I will regret it tomorrow, because 
at 8:00 pm I prefer drinking tequila and regretting it tomorrow to not 
drinking tequila and feeling no regret tomorrow. Tomorrow, of course, 
I will feel differently. It is perhaps unclear if my accepting the tequila 
is rational, or whether feeling regret tomorrow is rational.8 Regard-
less, we often make such decisions and feel such regret. It remains 
unclear when others should deny us services to prevent this regret 
from transpiring.
As noted above, my focus is primarily on voluntary services. Though 
I focus on voluntary services, I assume that a recipient can give their 
voluntary consent even if coerced by a third party into their decision, 
so long as they are not coerced by the agent providing them the ser-
vice. Mol was coerced by the Israeli government into repatriating, as the 
government would detain him if he stayed, but I assume his consent 
was valid if OBI was doing no coercing itself and could not stop the 
coercion. He nonetheless also made a decision he would likely regret. It 
is not clear what the moral status of this regret was.
Some might suppose that, because Mol was choosing between two 
objectionable options, he did not truly regret his choice. He only regret-
ted the state of affairs in Israel where he was forced to choose between 
detention and unsafe repatriation.
While it is true he regretted the state of affairs in Israel where he had 
only two choices, he also regretted the one choice he did make.9 More 
generally, one can regret a state of affairs and the choice made within 
5857_Gerver.indd   92 04/10/18   2:53 PM
Regret 93
this state of affairs. A patient diagnosed with cancer can later regret 
having had to choose between death and life-extending treatment, 
while still regretting accepting the life-extending treatment because of 
its painful side effects. This regret for a single choice is important: In 
many tragic or unjust scenarios, third parties must decide whether to 
offer an additional objectionable choice, likely to be regretted, or do 
nothing at all, constraining choices now.
4.1 REGRET AS ONE REASON TO DENY A SERVICE
I propose the following claim: If a service-provider can predict that an 
individual will regret accepting a service, and feel no or less regret if they 
reject the service, preventing regret is one reason to deny the service.
My claim can be derived from two broad values. First, there is value, 
all else being equal, in helping individuals live the lives they prefer liv-
ing. If an individual will later regret their decision to accept a service, 
and this regret will extend into the remainder of their lives, we can help 
them live the life they prefer by denying the service. It is true that future 
preferences are diffi cult to establish. But when predictions of future 
regret are strong and long lasting, this future regret ought, at times, to 
take priority over current short-term preferences.
There is a second value that underpins my general claim, related to 
control. In general, if a person lacks control over their past decisions, 
it is better if they are satisfi ed with their past decisions. Imagine that 
on October 1 I accept surgery for the afternoon of October 10, and on 
the morning of the 10th I suffer from locked-in syndrome, unable to 
communicate whether I still wish to receive the surgery. If I still wish to 
receive the surgery, and do receive the surgery, it seems that no harm 
is done: I gave my consent on October 1, and still prefer to have the 
surgery. In contrast, if I wake up on the 10th and am both locked-in 
and change my mind, it seems a signifi cant harm occurs as the surgeon 
inserts the scalpel into my body. It seems that lacking control when my 
preferences have changed is more disturbing than lacking control when 
my preferences have not.
When an individual makes an irreversible decision, they are not 
locked in, but they do they lack control over this earlier decision, given 
that they cannot change the past. All else being equal, it seems better if 
this person has not changed their mind about their past decision, given 
that they cannot control this past decision. If we know ahead of time 
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that a person will likely change their mind about their past decision, 
and so regret their decision, we have one reason to deny them a service 
which makes regret possible.
If we have one reason to deny a service that makes regret possible, 
we have reason to predict whether regret is likely. Determining how we 
predict regret would require a broad empirical discussion beyond the 
scope of this book, but one mechanism is to compare those who accept 
an intervention and those who do not. If the vast majority who accept 
an intervention regret their choice, but those who reject the interven-
tion do not, and future potential recipients hold similar characteristics to 
past recipients, this is evidence that regret will be widespread amongst 
future recipients.
Sometimes, the majority of individuals who accept a service do not 
regret their decision, but the majority of a sub-group do, and we can 
predict that future members of this sub-group will experience similar 
regret. Of the nineteen adults I interviewed who returned from Israel 
prior to 2012, only seven regretted their decision, but all seven were 
living in rural areas or without family connections, and all those who 
felt no regret were living in urban areas or had family connections. This 
suggests that future refugees returning to rural areas or without family 
connections may feel similar regret, even if most refugees will feel no 
regret. Similarly, out of all those I interviewed, the majority returning 
after 2012 felt regret, suggesting that future individuals returning after 
2012 would feel similar regret.
Of course, the above methods alone will not demonstrate that there 
is a causal relationship between the service and the regret. It may be 
that those accepting the service are more prone to feelings of regret for 
reasons unrelated to the service. It would therefore help to supplement 
this evidence with random control trials (RCTs). Today, limited RCTs 
have tested the extent that patients are likely to feel regret after the fi rst 
year of a medical intervention,10 and more long-term RCTs might be 
administered. If the vast majority of patients who are randomly given 
treatment regret their decision to accept treatment, but those randomly 
denied treatment do not wish they had received this treatment, then 
this is further evidence that the treatment contributes to regret, creating 
one reason to deny the treatment to future patients.11
RCTs can also determine whether the majority in certain sub-groups 
regret their decision to accept a service, even if the majority of all recipi-
ents do not. We might learn, for example, that the majority of individuals 
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who are younger than twenty-fi ve and suffering from migraines regret 
a given medical intervention, even if the majority of all recipients do 
not. Under some conditions, we may be able to use this data to pre-
dict that future recipients who are under twenty-fi ve and suffering from 
migraines are likely to feel similar regret.
The same holds true for the NGO that helped Mol repatriate. OBI 
could have run a type of RCT for repatriation. This would involve gath-
ering the names of all refugees seeking repatriation, and only helping 
a randomly selected segment from this group to repatriate, refraining 
from helping the rest. OBI could then ask those who repatriated if they 
regreted their decision, and ask those denied repatriation if they wished 
they had been selected to return. If the vast majority of all or a sub-
group regret their decision, while those randomly denied repatriation 
prefer to have not repatriated, this is evidence that repatriation leads to 
regret, creating one reason to deny repatriation.
The above claims are relatively modest. They do not establish when 
regret is a very weighty reason to deny a service, a question I shall 
address in the next section. They merely establish that future regret is 
one reason to deny a service, to be weighed against countervailing con-
siderations. They nonetheless face a number of objections.
4.1.1 The Fairness Objection
The fi rst I call the Fairness Objection. I claimed above that, to determine 
if regret is likely, we ought to use RCTs, randomly selecting who is pro-
vided the service and who is not. Some might feel it is unfair to force 
some refugees to stay in detention, rather than help all repatriate who 
wish to. Others may feel it is unfair to provide repatriation to some, who 
will then likely live in poverty and insecurity in their home countries, 
rather than relative security in a host country.
While it is true that such RCTs may be frustrating for those who are 
not assigned to their preferred group, they are still justifi ed. They are 
justifi ed if they give us pertinent information on what the effects of an 
intervention are. Such is the approach taken in medicine. Many medical 
subjects prefer a pill with an active ingredient, rather than a placebo, but 
it is often necessary to randomly assign some a placebo to learn what 
the effects of the active ingredient are. One potential effect of an active 
ingredient is regret. The same is true for other services: while many may 
prefer a service, it is often necessary to randomly deny the service to 
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some to learn what the effects of the service are, including whether 
regret is likely. Even if the service is ultimately provided despite regret, 
at least recipients will be aware of the likelihood of regret, ensuring 
their decisions are more informed.
There is another version of the Fairness Objection. It may be unfair 
to deny a service that most regret if some will feel no regret. Those who 
feel no regret may desperately want this service, and benefi t a great deal 
from its provision. Consider the case of Aken, who arrived in Israel in 
2006. For six years for fourteen hours a day she scrubbed hundreds of 
rooms in hotels in Tel Aviv, eventually saving tens of thousands of dollars 
before asking OBI for a ticket to South Sudan. She boarded the fl ight to 
Juba in 2010 and established a successful company importing dresses 
from Egypt, never regretting her decision to return.12 Nor did Nyebol, 
who saved up far less money before leaving Israel in 2010, and going to 
Aweil, a small secondary town in the northern region of South Sudan. 
She quickly bought a small stone house and modest cooker and began 
selling meals of ground meat, vegetable sauce and warm bread, today 
making a decent profi t while feeling no regret.13 Importantly, some felt 
no regret despite the risks to their lives after return. Recall Stephen, from 
the previous chapter, who knew about the risks of returning, returned 
regardless, and opened a small cleaning company before fl eeing to an 
IDP camp in 2013. By 2014 he still believed he made the right decision, 
preferring war in South Sudan to detention in Israel.14
While it is true that a minority will feel no regret, it is also true that 
we cannot know which minority will feel no regret. If we cannot know 
which individuals will feel no regret, but we can predict that a propor-
tion will feel regret, then we can often predict that any given individual 
will have a particular probability of feeling regret. For example, if 80 
per cent of returnees consistently feel regret, we can often predict that 
any one individual will have an 80 per cent likelihood of feeling regret. 
If there was an 80 per cent chance that Aken, Nyebol, and Stephen 
would feel regret, there was a reason to deny them repatriation given 
the probabilities known prior to their return. Moreover, even if we think 
there was no reason to deny them repatriation, given that in reality 
they did not feel regret, this does not undermine the general claim that 
regret is one reason to deny a service. Regret is one reason which can, at 
times, be outweighed by countervailing considerations. One counter-
vailing consideration could be the value of helping the minority return 
who will be happy with their decision.
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4.1.2 The Other Reasons Objection
Some may feel that regret is not even one reason to deny a service, 
let alone a reason that can be outweighed by countervailing consider-
ations. They might raise the Other Reasons Objection. In cases where a 
person feels regret, they are feeling regret about some change in their 
life, whether it be a reduction in welfare, freedom, or happiness. It is 
these facts that give reasons to deny the service. Regret creates no addi-
tional reason to deny the service.
There are three versions of this objection. The fi rst draws upon the 
principle of autonomy. In general, one condition for autonomy is that 
one has suffi cient welfare and an adequate range of options.15 For 
example, if one is forced to live in a refugee camp one’s whole life, or 
forced to live without adequate food, then one lacks autonomy. It is 
wrong, therefore, to provide services that signifi cantly reduce welfare or 
the number of options.16 It is wrong, therefore, for a repatriation facilita-
tor to help refugees return to a country where they will likely be forced 
to live in IDP camps, or forced to live without security. In cases where 
we intuitively feel that regret is a reason to deny a service, our intuitions 
are responding to the reduction in welfare or options, and not to the 
regret felt.
In some cases, this reasoning may hold. But in cases where a per-
son’s autonomy will be constrained regardless of whether they accept a 
service, regret may remain a deciding factor. Mol was choosing between 
detention in Israel, where he would be unable to travel more than a mile, 
and returning to South Sudan, able to travel but risking his life. In such a 
case, we cannot claim that Mol’s autonomy would be undermined from 
returning relative to leaving, because his autonomy was undermined 
either way. In such a case, his future regret tips the balance against help-
ing him return, creating a reason that would otherwise not exist.
Some may insist that, in the case of Mol, life in an enclosed camp in 
Israel was objectively better for him than life in an IDP camp in South 
Sudan. Staying would protect his welfare and autonomy more than repa-
triating, and this was reason enough to deny repatriation. Regret was 
irrelevant. Even if one accepts this for Mol, there are many other refugees 
living in insecurity and poverty in countries of asylum, forced to remain 
in refugee camps, who are choosing to repatriate to countries with the 
same levels of insecurity and poverty. Indeed, most refugees repatriating 
are returning from insecure poor host countries to insecure poor home 
countries.17 If these refugees will face similar conditions in remaining and 
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returning, we cannot claim their reductions in welfare and autonomy 
explain why return is wrong. If we feel it is wrong to assist with return 
when regret is likely, it seems the regret itself explains this intuition.
There is a second variety of the Other Reasons Objection. Some might 
claim that, though there is reason to deny a service when regret is likely, 
the regret is not an independent reason to deny a service. When indi-
viduals feel regret, they regret something that has happened, such as 
losing their freedom, or security, or subjective happiness. Regret is just 
the additional psychological response to such outcomes, rather than 
an independent consideration. To establish if regret is an independent 
consideration, we must consider cases where there is regret without any 
of the painful outcomes associated with regret. In other words, a truly 
interesting thesis would pull apart regret from other considerations, 
and this is only possible when considering cases where a person feels 
regret despite their life going better, such as a refugee who regrets repa-
triating despite their security and income improving, or an athlete who 
regrets joining a team despite facing no injury and having improved 
health. If we imagine such cases, we would unlikely be convinced that 
regret is a reason to deny a service, given that the lives of the relevant 
agents have improved.
I do not believe, however, that we can only establish if regret creates 
a reason to deny a service by isolating it from other properties, such as 
welfare harms. This is because, more generally, I do not believe we can 
only establish if a property creates a reason for action by isolating it 
from other properties. A property can constitute a reason in itself even if 
only arising when interacting with other properties. If I promise to lend 
Katie my pen, this promise gives me a weighty reason to lend her my 
pen, even if this reason is contingent on other properties, such as her 
still wanting to borrow my pen, her needing to borrow my pen, or her 
being aware that I promised to lend her my pen.18 Regret is similarly an 
independent reason to deny a service, even if contingent on the pres-
ence of other properties, such as welfare reductions.
If this is true, then to prove regret is a reason separate from welfare 
reductions, I needn’t isolate regret from these welfare reductions; it is 
enough to isolate these welfare reductions from regret. This is possible 
by comparing pairs of cases where welfare is identical for two individu-
als, and regret is present for one individual and not the other. If we com-
pare two refugees, two athletes, and two patients, and the fi rst of each 
pair will experience both regret and a welfare reduction after a service, 
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and the second will experience no regret but the same welfare reduction 
after the service, it seems we have reason to deny the service to the fi rst 
and not the second. If one refugee returning to South Sudan will expe-
rience insecurity and regret, while another refugee is returning to this 
same insecurity but will feel no regret, it seems the NGO has more rea-
son to deny repatriation to the fi rst refugee than the second. Regret is a 
distinct reason to deny a service, even if contingent on other properties.
There is a fi nal version of the Other Reasons Objection, derived from 
an argument by Krister Bykvist. We are often faced with choices that 
we know we will regret, but which we also know will make us hap-
pier. Imagine I have a choice to either stay single or get married. If I 
stay single, I will be happy but regret my choice, feeling marriage was 
preferable. If I marry, I will be miserable but not regret my choice, still 
feeling marriage was preferable. It seems my future regret as a single 
person is not a good reason to get married, because I will be miserable 
as a married person. Instead, Bykvist argues, we ought to consider how 
strongly we will later want our future state of affairs, and not whether 
we will prefer this state of affairs to the life we could have lived. If I will 
be happier as a single person I should stay single, even if I will prefer 
being married and so regret not having married.19 If Bykvist is correct, 
then when providing a service to others, their future attitudes about 
their circumstances are what matter, rather than future attitudes about 
the life they could have lived.
Bykvist’s example is helpful for demonstrating that future regret is 
often a very poor consideration for how we ought to act now. Nonethe-
less, it does not demonstrate that future regret is never a reason at all. 
It merely demonstrates that, when we will be miserable with a choice, 
this future misery creates a countervailing reason to avoid this choice. It 
remains the case that, when we are faced with two choices with equal 
predicted misery, future regret is a consideration for how we ought to 
proceed. Similarly, when we can predict that someone will feel regret 
when accepting our service, but equally miserable either way, their 
likely regret is a reason to deny them the service.
4.1.3 Future Preferences Objection
There is a third objection, which I call the Future Preferences Objection. 
It comes in two forms. The fi rst relates to reasons. Some argue that we 
have little reason to determine what we provide others based on their 
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future preferences. This is because we have little reason in our own 
lives to make choices based on our future preferences, as our future 
preferences are not our current preferences, and so what we have rea-
son to want later is not what we have reason to want now. This argu-
ment is often made by using an example from Derek Parfi t, involving 
a fourteen-year-old girl who decides to conceive, even though she is 
extremely ill-prepared to do so. She knows that, once her child is born, 
she will love her child, and feel it is preferable the child was born. The 
child, of course, will feel this as well.20 Neither will regret the decision. 
This prediction of future non-regret, it is argued, seems like a poor rea-
son for the girl to conceive at such a young age. Though she will later 
have reasons to affi rm her past decisions, these reasons arise from an 
attachment to her child, and she did not have this attachment prior to 
conceiving. If future preferences for past actions are poor reasons for 
these actions at the current time,21 we should not deny services to oth-
ers based on predicting their future preferences.22
I am not certain that the fourteen-year-old’s future affi rmation 
about giving birth gives her no reason to conceive. She may simply 
have other reasons to not conceive which outweigh this reason: It is 
better to create a world with children raised by mature parents, who 
are able to provide suffi cient resources and care.23 But even if one 
believes that the fourteen year old has no reason at all to conceive, 
despite her future affi rmation, future regret may still give her an addi-
tional reason to not conceive. This is because, even if future affi rma-
tion for past actions is irrelevant for how one acts at the current time, 
future regret may remain relevant for how one ought not act at the 
current time. Imagine an adult who, unlike the fourteen-year-old girl, 
knows she will not love her child in the future, and knows she will 
regret having the child, later wishing she could go back in time and 
never give birth. This woman has a very strong additional reason not 
to conceive because of her future regret.
There is a second version of the Future Preferences Objection. We 
might suppose that there is value in having autonomy, and having 
autonomy requires having control over one’s life. One is in control 
even if one’s preferences change, and this change leads to subsequent 
regret.24 Imagine an eighteen year old makes a choice that impacts her 
life at thirty, such as getting a tattoo. When she gets the tattoo she has 
control over her life, so long as her preferences and choices at eighteen 
are made with full capacity and information.
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Even if there is value in having control, control at one point can limit 
control at another. When this occurs, it seems important to minimize 
regret during the period of limited control. Imagine an eighteen year old 
consents to a full-body tattoo which she cannot easily remove. She has 
control when accepting the tattoo, but her control is limited as a result, 
given that she cannot change her earlier choice. In such a scenario, it 
seems her likely regret is one relevant consideration for whether the 
tattoo parlor ought to provide her the tattoo. This reason may not be 
very weighty – an issue I shall address in the next section – but it is a 
reason nonetheless.
4.1.4 Implications Objection
There is a fourth objection to my claim, the Implications Objection. It 
comes in two forms. The fi rst relates to paternalism. If we ought to 
sometimes deny services to prevent regret, because this fulfi lls indi-
viduals’ future preferences, this implies we ought to sometimes require 
services to prevent regret, because this fulfi lls individuals’ future prefer-
ences. We ought to force individuals to accept surgery they will regret 
not accepting, or force individuals to join a sports team they will regret 
not joining, or force refugees to return home who will regret remaining. 
This seems unacceptably paternalistic. It would seem wrong to require 
a patient to accept surgery even if they will later prefer having had sur-
gery, and wrong to require an athlete to join a team or a refugee to 
return home, regardless of whatever preferences they will later have.
There are two responses to this objection.
The fi rst begins with a premise: Committing an act constraining 
options requires a weightier justifi cation than omitting an act constrain-
ing options. Tying a person to a chair requires a weightier justifi cation 
than failing to help a person stand up from a chair.25 If one accepts this 
distinction between omissions and commissions, it follows that forc-
ing a person to accept a service requires a weightier justifi cation than 
denying a person this service. If this is true, then the justifi cation for 
denying a service may be insuffi cient for forcing someone to accept a 
service. If this is true, then claiming we should deny a service to prevent 
regret needn’t imply we should force someone to accept a service to 
prevent regret.
Some might reject the above explanation, arguing that there is no 
morally relevant distinction between committing an act and omitting 
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an act.26 Others may feel that, if an agent has a history of providing a 
service, suddenly withdrawing the service is more similar to commit-
ting an act, comparable to tying a person to a chair. If one holds either 
of these views, there is a second response to the Implications Objection.
In general, there is a distinction between our reasons for providing 
services and our reasons for not providing services. If a surgeon is pro-
viding surgery, or an NGO repatriation, their reasons for providing the 
surgery or repatriation are because this is what recipients desire, and 
possibly because this improves recipients’ lives. In contrast, surgeons 
and NGOs have many more reasons for not providing surgery or repa-
triation: they could engage in other activities instead, such as reading 
a book, dancing a jig, or helping other vulnerable populations in need. 
As such, their reasons for denying a service needn’t be as substantial; 
they have plenty of other reasons already. As such, preventing regret 
may be a decisive reason to deny a service when combined with these 
many other reasons for denying the service. These other reasons are 
not present when forcing someone to accept the service. It is therefore 
wrong to force someone to accept a service merely to prevent regret.27 
Therefore, my claim that we have reason to deny a service to prevent 
regret needn’t imply that we should force someone to accept a service 
to prevent regret.
There is a second version of the Implications Objection. If the rea-
son future regret matters is that a person’s future preferences matter, 
this implies that we have less reason to deny a service if a person will 
develop adaptive preferences. If OBI learned that past refugees per-
suaded themselves that life was fi ne to avoid the frustration of regret, 
OBI would have one less reason to deny repatriation. Similarly, if there 
was a magic pill refugees could swallow to rid themselves of regret, OBI 
would have less reason to deny repatriation.
This is not entirely odd. We often think it preferable to help individu-
als take high-risk choices if their preferences will remain the same later 
on. This is true even if their preferences are stable because they adapt 
their preferences to their surroundings, or use various tools – such as 
exercise or meditation – which encourage them to maintain their pref-
erences across time. If we know that an individual lacks the psychologi-
cal disposition to keep their preferences stable, or lacks the tools to do 
so, it is not odd to deny them a service to prevent regret. Indeed, this 
is the approach that many organizations already take. For example, in 
2006 I chose to join the military, requesting a particular unit, and the 
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recruitment offi cer asked me a series of questions intended to gauge 
whether my current preferences to join this unit would likely remain 
stable across time. The offi cer accounted not only for my natural dispo-
sitions, but whether I was likely to take actions – such as exercise and 
meditation – that would ensure my preferences did not dramatically 
change. Of course, the reason the recruitment offer wished to ensure I 
would not regret my choice was because she wanted to ensure I would 
be a reliable soldier, rather than because she cared about preventing 
regret for my own sake. But it is not implausible to imagine a similar 
system intended to predict regret for the individual’s own sake.
Importantly, one may accept this reasoning without holding that 
adaptive preferences or magic pills make a harmful service right. If an 
individual is living a safe life, we should often deny a service that will 
endanger their life even if the person will learn to prefer this dangerous 
life because she has no other choice. I am merely claiming that, if regret 
is likely, this future regret is an additional reason to deny a service, a 
reason that does not arise if an individual will feel no regret due to 
adaptive preferences.
4.2 REGRET AS A WEIGHTY REASON
Though regret is one reason to deny a service, it is not necessarily a 
very weighty reason, to be adopted into the policies of organizations 
and states. The extent that regret is a weighty reason will depend on six 
relevant properties.
4.2.1 Time
The longer the regret will likely last, the greater the reason to deny 
the service to prevent regret. For example, certain medical interven-
tions have led to relatively long-term regret, with patients still wishing 
they had never accepted an intervention a year later, and the regret 
increasing over the course of the year.28 Follow-up studies may fi nd that 
these patients continue to feel regret for years to come. Certain repa-
triation programs have led to similar long-term regret, with the major-
ity of refugees repatriating to Baghdad regretting their choice years 
later.29 Importantly, sometimes repatriation leads to no regret initially, 
but pronounced regret for an extended time later on. When I initially 
interviewed another refugee named Bol in 2014, he did not express any 
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regret about returning, but later began feeling that detention in Israel 
would have been better than displacement in South Sudan. He contin-
ued to feel this way when I spoke with him in Kenya in 2018.30
The most extreme case will involve individuals feeling regret for 
their rest of their lives. While this may seem rare, it is not so rare 
if we acknowledge that, even if an individual will likely feel regret, 
they needn’t feel distress. A person may prefer the life they could 
have lived while feeling happy, learning to cope with distress through 
meditation, music, education, and spending time with friends. Such 
was the case with Bol, who copes with his regret by focusing on his 
studies in Nairobi and his position as a leader in the Nuer commu-
nity. Just as a person who has experienced an involuntary medical 
intervention needn’t feel distress the rest of their lives, even if they 
prefer to have not had the intervention, a person who feels regret 
needn’t feel distress the rest of their lives, even if they prefer to have 
chosen differently.
4.2.2 All-Things-Considered
The second relevant property is that the regret is “all-things-considered.” 
For an agent to know she feels all-things-considered regret, she would 
need to consider all life events that resulted from her decision and com-
pare these to every event that would have happened, had she decided 
differently. She would then need to conclude that the life she would 
have lived was preferable to the life she was living. Imagine, for exam-
ple, that a woman stated that she regretted having an abortion.31 For a 
woman to truly know she felt such regret, she would need to consider all 
life events that resulted from the abortion, such as the job she obtained 
and the relationships she built, and compare these to every event that 
would have happened had she decided differently, such as the job she 
would not obtain and the relationships she would not build. If a woman 
chooses to have an abortion, she usually cannot know if the life she is 
living now would be very similar or different to the life she would have 
lived, had she decided differently. Without knowing how life would be 
different, she would struggle to know if she regretted her choice. If a 
woman rarely knows if she regrets her past choice, then it is usually 
wrong for others to deny her a choice based on future regret.
Though it is diffi cult to know if one feels all-things-considered 
regret, it is possible to be fairly certain one feels such regret. In rare 
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cases, a person is fairly certain that nearly all possible lives they could 
have lived, had they chosen differently, would have been better than 
the best possible life they can now live as a result of the choice they 
made.32 In the case of refugees repatriating, there is some evidence 
this was the case. Of those I interviewed, nearly all considered the very 
worst life they could have in Israel, including in detention, and felt this 
would have been preferable to the best life they could now live in South 
Sudan. They felt that the food and medicine they would have in Israel 
were more valuable than the freedom they gained from returning.
Now, in reality, the best life with a service is never certainly worse 
than the worst life without a service. Without a service, tragedy could 
have occurred. Had Mol not repatriated he may have been deported, 
killed, or died of natural causes in Israel. Assuming these outcomes 
were not preferable for him compared to whatever would happen if 
he returned, the worst possible life without repatriation was not better 
than the best life with repatriation. There is also the possibility that Mol, 
now that he has repatriated, will later fi nd refuge in another country. 
Refuge in another country may be better than the worst life he could 
have lived in Israel. Moreover, even if he must remain in South Sudan, 
he may adapt his preferences to his environment, and prefer the life he 
has to the life he could have had in Israel.
To account for this possibility, we can view this property as scalar: 
the greater the recipients will feel that the best life with the service will 
be worse than the worst life without the service, the greater the reason 
to deny the service. Imagine that we can predict that Mol will feel, after 
returning, the following three thoughts: (a) the best life after repatriation 
must involve resettlement to a safer country; (b) all other outcomes are 
worse for me than the worst life in Israel; (c) there is only a 1 per cent chance 
of resettlement to a safe country occurring.33 There would be a weightier 
reason to deny repatriation than if he held the fi rst two thoughts, but 
also felt there was a 2 per cent chance he could obtain resettlement to 
a safe country. Conversely, imagine that after returning Mol will feel, 
looking back at his life in Israel, that there was a 1 per cent chance of 
either dying in the near future or being deported had he remained in 
Israel,34 and dying or deportation in Israel are worse than the best pos-
sible outcome in South Sudan. If this feeling could be predicted ahead 
of time, there would be a weightier reason to deny repatriation than if 
he will later perceive a 2 per cent chance of dying or being deported had 
he remained in Israel.
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Note that the relevant property above is not the actual probabilities 
of certain outcomes arising, but the probabilities recipients will per-
ceive after accepting the service. We might imagine Mol thinking, after 
returning, that he has a 2 per cent chance of being resettled when he 
has in fact a 10 per cent chance of being resettled. His level of regret 
is based on a false understanding of the odds of his life becoming 
much better. Even though his regret is based on a false understand-
ing of the odds, we ought to care about such regret. This is because we 
ought to care about preferences based on a false understanding of the 
world, assuming the service provider provides accurate information of 
the world. Imagine a doctor warns a patient that the risks of paralysis 
from surgery are 1 per cent, but the patient insists there is a 60 per 
cent chance of paralysis from the surgery; if the patient rejects the sur-
gery, the doctor ought to respect her preferences. Similarly, imagine 
a doctor warns the patient that the risks of paralysis are 1 per cent, 
but the patient will feel regret after the surgery because she will feel it 
has caused her a 60 per cent chance of developing paralysis at some 
point in her life. There is a weightier reason to deny the surgery than if 
the patient will feel there is only a 1 per cent chance she will develop 
paralysis over the course of her life.
4.2.3 Greater All-Things-Considered Regret from 
Accepting the Service
In some cases individuals will likely feel all-things-considered regret 
if they accept a service, but would have felt the same regret had they 
rejected the service. This might occur if individual’s subjective prob-
abilities change as a result of decisions made. A refugee in deten-
tion might feel the probabilities of being safe if she returns are high, 
such that if she were to reject repatriation she would feel regret, but 
if she repatriated she would perceive the probabilities of protection 
to be low, such that if she were to accept repatriation she would feel 
regret. Even when a refugee’s perception of probabilities remain the 
same, her preferences can still change as a result of choices made. A 
refugee currently in detention may prefer detention to displacement, 
feeling the worst life with detention is better than the best life with 
displacement, such that if she remained she would feel regret, but 
if she returned she would change her mind upon being displaced, 
feeling the best life in detention would be better. If preferences for 
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outcomes can change based on choices, individuals can feel regret 
regardless of what they choose.
When individuals will feel the same regret regardless of whether they 
accept a service, there is a weaker reason to deny the service. Though 
denying the service would prevent regret – if an individual is denied a 
service, she cannot not regret her choice because she has no choice – 
it would still lead to individuals feeling that the best life they can live 
now is worse than the worst life they would have lived, had they access 
to the service. They will remain in a state where they lack control and 
their preferences are not met, failing to promote the value of prefer-
ence-fulfi llment described in the previous section. Regret is therefore 
a weightier reason to deny a service when the all-things-considered 
regret in accepting the service is greater than the all-things-considered 
regret in rejecting the service.
4.2.4 Epistemic Transformation
Some might feel that, even if the above three properties are present, 
individuals should still be provided services they will likely regret. So 
long as individuals give their informed consent to accept the service, 
the service gives them control, providing an option they otherwise 
would not have.
If what matters is that individuals have control, and they have 
control when giving informed consent to a service, there is a fourth 
relevant property: regret is a weightier reason to deny a service the 
less individuals can give informed consent. Individuals cannot give 
informed consent if they are uninformed, as when the service provider 
never discloses risks. This might occur if the service provider cannot 
gather information about the service, including the risks of regret. 
I assume such scenarios are irrelevant for our discussion: if there is 
no information about likely regret, we cannot know if there is reason 
to deny the service to prevent regret. Moreover, I assumed in the intro-
duction to this chapter that recipients are warned of risks, unlike in 
cases addressed in Chapter 3.
Even if recipients are warned of risks, there is another way they may 
not be fully informed. They may be accepting a service that is “epistemi-
cally transformative.”35
According to L. A. Paul, an epistemically transformative experience 
arises if one gains knowledge one cannot gain without the experience. 
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All experiences are epistemically transformative to an extent. The 
apple I ate this morning tasted slightly different than other apples I 
have eaten, and so I could not have known its taste before it touched 
my tongue. Some choices are more transformative, such as eating a 
durian fruit for the fi rst time. Some choices are so transformative that 
a dominant element of one’s life will change, and this change is both 
impossible to understand prior to the choice, and necessary to under-
stand in establishing one’s preferences.36 A woman who has seen only 
black and white, and is deciding whether to experience the color red, is 
faced with such a choice,37 as is a teenager deciding whether to enlist, 
a deaf individual deciding whether to gain hearing, and a potential 
parent deciding whether to have children. In such cases, the teen-
ager, deaf individual, and potential parent cannot establish whether 
they prefer enlisting, hearing, and having children unless they under-
stand what it is like to enlist, hear, and have children, but they cannot 
understand what these experiences are like until they experience them 
fi rst-hand. They are therefore faced with an insurmountable informa-
tion-constraint.38 In such cases, they cannot make an entirely informed 
choice because they cannot entirely understand the nature of the risks 
they are accepting, even if they are informed in words what these 
risks are. Though they cannot make an entirely informed choice, they 
nonetheless can consider how much they value new experiences and 
discoveries for their own sake, as distinct from the subjective good-
ness or badness of the outcomes. Because each person values new 
experiences to a different degree, only each person can decide what 
she ought to do.39
Based on the above analysis, governments and organizations should 
generally not deny services based on their epistemically transformative 
character. It is true that recipients of the services cannot entirely under-
stand the decisions they are about to make, but each individual is able 
to decide whether they are willing to accept a decision whose meaning 
they cannot comprehend.
Nonetheless, special reasons to deny such services arise if regret is 
likely. If individuals will likely regret a choice, they will later fail to live 
the life they want to live, and be unable to change their earlier deci-
sions. Given this likely outcome, there are reasons to ensure recipients 
are especially well-informed about the choices they are about to make. 
Being especially well-informed requires an especially clear under-
standing of the service one is accepting. Such a clear understanding is 
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impossible for services that are especially epistemically transformative, 
as they will change one’s life in a manner impossible to comprehend 
ahead of time. This creates one reason to deny the service likely to be 
regretted, a reason not arising with regretted services that are not epis-
temically transformative or with epistemically transformative choices 
that are not likely to be regretted.40
Mol’s choice to repatriate was epistemically transformative. Though 
he was informed about malnutrition in South Sudan prior to this return, 
and informed of widespread racism against Nuer citizens, he struggled 
to comprehend the meaning of such malnutrition and racism until 
actually experiencing these phenomena. This is because he had last 
lived in South Sudan as a very young boy, and had access to food and 
security as a young boy, having moved to Khartoum before violence 
reached his village. Similar experiences were common amongst others 
who repatriated, such as Bol:
You know, I should have stayed in Israel. It would have been better 
to stay in Israel, even in detention . . . Before I returned I had heard 
about what it was like in South Sudan. I heard about insecurity 
and the problems. But hearing is not experiencing.41
Refugees like Mol and Bol were told about the facts of life in South 
Sudan – such as persecution and malaria – but struggled to under-
stand the meaning of living with persecution and malaria, having lived 
their adult lives abroad. When individuals take a plunge into a life that 
includes elements impossible to understand, and these elements are 
crucial to understand in forming preferences, they struggle to give 
truly informed consent. If truly informed consent is necessary for ser-
vices involving all-things-considered regret, there is a weightier reason 
to deny epistemically transformative services that lead to all-things-
considered regret.
Not all cases of refugee repatriation are epistemically transformative. 
When refugees are returning to a country they have lived in recently, or 
for an extensive period of time, they may be returning to conditions they 
have experienced in the past, and so the experience will not be transfor-
mative. But such conditions are increasingly rare. Many refugees return-
ing from Uganda to Rwanda in the 1990s had last lived in the country 
as small children, having fl ed in the 1950s and 1960s. Younger refugees 
returning from Pakistan to Afghanistan in the 2000s had little recollection 
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of the country, having fl ed prior to the rise of the Taliban. Refugees cur-
rently returning from Kenya to Somalia are arriving in towns and villages 
they have never seen, their parents having fl ed before they were born.42 
If they cannot give their truly informed consent, the high likelihood of 
regret may be a decisive reason to deny repatriation.
4.2.5 Transformative Rejections
Of course, even if an individual is accepting an epistemically transfor-
mative service, rejecting the service might be equally transformative. 
Refugees who reject repatriation may fi nd themselves in detention for 
the fi rst time, an experience whose meaning they cannot comprehend 
beforehand, and they may feel similar all-things-considered regret to 
those accepting repatriation.
To account for the potential ways that rejecting a service can be 
transformative, we ought to add a fi fth relevant property: regret is a 
weightier reason if those rejecting the service will unlikely feel all-
things-considered regret at rejecting the service, or unlikely feel their 
decision was epistemically transformative. Were we to learn that both 
providing and denying the service were all-things-considered regretful 
and transformative, there would be a weaker reason to deny the service, 
as individuals will still be experiencing something incomprehensible 
and contrary to their future preferences.
In contrast, when individuals accepting and rejecting the service feel 
similar all-things-considered regret, but only one group is accepting 
an option that is epistemically transformative, there would be greater 
reason to deny the option that is transformative. This might occur if ref-
ugees are choosing between a life in detention they have already expe-
rienced, and a life in a country of origin they have never seen. In such 
a scenario, if regret is likely for both choices, only the second choice is 
transformative, and so only the second choice is not fully informed. In 
such a scenario, there would be a weightier reason to deny repatria-
tion than if both remaining and returning were equally transformative. 
Similarly, we might imagine refugees who have lived in their country of 
origin recently, but will experience detention if they remain, and they 
have never experienced detention before. In such a scenario, if regret is 
likely for both returning and remaining, only remaining is transforma-
tive, and so only remaining is not fully informed. In such a scenario, 
there would be a weaker reason to deny repatriation.
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4.2.6 Causality
There is a fi nal relevant property, relating to causal explanation: The 
more the service explains the regret, the weightier the reason to deny 
the service to prevent regret. In cases where the recipient will likely feel 
regret because of the service alone, and this regret is not dependent on 
other choices, there is an especially weighty reason to deny the service.
There is some evidence that Mol’s all-things-considered regret was 
largely explained by the repatriation he accepted. While still living in 
Israel, Mol could not apply for refugee status, and so was forced to work 
on the black market, and then forced to face detention. He had only 
two choices: live in detention, or repatriate. When he returned, his only 
source of income was the money he returned with, his only option of 
employment was to start a business, and his only place to live was Juba, 
given the lack of customers in secondary towns. He was then forced to 
fl ee to an IDP camp. In a life of few options, repatriation was the only 
choice that resulted in the outcome of all-things-considered regret. 
And it is this choice alone that was made possible by OBI. As such, 
he received help to make a choice that was largely responsible for the 
all-things-considered regret he felt.
This is not always the case with repatriation. Unlike Mol, some refu-
gees can apply for refugee status, but choose not to. Had they applied, 
and gained refugee status, they would have gained residency and pos-
sibly citizenship. Had they gained citizenship, they could have left and 
re-entered the safe host country fairly easily. Had they repatriated after 
this, their repatriation would be reversible, and less likely to be regret-
ted. If in reality they chose to not apply for refugee status and also chose 
to repatriate, their all-things-considered regret would be from a series 
of choices, and not just repatriation. Helping with repatriation in such 
cases is not as problematic. Repatriation would be only one of many 
choices that, in combination, lead to the regret felt.
Some might suppose that this property is rarely ever found. This is 
because it is rare that someone feels regret from a single choice alone, 
or even from a small number of choices. Mol almost certainly made 
many choices after he repatriated that he regretted, and so the regret he 
experienced after repatriating would be the result of both repatriation 
and these subsequent choices. For example, if Mol repatriated, regret-
ted his decision, and then opened a small stand in the IDP camp which 
he regretted as well, he would feel regret from both repatriating and 
this subsequent decision. Indeed, there will likely be many decisions he 
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makes in life that lead to the feeling that his life could be better had he 
decided differently, and so no one decision that will lead to the regret 
he feels.
Though Mol will likely make other decisions that lead to regret, it 
is unlikely he will make other decisions that lead to regret that is all-
things-considered, and from an epistemically transformative experi-
ence. This regret is rare, and so if one does feel such regret from a service, 
there will likely be an extended period of time where the service alone 
explains this regret. In the case of Mol, even if he were to regret open-
ing a stall in the IDP camp, he would not feel all-things-considered 
regret, where the worst life without the stall would have been better 
than the best life with the stall. If only the choice to repatriate entailed 
such strong regret, and no other choice explains this strong regret, then 
repatriation explains this strong regret. The more repatriation explains 
this strong regret, the greater reason to deny repatriation.
This sixth property is not limited to cases of repatriation. Imagine 
a segment of the population, despite leading the healthiest of lives, is 
diagnosed with cancer, and undergo treatment to extend their lives by 
two years, leading to painful side effects and regret. Imagine they feel 
regret from the particular choice to accept the treatment, never having 
made another choice that contributed to the regret felt. In such cases, 
the doctor providing the treatment would be contributing a great deal 
to the regret felt, as the regret would arise from the treatment alone, 
and no other prior or subsequent choices. The hospital would have a 
weighty reason to discontinue the treatment, assuming the other fi ve 
properties were present. Similarly, imagine students regret their choice 
to enroll in a costly degree program, later feeling that their lives would 
be all-things-considered preferable had they never enrolled, and no 
other choice explains this all-things-considered regret they feel. If this 
regret were epistemically transformative, and they wished the degree 
had never been an option at all, this would give the university an espe-
cially weighty reason to discontinue the degree program, or limit it to 
students less likely to feel all-things-considered epistemically transfor-
mative regret.
It is worth noting that, even in cases where regret is an especially 
weighty reason to deny a service, because there is a strong presence of 
all six properties, there may still be competing considerations. When 
these competing considerations are suffi ciently weighty, regret may not 
be a decisive reason to deny the service.
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This might be the case if those who will not regret their choice 
will help the worst off as a result of their choice. Some refugees who 
repatriated from Israel started their own businesses, felt no regret, and 
employed other South Sudanese nationals who would otherwise have 
no employment. Such benefi ts may justify continuing repatriation ser-
vices, even if most who repatriate regret their decision. Moreover, we 
may feel that regret is not a decisive reason to deny a service if, in the 
distant future, the recipients will ultimately feel no regret. If recipients 
will likely be satisfi ed with their decision in the fi nal years of their lives, 
feeling they ultimately made the right decision, this future satisfaction 
may create a countervailing reason to support the service, even if regret 
in the interim period is long lasting.
This same conclusion is relevant outside the sphere of repatriation. 
Consider policies surrounding contraceptive sterilization. Today, many 
states deny sterilization to individuals younger than twenty-fi ve,43 as 
those younger than twenty-fi ve are statistically more likely to regret 
their decision.44 Even if there is a weighty reason to deny sterilization, 
this reason may not be decisive due to competing considerations. One 
competing consideration is related to reproduction: the right to con-
trol one’s reproductive organs to not have children may be especially 
weighty, such that preventing regret may be insuffi cient to override 
this right.45
Though regret is not always a decisive reason to deny a service, it is 
still a weighty reason, and this can have implications for cases where 
competing considerations are relatively weak. Such is the case, I believe, 
with repatriation: the interests in refugees returning to unsafe coun-
tries is not a weighty enough consideration to trump the importance 
of preventing of regret, at least when the six properties I described are 
present. Similarly, athletes’ interests in joining a team do not necessar-
ily trump the value of preventing regret, and it is not clear that patients’ 
interests in extending their lives by two years trump the value of pre-
venting regret. Of course, establishing when other interests trump the 
value of preventing regret will require a broader discussion, but such a 
discussion is necessary precisely because regret matters.
Until now, I have limited my discussion to individuals who will feel 
regret in addition to experiencing reductions in welfare and freedom. 
When Mol repatriated he was forced into an enclosed camp without 
reliable food and water, and regretted his decision for these reasons. 
I believe that regret also matters when welfare or freedom will be 
5857_Gerver.indd   113 04/10/18   2:53 PM
114 The Ethics and Practice of Refugee Repatriation
improved. Imagine a refugee who repatriates from a detention center to 
Gambella in Ethiopia, never having tasted Ethiopian food or Ethiopian 
espresso, never having lived in a hot tropical climate, never having slept 
under a mosquito net, and never having worked as an interpreter, his 
profession upon arrival. His life is improved according to certain objec-
tive criteria – he has more food and mobility – but he regrets his choice 
nonetheless, a choice leading to a life he could not fully understand 
prior to repatriating. If an NGO could predict that he would likely feel 
this way prior to return, I believe the NGO would have a reason to deny 
him repatriation. This is because, if regret is likely, we ought to demand 
a higher level of informed consent, impossible to obtain with epistemi-
cally transformative services.
Some may reject this last claim, and argue that regret is only a 
weighty reason to deny a service if welfare or freedom will be reduced. 
If this true, then we might add this as a fi nal, seventh relevant property. 
It remains the case that, even if regret is only a reason to deny a service 
when welfare and freedom are reduced, regret is a reason distinct from 
these outcomes. Were we to compare two refugees, two athletes, and 
two patients, and the fi rst was likely to feel regret because her welfare 
was reduced, and the second unlikely to feel regret despite her welfare 
being reduced, there would be a reason to deny repatriation to the fi rst 
and not the second. Regret is a distinct reason, and ought to be taken 
seriously by organizations and states.
4.3 REGRET-EITHER-WAY
Even if we accept that regret is a weighty reason to deny a service, a 
dilemma remains for what I call regret-either-way cases. These occur 
when most accepting a service feel regret that is epistemically transfor-
mative and all-things-considered, but those declining the service feel the 
same level of regret as well. Therefore, both continuing and discontinu-
ing the service will likely lead to unfulfi lled preferences later on. In such 
cases, I argued in the previous section, there is weaker reason to deny the 
service compared to cases where individuals will only feel regret if they 
accept the service. Nonetheless, it is still not clear what those providing 
the service ought to do.
For example, when the Israeli government completed a mass deten-
tion center for asylum seekers in 2013, thousands were either detained 
or denied work visas, leading thousands to return.46 Though many 
regretted their choice to return, many who stayed in Israel regretted 
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staying, feeling they were wasting their youth either homeless in Tel 
Aviv, or in a cold detention cell in the middle of the Israeli desert.47 In 
such cases, it is not clear if NGOs should help with return. They will 
cause regret if they do, but if they don’t, individuals will still prefer the 
life they could have lived.
A similar issue may be prevalent in other countries of asylum. Some 
Iraqi refugees feel regret at having arrived in Germany, because of 
unemployment, xenophobic attacks, and being forced to live in cramped 
quarters with strangers. They wish to return home as a result.48 If many 
regret returning, a sub-set of refugees may both regret remaining and 
returning. Importantly, they might regret remaining and returning to 
the same degree. This would be the case if both those accepting and 
those rejecting return feel all-things-considered regret to the same 
extent, and the outcomes are both transformative to the same extent.
A similar dilemma arises outside the sphere of repatriation. Imagine a 
woman in her early twenties wishes to undergo sterilization, and evidence 
demonstrates that she will likely feel regret if she does, and regret if she 
does not due to the distress of potentially having a child she does not 
want.49 Were a hospital to deny her sterilization to prevent regret, it would 
prevent the regret of unwanted sterilization, but would cause her to feel 
her preferences have not been met. It is not clear what the hospital ought 
to do, just as it is not clear what repatriation facilitators ought to do.
Some might claim that it is irrational for someone to feel regret 
either way. Either a woman will regret sterilization, feeling the best out-
come with sterilization is worse than the worst outcome in remain-
ing fertile, or she will regret remaining fertile, feeling the best outcome 
remaining fertile is worse than the worst outcome with sterilization. 
Similarly, either a refugee will regret returning, feeling the best out-
come in returning is worse than the worst outcome in staying, or she 
will regret staying, feeling the best outcome in staying is worse than the 
worst outcome in returning. How could both possibly be true?
I believe they can. As humans, our preferences change depending 
on what we are experiencing, and so we can regret a choice because 
we chose it. For example, some people get married because they can-
not imagine life without their partner being better than life with their 
partner. After several years of experiencing life with their partner, they 
begin feeling that the worst life without their partner would be better 
than the best life with them. If they get divorced, they may again change 
their mind, pining for their ex-spouse precisely because they are gone, 
again feeling the worst life with their ex-spouse would be better than 
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the best life without them. While marriage is reversible – a person can 
marry and divorce multiple times – many choice pairs are not. When a 
person must select one of two irreversible choices, she may face angst 
and indecision, knowing that all-things-considered regret is inevitable. 
When we are tasked with helping others reach one of two likely regret-
table decisions, it is similarly unclear what we ought to do.
A similar question arises when we cannot contact past recipients, 
and so cannot establish the extent of regret-either-way. For example, 
the UN struggles to contact those who have repatriated to rural areas, 
or who have migrated to other countries after repatriating. More worry-
ingly, the UN may have the most diffi culty contacting those most feel-
ing regret, because those most feeling regret have no access to a cell 
phone in an IDP camp. It is not clear if repatriation should continue 
if the UN cannot determine whether refugees returning feel greater 
regret than those remaining.
The above dilemmas can be avoided by appealing to considerations of 
freedom and safety. If refugees will face detention if they stay, in addition 
to regretting their choice either way, then return should be facilitated 
because at least they will be free. If refugees will face persecution if they 
return, in addition to regretting their choice either way, return should 
not be facilitated because at least they will be safe. Similarly, if refugees’ 
regret is uncertain, because they cannot be contacted, return should be 
facilitated to avoid detention, or not facilitated to protect safety.
However, this is unhelpful if refugees will face detention if they stay 
and lack safety if they return, possibly regretting either outcome. In such 
cases, there is another relevant consideration. Sometimes, one choice is 
reversible while another is not. For example, a woman rejecting steriliza-
tion can always accept sterilization later, but if she accepts sterilization 
now she cannot reject sterilization later.50 Repatriation often has this 
asymmetry. Many refugees can return later if they do not return now, 
but cannot live in the host country if they do return now.51 When such 
asymmetry arises, facilitators should not necessarily block refugees from 
repatriating if they cannot predict regret, or if regret is likely to occur 
either way.52 But facilitators should nudge refugees to stay rather than 
return. This can be instituted by requiring that refugees wait a specifi ed 
amount of time before their transport is provided, or by emphasizing the 
extreme dangers of returning and the advantages of staying.
The idea of nudging individuals to accept a reversible decision over an 
irreversible one has been applied in spheres outside repatriation. It has 
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been noted by Wang et al. that, when a person posts on Facebook, they 
are posting a largely irreversible post, and many posts are life-altering, 
involving an offensive joke or an incriminating photo, undermining a 
person’s career, reputation, and friendship network. Because of this risk, 
Wang et al. suggest that users fi rst be asked if they are certain they wish to 
post a comment. The authors emphasize that this is justifi ed to mitigate 
regret,53 and I believe the reason it mitigates regret is that, if users post 
now they cannot reverse the act, but if they do not post now they can 
always post later.
While only nudging is justifi ed in most cases, completely deny-
ing a service may be justifi ed if, one day in the future, a choice will 
become reversible. In such cases, service providers should wait until 
this day arrives before helping. Such was the case for Theodore, a South 
Sudanese refugee who arrived in Israel in 2007 and lacked any legal 
status in Israel by 2012. Had he returned he would be unable to re-enter 
Israel, but he had a child with his Israeli partner, qualifying him for 
residency status in the future.54 Once he gained this status, he would be 
able to enter and exit Israel at will, and repatriating would no longer be 
irreversible. Refugees like Theodore should not be assisted with repa-
triation until they gain residency status, making repatriation reversible. 
Under such a policy, refugees would be able to avoid the all-things-
considered regret that comes from irreversible decisions, while still 
accessing repatriation later on.
In many cases, irreversible choices will likely remain irreversible. 
Many refugees will be unlikely to gain legal status to exit and enter their 
host country at will. In such cases, we cannot wait until their choices 
become reversible if they never will. The irreversible nature of their 
choice is not a reason to deny it, even if regret is possible.
4.4 CONCLUSION
When an individual consents to a service, we might provide it, believ-
ing it is her choice to make. But a choice at one time can confl ict with 
preferences at another. Mol later regretted leaving Israel, feeling his life 
would have been better had he remained, and such regret was per-
haps predicable: the UN warned of likely violence and poverty, and past 
returnees expressed similar regret to what Mol felt. When regret for a 
life-altering service is predictable, regret is one reason to discontinue 
the service.
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In cases where someone will likely feel regret from both receiving 
and rejecting the service, the service should be denied if it is irrevers-
ible, assuming it will become reversible in the future. When the service 
will not become reversible in the future, it should be provided but still 
discouraged: those given the service should be told the benefi ts of its 
rejection and the disadvantages of its acceptance.
Repatriation facilitators today rarely explore whether their assistance 
leads to regret. If regret is ever a reason to deny a service, they ought 
to interview past returnees, asking them if they regret their choice to 
return. Most refugees will unlikely experience all-things-considered 
regret. But some may feel regret similar to that of Mol. We should know 
about such experiences, accounting for preferences refugees have later, 
when assisting them now.
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PAYMENTS
In 2007 Sweden offered $7,150 to families who agreed to return to 
Afghanistan.1 A year later the Ghanaian government, working with 
the UN, gave refugees $100 to return to Liberia.2 Soon after, Denmark 
began offering $18,700 to anyone returning to Iraq, Iran, and Soma-
lia.3 In 2010 the British National Party promised, if elected, to give 
$78,000 to migrants or refugees who agreed to leave the country.4 The 
BNP was never elected, but in 2011 the UK government handed over 
$3,500 in cash to families agreeing to return to Zimbabwe.5 In 2013 
the Israeli government followed suit, providing $3,500 to thousands 
of asylum seekers who agreed to repatriate. Those who refused were 
provided a slightly different offer: $3,500 to accept a one-way ticket to 
Uganda, Rwanda, or Ethiopia, where they would be unable to obtain 
any legal status. Three years later Germany began paying $7,000 to 
Afghan nationals returning home,6 and Australia promised $20,000 to 
Rohingya returning to Myanmar.7
In all of these cases, and many more,8 a large proportion of those 
returning were owed asylum and protection from deportation.9 
Given that they were owed asylum, it is not clear if paying them to 
leave was morally permissible. Perhaps it was, because only forcing 
refugees to leave is wrong, but perhaps it was not, given the dangers 
of returning.
Payments for repatriation are not new, but there are few studies 
describing such payments, nor analysis as to whether they are ethical.10 
This chapter both describes payments, and considers whether they 
ought to be given.
Section 5.1 describes “Motivation Payments,” when governments 
hope to motivate refugees to unsafely leave the country. I argue 
that such payments are only morally permissible if refugees can 
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again access the host country after leaving. In Section 5.2 I address 
“Coercion Payments.” These occur when refugees are coerced to 
return, because they are forced to endure insecurity, detention, or 
enclosed camps if they remain. Humanitarian organizations, eager 
to help, provide money to refugees who decide to return. Such was 
the case in the 2000s, when the UN provided $400 to thousands of 
refugees repatriating from Kenya to Somalia11 and to hundreds of 
thousands of refugees repatriating from Pakistan to Afghanistan.12 If 
refugees are accepting money to return because remaining is unsafe, 
it is not clear if organizations should be providing such money. I 
argue that organizations should provide money if refugees will likely 
face detention or insecurity regardless, and if providing money does 
not causally contribute to government coercion. In Section 5.3 I 
address an objection: refugees ought to be given funds to expand 
their choices, even if the funds motivate them to forego asylum, and 
even if returning contributes to government coercion. I argue that 
payments may, indeed, be justifi ed for this reason, but only in cases 
where the funds are substantial enough to ensure long-term safety.
Before addressing the above claims, a clarifi cation is in order. As in 
previous chapters, I assume that states ought to grant asylum to sur-
vival migrants, including those fl eeing poverty or general violence, 
rather than only those fl eeing persecution. As before, one can reject 
this assumption while still accepting my general conclusions about 
payments. If you think that only those fl eeing persecution have a 
right to remain, or only those fl eeing violence, then assume my anal-
ysis is limited to such individuals. I aim not to establish who has a 
right to asylum, but whether those with a right to asylum ought to 
be paid to leave.
5.1 MOTIVATING REFUGEES TO LEAVE
Motivation Payments occur when states offer refugees full protection, 
and motivate them to decline this protection by providing money on 
the condition they leave. It is unclear if such money is ethical.
Consider, for example, a case involving Gatluak, a refugee who fl ed 
southern Sudan as a boy during the Second Sudanese Civil War in 
the 1980s. As an adult he eventually took a boat to Egypt and crossed 
into Israel with the help of smugglers. In Israel he was denied the 
right to apply for refugee status, but was provided a temporary visa as 
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part of general protection granted to all southern Sudanese. His life in 
Israel was satisfactory, as he was free to work in a hotel, could access 
medical care, and experienced no coercive pressure to leave. When 
South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 Gatluak feared 
returning due to his ethnic identity, and because he lacked family to 
ensure basic food security after returning. He nonetheless returned in 
2012 when offered $1,500 by the Ministry of Interior. Six months later 
he was living on a concrete patio outside a police station in Juba, with-
out shelter, savings, job skills, family or daily meals. When I visited 
him that year, strangers were providing him limited food, medicine, 
and water. He did not know how long their charity would last, and 
had no access to state services.13 I was unable to reach him when the 
South Sudanese Civil War broke out in 2013. Based on my interviews 
with other former refugees who returned, he was likely displaced, and 
possibly killed.
We might suppose that Gatluak’s choice to return was not voluntary 
because he did not have true protection in Israel, lacking any refugee 
status. We might also suppose we cannot know if he was a genuine 
refugee, precisely because his claim was never assessed. But Motivation 
Payments are also provided by states assessing claims and providing 
asylum. In the 1990s Australia recognized tens of thousands of Afghan 
asylum seekers as refugees, providing them access to social services, 
work visas, and healthcare, later offering each family $10,000 to repatri-
ate in 2002, leading 3,400 refugees to return.14 Similarly, in the 1990s the 
German government assessed the claims of all Bosnian asylum seekers, 
and recognized them as refugees, later using money to motivate them 
to repatriate to a country where they faced extreme poverty and dis-
crimination.15 Sweden, when providing payments to Afghan refugees, 
similarly assessed their claims and provided them refugee status before 
paying them to repatriate.16 In all of these cases states were offering 
protection, but also paying refugees to decline such protection. It is not 
clear if such payments were ethical.
The UN’s offi cial position is that such payments can be ethical if 
conditions have substantially improved in refugees’ countries of ori-
gin.17 The UN also endorses payments when, though conditions remain 
unsafe, there is evidence that conditions are improving, and refugees’ 
status will soon be revoked. For example, the UN approved of payments 
to refugees returning from Ghana to Liberia in 2008, and to refugees 
returning from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2014.18 However, the UN 
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remains silent on cases where return is clearly unsafe and will remain 
unsafe, and governments still wish to encourage return using mon-
etary incentives. Furthermore, even when conditions have improved, 
it remains unclear whether payments are ethical if conditions are still 
dangerous enough to warrant continued protection.
Before considering when such monetary incentives are ethical, it is 
worth establishing if there is any empirical evidence that money moti-
vates return. In the cases noted, refugees may be responding only to 
fear of future detention, or a belief that conditions have improved in 
their countries of origin. If money itself does not motivate return, there 
are no true Motivation Payments.
There is some evidence that money did motivate refugees to leave 
Israel. I analyzed Israeli labor statistics on payments provided to 
Eritrean, Sudanese, and South Sudanese refugees agreeing to repa-
triate or accept resettlement to Rwanda and Uganda. In the months 
refugees received more money to leave, more tended to leave, even 
when detention rates were the same as in other months, and con-
ditions in countries of origin remained the same.19 For example, in 
October 2013, the government paid all asylum seekers $1,500 if they 
left the country, and also began detaining asylum seekers. There were 
180 who left. While the number decreased when the High Court of 
Justice ordered asylum seekers released in November, from the begin-
ning of December the government passed new legislation to detain 
refugees, and also increased the grant money to $3,500, such that 
detention policies were similar to October, but the payments greater. 
That December 295 returned compared to October’s 180, a signifi cant 
increase.
There was also evidence that the government used money to 
encourage return precisely when detaining refugees was legally diffi -
cult. In March 2013, the UN and Israeli High Court of Justice pressured 
the government to stop detaining refugees and the government imme-
diately increased the payments from $100 to $1,500. Between March 
and August 2013 the government found other ways to detain refugees, 
using a series of by-laws to circumvent the court’s instructions, and 
never also raising the payments. The High Court ordered the end of 
these by-laws in September, requiring the government to again release 
refugees, and the government soon began talks to increase the pay-
ments again. When the government stalled and never actually released 
any refugees, the High Court forced the government to release refugees 
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in October, and the prime minister rapidly approved an increase in pay-
ments from $1,500 to $5,000.20
The above does not prove that money motivated return, as other 
unknown variables – such as the rate of policing, or refugees’ changing 
access to information – may also explain the variation in return rates. 
Nonetheless, this provides supporting evidence that money motivated 
return, and similar evidence was found in studies on repatriation from 
Pakistan to Afghanistan, where refugees were provided $100 to repa-
triate;21 from Tanzania to Burundi, where refugees were provided $41 
to repatriate;22 and from the UK to Zimbabwe, where refugees were 
paid $3,500 to repatriate.23 In all of these cases, there were either posi-
tive correlations between payments and return rates, or governments 
stated that payments were to increase return rates.
If payments motivate refugees to leave, and are intended to motivate 
them to leave, are they morally permissible? To answer this question, 
we might fi rst consider whether refugees are accepting payments vol-
untarily. If they are not, they are victims of forced return, and may be 
wronged for this reason.
In general, there is broad consensus that individuals’ choices are 
voluntary if four criteria are met: individuals must be fully informed; 
they must have full capacity;24 they must not be coerced into their 
decisions; and they must have at least one alternative that ensures an 
acceptable level of welfare.25 For an example where the last condition 
is not met, imagine a starving person accepting a job at slave wages. 
Their choice is involuntary, as both working and not working involve 
unacceptably low levels of welfare. Refugees are similarly involun-
tarily repatriating when choosing between life in detention and star-
vation upon return, or starvation in a refugee camp and persecution 
upon return.26
Though choices are not voluntary when both the choice and alter-
natives are unacceptable, a single choice can be voluntary if this choice 
is acceptable and all alternatives are not. Katy Long has persuasively 
demonstrated this point, using the example of a destitute person who 
has no choice but to accept a job they feel is fulfi lling, and which meets 
their welfare needs.27 The person’s choice seems voluntary because they 
have one acceptable option. Following Long’s reasoning, a choice is 
also voluntary if one is leaving behind a life with a high level of welfare, 
and choosing a life without basic necessities, such as a businesswoman 
voluntarily choosing to quit her pleasant and well-paying job and move 
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to a desert island. Her choice seems voluntary because she has at least 
one acceptable alternative.
Based on the above criteria, refugees who accept money and return 
are doing so voluntarily if they are returning to a country where their 
lives will be safe and their conditions reasonably acceptable or if, though 
returning is unsafe, they have the option of staying in the host country 
with reasonably acceptable conditions. In the case of Israel, these con-
ditions were arguably met for Gatluak, though not for all refugees in 
the country. These conditions were also met for some refugees return-
ing from Australia and Sweden to Afghanistan in 2002 and 2007, as 
some refugees returning could access full rights if they remained.
Therefore, the minimal conditions for voluntariness can be met with 
payment schemes. But even if returns are voluntary, there is another 
reason to believe the payments are unethical. In general, voluntary 
offers can be unethical if they demean the recipients of the offers, or 
create negative externalities for others.28 When governments pay refu-
gees to repatriate, this may reinforce the stereotype that refugees are 
unwanted members of society, whose exit is worth whatever money the 
government is willing to pay. Payments also send a demeaning message 
to refugees: “We do not want you so much,” the payments imply, “that 
we are willing to sacrifi ce money so that you repatriate.” The greater the 
money offered, the stronger this message. For this reason, the British 
National Party – a fringe party and openly xenophobic – was willing to 
give $78,000 to each asylum seeker returning, far more than any other 
party or government in the world. Refugees have no alternative but 
to be exposed to this demeaning treatment, whether they accept the 
money or not.
I believe this is a strong reason to deny payments some of the time. 
When the government pays only African refugees to leave, as part of 
a racist immigration policy, the payments are impermissible because 
of their demeaning nature alone. I shall elaborate on this reasoning in 
Chapter 8. However, when all refugees are paid to leave, and there is 
no racist intention, I do not believe the demeaning nature of the pay-
ments creates a decisive reason against their provision. Refugees can 
turn down the offer, and send a strong counter-message back: “We want 
to stay so much that we are willing to reject your money in order to 
stay.” The greater the money offered, the stronger this counter-message. 
Rejecting payments can strengthen the expressed commitment of refu-
gees to stay, publicizing how dangerous it is to leave.
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There is a second, stronger reason to believe payments are imper-
missible. In general, offers are impermissible if they involve great physi-
cal harm. For example, if I agree to lend you money, and you agree to 
give up your right hand if you do not pay me back, no judge should 
force you to give up your right hand if you cannot pay me back. In 
contract law, judges do not uphold such “unconscionable contracts” 
partly because it is wrong for the state to encourage self-harm, given 
that states were created partly to protect residents within their borders. 
Were the state to encourage self-harming activity, it would also be forc-
ing citizens to pay taxes into a system that made such encouragement 
possible, and there is a limit to what the state should force citizens to 
do.29 Self-harming contracts are also involuntary in one sense: When 
an individual accepts money on the condition they accept harm in the 
future, their future selves will be forced to accept this harm. There is a 
limit to the harm our future selves should be forced to accept, even in 
light of previous consent.
Payments to repatriate are types of “unconscionable contracts.” In 
Israel, refugees arrive at the offi ce of a civil servant, sign on a dotted 
line, their legal status is revoked, and they receive $1,500 in an envelope 
once boarding a fl ight. If they attempt to re-enter the country, they will 
likely be deported, because they earlier received money to forgo future 
protection.30 Throughout this process, refugees are encouraged to risk 
their lives, rather than continue to accept protection, and the public is 
forced to pay taxes into a system that enforces this contract.
We might claim that, in cases where refugees cannot re-enter the 
host country, it is not payments that are wrong, but the enforcement of 
the agreement. If refugees who tried to re-enter Israel were deported, 
then this was a form of refoulement, the illegal forced removal of ref-
ugees according to international law. The problem is the wrongful 
rejection of genuine refugee claims, and this would be wrong whether 
there were payments or not. However, even in cases where refugees 
are merely paid to repatriate, but not blocked from re-entering, they 
may still face immediate danger after return, and be unable to apply 
for a visa, travel back to the safe country, and again apply for refu-
gee status. When civil war broke out in South Sudan, almost half of 
my respondents fl ed to an IDP camp, and could not leave the camp 
safely because of their Nuer identity. They also lacked money to pay 
for a private vehicle to pick them up, take them swiftly to the airport, 
and fl ee the country by air. If the risks of return are signifi cant, then 
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the government is still encouraging self-harming activity, even if it is 
merely paying for repatriation, rather than paying for the revoking of 
all future refugee rights.
The above reasoning suggests that payments are morally permis-
sible for those not at risk from return. Some refugees return to coun-
tries with considerably improved conditions, or have private means for 
ensuring protection. Others are returning to unsafe countries but have 
practical and legal mechanisms to later re-enter the host country if they 
fi nd themselves in danger.
This last condition may be realized if refugees are paid to leave 
with re-entry visas and evacuation services in the event of a cri-
sis, similar to the evacuation provided to citizens abroad. The risks 
to return would be limited, and so such payments permissible. As 
noted in Chapter 3, a close version of this policy was implemented 
in the 1990s, when the governments of Sweden, France and the UK 
provided funds to Bosnian refugees to travel to Bosnia, and allowed 
them to re-entry to these states’ territories if they were unhappy with 
their return.31 On a more limited scale, UNHCR organized “go-and-
see” visits for Burundian refugees in Tanzania, providing them pay-
ments to repatriate, along with transport to again re-enter Tanzania 
if they so wished.32
Many of these programs did not allow refugees to change their mind 
more than once: They could repatriate, re-enter the host country once, 
and if they repatriated a second time they were not offered a visa to 
again re-enter the host country. A better policy would allow refugees to 
exit and enter the host country at will, and access emergency evacua-
tion if necessary. Such payments would merely incentivize return, with-
out signifi cantly sacrifi cing refugees’ safety.
5.2 PAYING REFUGEES FORCED TO LEAVE
In many cases refugees will likely face serious risks if they return, but if 
they stay they will be detained, destitute, confi ned to camps, or likely 
deported in the future. In such cases, humanitarian organizations often 
provide their own funds to refugees hoping to return. These organiza-
tions clearly provide payments for involuntary returns, given that refu-
gees are choosing between two unacceptable alternatives, but perhaps 
they should provide payments if refugees are unlikely to be offered full 
rights regardless. It may be better to encourage individuals to return via 
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a repatriation program than to remain in detention or enclosed camps, 
possibly violently deported.
Such was the case in the mid-2000s in Tanzania, when anti-refugee 
sentiment increased, prompting the government to confi ne Burundian 
refugees to camps, denying them the option of working in urban areas, 
and forcing many into detention-like conditions. The UN, hoping to 
help alleviate these conditions, offered refugees funds to repatriate, 
even as evidence grew that they would be unlikely to fi nd food security 
in Burundi with the money offered.33 In 2002 UNHCR made a sim-
ilar decision in Pakistan and Iran, where over three and half million 
Afghan refugees were living at the time, many detained, denied visas, 
and threatened with deportation.34 UNHCR offered refugees willing 
to return $50, a signifi cantly large proportion of the average annual 
income for refugees. It later managed to raise enough money to pay 
$400 to each refugee repatriating, hoping to eventually pay each family 
$3,000.35 Its payments were a critical factor in explaining at least some 
refugees’ reasons for returning, and critics argued that the UN was 
complicit in mass forced returns.36
The same dilemma arose in Kenya, where the UN began paying 
Somali refugees $200 if they returned home, and an additional $200 
once they arrived. Some refugees explained that they agreed to return 
because it was better to accept money now than be deported later. One 
mother-of-fi ve explained, “Since our future is unclear, I do not want to 
be put on a lorry and sent back, so I will take the money.” A 70-year-old 
grandfather similarly stated:
What will happen if we don’t voluntarily return? Will we be forced 
back in a few months? We are feeling a lot of pressure. If we will 
be forced back anyway, it would be better to take the benefi ts 
now rather than just get kicked back later.37
Around the time Somali refugees began leaving Kenya, Eritrean and 
Sudanese refugees began leaving Israel, either returning home or 
accepting a one-way ticket to Uganda or Rwanda.38 At fi rst, the gov-
ernment was the only body to provide funds to refugees leaving, and 
most NGOs refused to cooperate, feeling refugees were accepting 
funds because they feared detention or deportation. Evidence suggests 
that refugees were indeed accepting funds for these reasons. Accord-
ing to the labor statistics, more refugees accepted funds to leave when 
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detention increased, and fewer left when detention decreased, even 
when payments remained the same.39 For example, in August 2013 the 
government passed a new “Anti-Infi ltration Law” allowing the Ministry 
of Interior to arrest refugees, and 170 left the country. When the High 
Court of Justice nullifi ed the law in September, only eighty-nine left, 
even though payments remained the same. When no one was actu-
ally released by October 2013, the number of those leaving increased 
again, from eighty-nine to 180, even while payments remained the 
same as in September.
Some refugees, though destitute or in detention, were afraid to leave 
and remained homeless or detained. As the Israeli government seemed 
unwilling to change its policy, some NGOs eventually offered refugees 
an additional payment of €800 to those returning home, feeling this 
was preferable to no help at all. One of the fi rst refugees to receive 
such funds was Tigisti, her husband Massawa, and their two children.40 
All were included in the 38,000 individuals whom UNHCR considered 
likely refugees,41 despite the Israeli government denying them this sta-
tus. Tigisti decided to return because, though UN offi cials were reset-
tling some refugees to Europe and North America, she did not know 
if she would be included in this resettlement. When her husband was 
detained in 2013, NGOs tried to help him obtain a visa, but failed, 
instead offering the family €3,200 to repatriate. After returning she and 
her family fl ed to Ethiopia where they gained asylum-seeker status 
but no work visas to support themselves.42 Given that her return was 
involuntary and unsafe, and given that she would not have returned 
had it not been for the funds, it is not clear if the NGOs ought to have 
provided these funds.
The dilemma becomes more complex when we consider cases of 
asylum seekers who have yet to prove they are refugees. Consider, for 
example, the case of Daniel. In the 1980s Daniel’s land was confi s-
cated by the government of Ethiopia, forcing him to migrate to Sudan, 
where he joined a church, found work as a bus driver, and married, 
but faced harassment from authorities. He eventually moved with his 
wife to Egypt, where they gave birth to their daughter, but faced simi-
lar harassment from authorities, deciding eventually to pay smugglers 
to take them into Israel in 2006. Once there, they found jobs in hotels, 
and a school for their daughter, but in 2012 they separated and Daniel 
was forced to raise his daughter alone. When anti-immigration pro-
tests spread, he was detained and his daughter placed in foster care. 
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Government offi cials told him he could re-join his daughter if they 
returned to Ethiopia, and he at fi rst refused, demanding access to a 
Refugee Status Determination process. He fi nally agreed to repatriate 
when an NGO offered him €800 for this purpose. After returning he 
and his daughter lacked medical care, food security, reliable shelter, 
and access to Daniel’s ancestral land.43
We might at fi rst suppose that, in the case of both Tigisti and Daniel, 
NGOs should not have provided money for return. Tigisti and her fam-
ily were faced with only two unreasonable options, and so their choice 
was involuntary. They were therefore victims of refoulement, the ille-
gal forcing of refugees back to their countries of origin. Daniel was not 
necessarily a refugee, but he was denied the right to apply for refugee 
status, and so was wrongfully forced to return before given this right. 
If his return was unsafe, he too was faced with only unreasonable 
alternatives, and so his choice was involuntary as well.
Even if Tigisti and Daniel’s choices were involuntary, NGOs 
might defend their actions with one of two arguments. As argued 
in Chapter 2, it is not wrong to help a person with an involuntary 
choice if there is no other choice available. If I am shot by a sniper 
and run to the hospital, I can give valid consent to a doctor for risky 
life-saving treatment, even though my options are all unacceptable 
due to the sniper. Refugees may be capable of giving valid consent to 
humanitarian organizations, even though they have no reasonable 
options, so long as organizations can do little else to help. If they can 
help – such as by trying to stop government detention – they should, 
but if they try and fail then payments are justifi ed. Similarly, in cases 
where refugees and asylum seekers are denied access to food and 
shelter, organizations are justifi ed in providing funds to repatriate if 
there is nothing else they can do. Though refugees are involuntarily 
accepting money, it would be even more involuntary for refugees to 
lack the resources to return. This reasoning has been expressed by 
the UN, which states that humanitarian organizations should assist 
refugees to obtain their legal rights but, if this fails, assisting with 
return may be ethical if the “life or physical integrity of refugees in 
the country of asylum is threatened.”44
The above argument, however, is not quite enough to justify the 
payments. Humanitarian organizations could make return possible 
without actively encouraging return by offering thousands of dollars for 
the opportunity. Though refugees may be deported, this is not certain, 
5857_Gerver.indd   134 04/10/18   2:53 PM
Payments 135
and so encouraging return risks undermining potential protection in 
the future.
Humanitarian organizations may present a second argument 
defending payments. Encouraging refugees to return is justifi ed because 
returning is better than waiting. Waiting involves possible deportation, 
even if deportation is not certain. If Daniel had remained in detention, 
immigration offi cials would likely one day open his cell door, force him 
and his daughter into a van, drive them to the airport, and handcuff 
both to their seats as the plane lifted off. Deportations throughout 
Europe involve psychiatrists forcibly sedating refugees on fl ights and 
offi cials physically sitting on refugees until they cannot breathe, move, 
or fi ght back.45 If deportation is traumatic, it would be better to return 
without resistance, and money encourages such non-resistance.
Though payments may encourage a safer return compared to forced 
deportations, there is a good reason organizations should still avoid 
payments. As noted in Chapter 2, organizations should avoid causally 
contributing to coercive policies. When organizations encourage refu-
gees to return from detention, they may encourage the government to 
detain even more refugees.
Such a causal phenomenon may have been at play in some of the 
cases raised in Chapter 2. In 1994 and 1995, when UNHCR began facili-
tating the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Burma, 
it provided limited aid to the most vulnerable, and various forms of 
aid upon return. The Bangladesh government may have signifi cantly 
increased its pressure on refugees to return precisely because it knew 
that aid would be provided.46 And, in general, if facilitating return frees 
up places in detention, then encouraging return by providing payments 
would free up places even more, contributing to the further detaining 
of refugees.
Such payments may also make petitions against government poli-
cies very diffi cult, by making it diffi cult to prove that return is coerced. If 
refugees quietly accept cash in an envelope, the public may believe the 
return is voluntary and safe, when it is not. This may undermine advo-
cacy efforts, further fueling detention policies. In contrast, if refugees 
stay in detention they send a message to the public that they are afraid 
to return and, if they are eventually deported, the public and judicial 
system will be aware that they were forced to return.
Payments to repatriate may similarly discourage refugees from pro-
testing for a change in policy. Activist refugees in Israel, who strongly 
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opposed payments schemes, would organize hunger strikes in deten-
tion, long marches through the desert, and incessant media campaigns 
documenting precisely why they left Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South 
Sudan.47 They focused on encouraging others to lobby the government 
so their claims could be heard. These politically active refugees felt that 
repatriation funds undermined legitimate resistance. This phenome-
non was especially clear in 2012. That year, a month before the planned 
deportation of all South Sudanese nationals in Israel, hundreds of refu-
gees protested regularly against the deportation. Soon after, represen-
tatives from OBI began offering money to return, explaining to refugees 
that deportation was likely.48 The campaign to prevent deportation 
slowly died down, as more returned, and fewer remained in detention. 
As the campaign died down, the detention rates steadily increased, 
leaving fewer behind to protest and encouraging even more to return. 
As more returned, more detention cells became available, allowing the 
government to detain even more refugees.
More evidence is needed to fully establish whether payments caus-
ally contribute to coercion in the way described. If they do, humanitar-
ian organizations have a weighty reason to discontinue payments. Not 
only will denying payments help mitigate coercion, but it needn’t force 
refugees to stay in detention or face a traumatic deportation. Refugees 
can still avoid such traumatic deportation by acquiescing to deportation 
without money. Immigration authorities informed Daniel that his fl ight 
would be paid for by the government, and he could board the fl ight with-
out handcuffs any time. Organizations, in paying him to return, did not 
substantially increase his options; they merely encouraged acquiescence 
to a silent return, potentially undermining advocacy in the process.
The above reasoning suggests it would be ethical for humanitarian 
organizations to provide payments in either one of two scenarios. The 
fi rst is where individuals will be safe if they return, either because con-
ditions are generally safe, or because they are receiving enough money 
to pay for security and necessities after return. Such a return would be 
voluntary because the choice would entail an acceptably high level of 
welfare upon return, even if the alternative is unacceptable detention in 
the host country.
The second scenario is when, though return is unsafe, refugees will 
continue to lack rights regardless of whether they are paid money to 
repatriate and, in being paid money, this does not causally contribute to 
the coercion of others. Money needn’t contribute to coercion if it does 
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not undermine advocacy efforts, and if the government has unlimited 
means of coercion. If the government has enough cells in detention 
centers to detain all refugees in the country, encouraging one refugee 
to return would not free up a cell to detain a new refugee. The govern-
ment might also, rather than detain all, simply deny work visas to all, 
forcing all into destitution, such that if one person left, this would have 
no effect on the overall level of destitution. Such is possibly the case 
when the Kenyan government denies work visas to Somali refugees,49 
such that when a given Somali refugee repatriates to Somalia, this has 
potentially no effect on the overall level of destitution amongst Somali 
refugees in Kenya.
In the case of Daniel, the fi rst scenario did not arise, as return was 
unsafe. The second scenario might have arisen if he would likely remain 
in detention regardless, and there was space in detention to detain all 
asylum seekers and refugees. Helping him return, in this hypothetical 
case, would not contribute to the detention of others, and would help 
him and his daughter avoid a traumatic deportation or a life of destitu-
tion in Israel. In reality, however, the second scenario unlikely arose: 
there were a fi nite number of detention cells in Israel, and encouraging 
him to return freed up his detention cell, leading to the detention of 
others.
Similarly, in the case of Tigisti there is evidence that neither sce-
nario arose. Return was unsafe and there was a strong chance she and 
her family would eventually secure refugee status, either in Israel or 
another safe country. The UN in Israel recognized them as likely ref-
ugees and the High Court of Justice had called for ending indefi nite 
detention of Eritreans. Growing international pressure on Israel also 
led some Western governments to accept refugees for resettlement 
from Israel. NGOs should not have encouraged her and her family to 
acquiesce to returning, given that protection was likely. Even if they 
ultimately would be deported, at least the deportation would be public, 
unlike quietly returning with money. A public deportation can serve as 
evidence in a court petition against the government’s actions, and help 
contribute to greater protection for others in the future.
Some may fi nd the implications of my last point disturbing. By 
denying payments to refugees, organizations would be creating a sce-
nario where some refugees will not agree to return and may ultimately 
face deportation, possibly experiencing police brutality in the process. 
To deny refugees payments would seem to be using them as a means, 
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discouraging them from returning quietly for the purpose of creating a 
traumatic return, all to help bring about a change of policy. Encourag-
ing refugees to repatriate, in contrast, addresses the welfare of refugees 
as individuals with their own needs, rather than objects for a larger 
scheme.
Though it is true that refusing to give money is for a larger scheme, 
it is not true that refusing such money is wrongly using refugees. For 
we generally do not wrongly use others when denying them an option, 
unless we have a duty to provide the option. If I refuse to buy some-
one cigarettes, out of concern for others who would be harmed from 
second-hand smoking, I am not using the person as a means, because I 
have no duty to buy them cigarettes. Similarly, if organizations have no 
duty to pay refugees to return, they are not using refugees when refus-
ing to provide money to leave.
Some might claim that organizations do have a duty to pay refugees 
to leave, so long as these organizations are personal advocates. As noted 
in Chapter 2, a personal advocate assists those who cannot assist them-
selves. A lawyer is a personal advocate, and has a duty to defend her 
client in the best way possible, even if successfully defending her client 
causes others to be wrongfully accused. Organizations can permissibly 
provide payments to help refugees who cannot help themselves, even if 
this contributes to the coercion of others.
While it is true that some organizations serve as personal advocates, 
many do not; IOM and UNCHR claims to be providing repatriation for 
the benefi t of all, rather than only the individuals they help return. More 
importantly, personal advocates still have some duties towards others; 
signifi cant harm towards others provides them reason to discontinue 
their services, just as a lawyer has reason to discontinue representing 
clients if this signifi cantly increases wrongful accusations. If the making 
of payments by organizations signifi cantly undermines efforts to end 
coercion, they have a weighty reason to end such payments.
5.3 CHOICE
We have, at this point, reached two conclusions: Governments should 
avoid payments that encourage return, unless they also provide re-
entrance visas; and humanitarian organizations should avoid payments 
that encourage return, unless return is safe and does not signifi cantly 
contribute to government coercion. These two conclusions imply that, 
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when payments are wrong, governments and organizations are still 
permitted to allow refugees to repatriate without money.
If this is true, some may raise the following objection: If some refu-
gees will return regardless, perhaps it is best to provide money, giving 
them options to start a business, go to school, or migrate to another 
region in their home country. Even if refugees would not really have 
returned on their own, and are indeed motivated to return because of 
money, they will have more choices if they are given money, and there 
is value in having more choices.
Consider the case of Bessie. In 2009 she fl ed an East African coun-
try, went to Egypt, and paid smugglers who promised to take her to 
Israel. As she began her journey across the Sinai, she was kidnapped 
and tortured, but managed to fl ee to Israel, where she was given a year 
of residency, and a room at a center for victims of human traffi cking. 
She wished to return to her country of origin with some investment 
money, a choice made possible when she was offered €800, enough 
money to help her survive during the fi rst year after repatriation in her 
home village. She used the money for rent, school for her children, and 
to start a chicken farm. The chickens she bought eventually died, she 
lost her life savings, and she regretted her decision, but she is still happy 
she had the opportunity to leave Israel with money. Though the money 
ultimately did not help her reintegrate and access suffi cient welfare, 
she feels it increased the chances she would, giving her one choice she 
otherwise would not have.50
The idea that money enhances choices is widely accepted by a num-
ber of repatriation programs. The UK program was called “Choices,”51 
and emphasized that funds assist refugees to start businesses or receive 
job training, an option they otherwise would not have. In Pakistan, the 
UN emphasized that refugees should have the choice of returning to 
Afghanistan with funds, rather than no assistance at all, even if they 
faced insecurity after returning.52 The UN made similar claims when 
helping refugees return from Tanzania to Burundi.53
Though money may provide an extra choice, it can also diminish 
choices in the long run. If a refugee is unlikely to access suffi cient wel-
fare after returning, they will lack various choices associated with wel-
fare, including the choice to leave a given village, send one’s children 
to school, and access suffi cient nutrition. A year after Bessie returned, 
she lacked the full range of employment choices open to her in Israel, 
and the resources to leave her home village. As a result, she also 
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lacked the resources to ensure she could access an adequate range of 
food, shelter, and education for her children. Similarly, two years after 
South Sudanese refugees repatriated, most of my respondents were 
confi ned to IDP camps without resources to leave. Their choices were 
severely constrained compared to their co-nationals in Israel. If orga-
nizations and governments will not send money to those who have 
already returned, and those who return will later need money to access 
mobility and basic necessities, then funds may diminish rather than 
expand choices.
Some may feel that, even if money diminishes choices in the long 
run, the value of choices is that it provides individuals control over 
their lives, and there is value in giving refugees control over how they 
repatriate. Money can provide such control. But even if there is value in 
permitting individuals to control their own lives, there seems less value 
in actively providing resources for control if this undermines welfare 
in the long term, and especially if this contributes to regret later on. 
If I provide an individual cigarettes, they have more control over their 
lives because they can choose to smoke, but it seems my assistance is 
of little value if regret is likely, and if smoking will contribute to cancer 
later on.
This suggests that providing money for repatriation is ethical if it 
enhances control and protects long-term choices associated with secu-
rity and welfare. We might imagine a refugee returning with her husband 
and four children, and each family member receiving $78,000, as prom-
ised by the BNP in the UK. Such funds would total almost half a million 
dollars, providing refugees the choice to decide where to live, what they 
eat, and when to move again. It is nonetheless not enough to claim any 
amount of money increases choices. Money can enhance choices at one 
time, but constrain them at another.
5.4 CONCLUSION
Immigration control involves not just force, but incentives. One major 
incentive is the money refugees receive when agreeing to return home. 
If it is wrong for governments to endorse physically unsafe contracts, it is 
wrong for governments to provide payments to encourage unsafe repa-
triation. In cases where the government is detaining refugees or threat-
ening them with deportation, organizations should avoid providing 
payments that signifi cantly contribute to these policies. Organizations 
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should limit payments to those who are not foregoing safety, and whose 
return does not signifi cantly contribute to the detention of others. While 
it is true that all payments may enhance choices to an extent, repatriation 
can undermine choices when refugees lack basic necessities after return-
ing home.
Given these conclusions, governments and organizations should 
consider changing their current practices, adopting the following policy 
changes.
5.4.1 Re-Entry Visas
In cases where return entails signifi cant risks, states should only pro-
vide funds if they also provide refugees the option of living in the host 
country later on. States ought to either provide residency visas prior to 
returning, or agreements where refugees can be re-admitted with the 
same legal status they had prior to leaving. Such a policy was imple-
mented in the 1990s and 2000s when the French, German, and British 
governments provided funds to Bosnian refugees repatriating, allowing 
them to re-enter France, Germany, and the UK if they felt unsafe after 
returning.54 An even stronger policy would also include evacuation ser-
vices for refugees who fi nd themselves displaced after returning, and 
unable to reach safety. Were states to deny refugees re-admission and 
evacuation, refugees may fail to gain a visa to board a fl ight to safety, 
forcing them to pay smugglers and endangering their lives. Such was 
the case when Israel paid South Sudanese refugees to return, and some 
faced persecution, with one paying smugglers to try reaching Egypt, 
Sudan, and Israel. His experience entailed signifi cant risks. Such risks 
could have been avoided had he been given a visa to safely and legally 
re-enter Israeli territory.
5.4.2 Post-Return Research
To ensure that repatriation does not lead to long-term destitution and 
persecution, states should also conduct post-return research. After a 
signifi cant number of refugees and asylum seekers have returned, 
states should interview a random sample of such returnees, and con-
duct an in-depth study on the mortality rate, rate of displacement, and 
other risk factors related to their return. If the vast majority of returnees 
are living in safety and security, it may be justifi ed to provide funds to 
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encourage return without the corresponding promise of allowing later 
re-entrance. Repatriation would be far more permanent, but at least 
safe. However, this policy must ensure absolute safety for returnees, 
including access to food security, healthcare, and reliable protection 
from the police and military.
5.4.3 Encouraging Voluntariness
In cases where refugees are in detention or enclosed camps, and their 
return is coerced, humanitarian organizations should avoid immedi-
ately providing payments for return. They should fi rst do everything 
possible to try and secure a fair Refugee Status Determination process 
for those in detention and enclosed camps, and help them obtain access 
to freedom, work visas, and social services. Organizations should only 
provide repatriation funds to those whose lives will certainly not be at 
risk, or for those likely to face deportation if they stay, and only if this 
does not signifi cantly contribute to further deportation, detention, or 
destitution amongst other refugees. They should not provide payments 
to populations likely to gain refugee status if they refuse repatriation, as 
was the case with Tigisti, or for those whose departure will contribute 
to others being detained, as was the case with Daniel.
Though organizations should not provide money for return in 
these cases, they may still provide money to those who have already 
returned. So long as organizations do not widely publicize that they 
are helping refugees after return, such assistance needn’t encourage 
repatriation, while still helping protect returnees in their countries of 
origin. For example, a small NGO in Israel began paying for the school 
fees of children whose families had already returned to South Sudan. 
Such assistance, because it was relatively limited, and only provided 
to those most in need after return, did not have a major impact on 
encouraging future repatriation. Indeed, the NGO actively discour-
aged South Sudanese from returning, even while assisting those who 
felt compelled to repatriate to avoid detention. Such policies focused 
on post-return aid as the need arose, rather than pre-return funds to 
encourage return.
The above three policies would create a more ethical repatriation, 
but there remain serious dilemmas. It is not clear if payments are always 
morally permissible when provided to migrants returning to safe coun-
tries. Such payments may be wrong if only some ethnic groups are 
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offered money to leave, in order to cater to the interests of racist voters. 
We may also feel uncomfortable with offi cials approaching our friends, 
classmates, and colleagues, telling them they can have cash if they leave, 
after having established themselves in our neighborhoods, schools, and 
businesses. Payments do not become ethically unproblematic when 
return is safe. But they are especially problematic when return is unsafe. 
Facilitators should avoid encouraging such unsafe returns, and recon-
sider their current practices.
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Chapter 6
CHILDREN
A child is very sick. Her parent refuses to bring her to a hospital, despite 
the risks of staying home. The child dies. We might blame the parent 
for being reckless. This is not because the parent neglected to save the 
child’s life by acquiring medical skills to do so. Rather, the parent had a 
duty to be in a particular place, at a particular time, so others could save 
the child’s life.
A hospital is a very narrow space. We might imagine a broader geo-
graphical location where children have a higher likelihood of being 
saved if they are in danger. It may be reckless for a parent to be in a 
particular neighborhood, region, or country if they are exposing their 
children to greater risks than parents are permitted to take. Should 
parents be able to live wherever they please? More specifi cally, should 
parents be able to migrate to any country they desire?
There are many reasons that parents may choose to live in an unsafe 
country, but perhaps the most common is that they wish to return to their 
countries of origin. In some such cases, refugees are returning to coun-
tries unsafe for children due to ongoing violence, insuffi cient food secu-
rity, and a lack of public services. Such unsafe repatriation was common 
when parents returned from Australia to Afghanistan in the early 2000s,1 
from Norway to Iraq in the late 2000s,2 and from Kenya to Somalia in the 
2010s.3 In these cases, parents left countries with relative security, educa-
tion, and healthcare, traveling to countries without these basic necessi-
ties. Though some parents had savings, many did not. And of those who 
did, it was not clear how long their money lasted, nor if it helped.
As noted in previous chapters, when refugees repatriated from Israel 
to South Sudan, the country lacked basic safety and healthcare.4 Despite 
the risks, parents returned with their children, wishing to raise them on 
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their ancestral land, or feeling there were more opportunities in South 
Sudan compared to staying in Israel.
One returning family was comprised of Mary, Dak, their six-year-
old son and their two newborn twins. They landed in Juba in the 
summer of 2012 and took a taxi to the neighborhood of Tong Peng, 
where friends awaited to host them until they found work. As weeks 
passed they failed to fi nd jobs and were unable to pay for their chil-
dren’s schooling. In November, when their youngest son contracted 
malaria, they sent him to a hospital, using most of their $3,000 in 
emergency savings. As the treatment continued, their money ran 
out, and their son steadily lost the ability to walk or speak, dying in 
February 2013. He was one of seven children known to have died 
within the fi rst three months of return.5 At least two more were killed 
when civil war broke out in December 20136 and of the forty-eight 
children whose conditions I could confi rm as of July 2014, fi ve had 
died of malaria or were killed. This represented over 10 per cent of 
my sample. Importantly, I learned of these fi ve children in relatively 
safe areas and from their guardians: had I confi rmed the conditions 
of all of the children who returned, including those in unsafe areas 
and whose guardians had died, the percentage would likely be higher 
than 10 per cent.
It was not clear if these children’s parents had a right to repatriate to 
South Sudan, or if others should have assisted with their repatriation.
The question of parental rights to repatriate has been largely over-
looked in today’s debates on immigration. Philosophers focus on 
whom states should not deport,7 not whom states should allow to 
leave. The few discussions on the right to leave largely focus on adults, 
with most arguing that adults always have a right to leave.8 Even if 
they do, it remains unclear if they have a right to bring their children 
with them.
In the following section I present a general theory of parental rights. 
I argue that parents must protect their children’s welfare above a given 
threshold. When parents fail to protect their children’s welfare, states 
have a right to intervene. In Section 6.2 I argue that states have a right 
to intervene to stop repatriation that undermines children’s welfare. In 
Section 6.3 I address cases involving coercion, where the state forces 
parents and children to remain in detention or enclosed camps, and par-
ents wish to repatriate as a result. I argue that humanitarian agencies 
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should help parents repatriate if remaining is more dangerous than 
returning.
Before addressing the above arguments, a brief note on my focus 
and assumptions.
Throughout this chapter, I shall focus on families who leave a country 
and cannot easily re-enter this country. This is the case when families 
live without legal status in a host country and, once they repatriate, can-
not re-enter the host country again. This is also the case when refugees 
repatriate and lack the means to re-enter their former host country.
Though I focus primarily on parents repatriating with their children, 
my conclusions may have broader implications. If parents have no right 
to repatriate when this places their children at risk, they may have no 
right to move to a new country that similarly places their children at 
risk. Moreover, if children should never be forced to live in an unsafe 
country, a state could justifi ably deny entrance on the grounds that it 
is too dangerous for children within its territory. We might imagine, for 
example, that a state suffering from poverty, internal strife, or a natural 
disaster could refuse to grant visas to minors, or refuse to allow children 
to repatriate to its territory. Though I do not address these cases, it is 
possible that states ought to take such measures, based on the argu-
mentation I put forth.
6.1 PARENTAL RIGHTS
Let us establish what rights parents have over their children. We can 
start with a consensus: Across cultures there is general consensus 
that parents have some rights to decide where their children live, 
what they eat, where they go to school, and what languages they 
speak. This is partly because, if parents have such authority, they 
can more easily care for their children, ensuring children have basic 
food and shelter, and various moral and inferential reasoning skills. 
Mary and Dak were able to speak to their children in Nuer while in 
Israel, and this allowed them to teach their children how to count 
to ten, tell their children to come inside when it grew dark, and 
encourage them to fi nish their homework on time. Parents also have 
rights over their children because parents’ rights matter, and parental 
rights to share their culture and way of life ought to be respected.9 
When Mary and Dak spoke to their children in Nuer they were not 
only educating their children and keeping them safe, but choosing 
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to share with them their tribal identity, a choice that ought to be 
respected regardless of educational benefi ts.
There is another consensus: parents have a right to raise their own 
biological children. Were the state to pry away children from competent 
parents, and give them to the very best adoptive parents, the psycho-
logical distress biological parents felt would be signifi cant, and so such 
interference would be wrong, unless parents’ care falls below a minimal 
threshold.10
Parents’ care falls below a minimal threshold, I assume, if parents 
fail to help their children lead healthy lives and gain the skills to rea-
son, form reciprocal relationships,11 and function in the society they are 
residing in. For example, parents should try to teach their children to 
make friends, cooperate, and understand basic norms. While there are 
debates as to why parents should help their children gain these skills 
– some claim this protects children’s happiness, others that it protects 
children’s autonomy12 – there is a consensus that parents do have duties 
to ensure children obtain these and other skills.
Perhaps one of the most central of these skills is the ability to func-
tion within an economy, allowing children to later access resources to 
survive, and the self-respect that comes with employment. For example, 
parents should bring their children to school to learn to read, as reading 
is essential for employment later in life. However, it is not clear whether 
parents must merely help children gain skills to function in the econ-
omy they live in, or to function in any economy they desire. Brighouse 
and Swift suggest the former, raising the example of nomadic tribes-
people in sub-Saharan Africa who can function within their economy 
without a high level of literacy,13 and so can respect children’s rights 
without teaching them to read.
There is a problem with this reasoning. Children may be forced 
to live within a particular economy precisely because they only 
gained skills to function within this economy. If a young girl does 
not gain a high level of literacy because she is living in a rural area, 
then the reason she lives in her rural economy may be because she 
has not gained a level of literacy to function elsewhere. Indeed, if 
all children everywhere were illiterate and innumerate, and grew up 
into adults who formed verbal-based economies, they too may be 
able to function in their own economy without literacy. This tells us 
nothing about the sort of economy children ought to be able to func-
tion in as adults.
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It seems that children ought to be able to function in an economy 
that can likely provide them a safe life, a long life, and a life they feel is 
worth living. Children accessing education can more easily obtain these 
goals, because they can access better employment with literacy and 
numeracy, essential for communicating across distances and keeping 
track of transactions. For this reason states aim to ensure that all chil-
dren attend school. Even children who live a nomadic or subsistence 
lifestyle are normally required to gain a given level of education so that, 
once they become adults, they can access other jobs if their traditional 
economies fail.14
6.2 REPATRIATION
Though all states ought to provide education, healthcare, and security, 
many do not. When parents wish to repatriate to such states with their 
children, it is not clear if they have a right to do so. We might at fi rst 
suppose that parents have no right to repatriate if this entails harms 
we do not allow parents to infl ict on their children domestically. If par-
ents act recklessly when failing to bring their children to hospitals and 
schools, they act recklessly when returning to a country without reliable 
hospitals and schools. But we might also suppose it would be wrong 
to stop parents from repatriating, as this would be a form of foreign 
interference. Just as it is wrong to send policemen to foreign countries 
to force parents to send their children to school, it would be wrong to 
prevent parents from returning to countries where their children will 
not attend school.
I shall accept that it is wrong to send policemen to foreign coun-
tries to improve safety and welfare for children, except in extreme 
cases. This would, indeed, entail intervening in the affairs of another 
state. But preventing a parent from repatriating would not entail 
intervening in the affairs of another state, because a parent who 
repatriates is engaging in a domestic act. His repatriation entails pay-
ing for transport and arranging travel documentation, arriving at the 
airport, sitting down in the departure lounge, boarding the fl ight, and 
sitting down in a seat. These actions all take place without leaving 
the state. Just as the act of theft involves not just placing money in 
a bag, but breaking, entering, and picking up the money, the act of 
repatriating involves not just arriving in a foreign country, but every-
thing prior that is necessary to arrive in the foreign country. Even 
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the moment a refugee’s body passes over a border may be consid-
ered within the jurisdiction of the state, in the sense that borders are 
shared by states, and so within their jurisdiction. If a refugee is act-
ing within the jurisdiction of the state when she repatriates, and she 
does not have a right to endanger her child within the jurisdiction of 
the state, then she does not have a right to endanger her child’s life 
through repatriation.
More specifi cally, parents ought to be treated in the following man-
ner: When parents attempt to repatriate in a manner that entails risks for 
their children, states should prevent such repatriation when this entails 
risks parents are prevented from taking more generally.
For example, if parents are required to bring their children to school 
until the age of eighteen, parents should be prevented from repatriat-
ing to a country without schooling for their seventeen-year-old child. In 
contrast, if parents are permitted to remove their children from school 
before the age of eighteen, they should be permitted to repatriate to a 
country without schooling for their seventeen year old.
Some may oppose to this rule of thumb, raising one of three objections.
The fi rst relates to jurisdiction. If a parent is a foreign national, and 
wishes to repatriate to her home country, her home country should 
have jurisdiction over her children. The country she wishes to leave has 
a responsibility to protect its own nationals, rather than foreign nation-
als, and so ought to permit the repatriation of foreign national children. 
It would be wrong if the state of Israel had prevented refugees from 
repatriating to South Sudan, given that it is South Sudan that is respon-
sible for the welfare of these children, rather than Israel.
I believe this objection is relatively weak. It is generally accepted 
that states can prevent risky illegal acts that take place within their 
jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship of those who commit these 
acts. A parent who intentionally refuses to bring his child to the hos-
pital may be tried for recklessness, regardless of his nationality. If 
repatriating is a domestic act that places a child at risk, and placing 
a child at risk is illegal, the state can legitimately prevent the parent 
from repatriating.
There is a second objection. Some claim states are generally per-
mitted to deport foreign nationals, including children, unless they will 
almost certainly die from famine, violence, or persecution in their home 
countries.15 Perhaps states are permitted to deport children who will 
merely lack reliable healthcare or education in their home countries. If 
5857_Gerver.indd   153 04/10/18   2:53 PM
154 The Ethics and Practice of Refugee Repatriation
states are permitted to deport such children, surely they are permitted 
to allow them to repatriate with their parents.
I believe, however, that states are not permitted to deport children 
who will lack reliable healthcare or education in their home coun-
tries. This is because children are owed greater protection than adults. 
Children have fewer mental capacities, and are less able to survive in 
an unsafe environment compared to adults. If a child is returning to 
a country without reliable healthcare, she will be more susceptible to 
various contagious diseases, partly because she has less immunity, but 
also because she may not take precautions that an adult would take 
against catching these diseases. If a child lacks education, she may also 
be unable to develop capacities to care for herself. Because of this, chil-
dren should be protected from deportation even if the risks in the home 
countries are not substantial enough to warrant protection for adults.16 
If children should be protected from deportation to countries without 
reliable healthcare or education, they should be protected from repa-
triation to these same countries.
A third objection concerns cultural rights. Parents, we might sup-
pose, have the right to deny their children some levels of education 
and general healthcare to promote their own culture. Different cultures 
have different conceptions of what is necessary in life, and so parents 
ought to have some discretion over what necessities their children 
obtain.17 For this reason, parents are given the right to refuse to vac-
cinate their children as infants, and sometimes given the right to pull 
their children from school at an earlier age, as when Amish parents in 
the US withdraw their children from school at age fourteen.18 If such 
policies are morally acceptable, then states ought not to prevent repa-
triation to countries with similar risks, such as repatriation to a country 
without vaccinations or reliable schooling. So long as children will not 
face immediate risks from repatriating – such as a child with diabetes 
returning to a country without insulin – repatriation should be permit-
ted. Children will face some risks, but there are clear subjective benefi ts 
for the parents and, in these parents’ minds, these benefi ts extend to 
their children.
These considerations ought to be taken seriously, but they are con-
sistent with the general principle I put forth. The principle held that 
states should prevent repatriation when this entails risks parents are 
prevented from taking domestically. If a state prevents parents from 
removing children from school at fourteen, even if the parent believes 
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this is necessary for their children, the state should not allow parents 
to repatriate with their children to a country without any secondary 
schooling. In contrast, if parents are permitted to remove their children 
from school at age fourteen, parents should be permitted to repatri-
ate to a country without schooling at fourteen, assuming the risks are 
similar.
In establishing whether risks are similar, it is necessary to account 
for the irreversible nature of repatriation. When a child leaves school at 
fourteen within a state, but remains in the state, she can often return 
to school later as an adult, and leave her community behind. A four-
teen year old repatriating to a country without schooling often cannot 
return to school and leave her community behind. Of course, even if 
a fourteen year old leaves school but stays in the country she will still 
suffer from some irreversible effects; missing school at an early age can 
mean challenges learning to read later on. But these challenges can 
be somewhat mitigated through adult education classes, classes often 
unavailable to those repatriating to low-income countries. Similar con-
clusions may be reached regarding some vaccinations and healthcare: 
A parent who refuses to vaccinate their children or bring them to a 
doctor within a state may be threatening their child’s health in a way 
that is irreversible, but the threats can be somewhat mitigated through 
vaccinations obtained as an adult, in addition to the effects of herd 
immunity and general healthcare.19 In contrast, a parent repatriating 
to a country without vaccinations or reliable healthcare prevents their 
child from accessing vaccinations and reliable healthcare in the future. 
As a general rule, irreversible repatriation requires greater safety than 
comparable acts within a state.
In current policies around the globe, the opposite is the case. States 
accept greater risks in repatriating compared to risks of remaining 
within a state. For example, the UK only bans parents from repatriat-
ing with their children if they are planning on marrying their child off 
or traveling to Islamic State-controlled territory.20 In contrast, the UK 
permits families to repatriate to the Central African Republic or South 
Sudan, both of which lack universal schooling and reliable healthcare.21 
In other words, the UK gives parents no authority to remove children 
from school or a hospital domestically, but gives them authority to 
remove their children from a school or hospital through repatriation. 
But it is precisely repatriation that may be irreversible, requiring greater 
vigilance rather than less.
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Now that I have established that parents have no right to repa-
triate when risking their children’s safety and capacities, and states 
have a duty to prevent such repatriation, let us consider how the state 
should intervene. The state could consider the particular risks a child 
will face on a case-by-case basis. For example, the UK has a policy 
of preventing a parent from traveling to Pakistan with their child if 
there is evidence that the parent intends to marry their child off upon 
reaching Pakistan.22 Such case-by-case determinations, however, may 
fail to protect most children, as risks often arise from the country the 
child is moving to, rather than the intentions or actions of the parents. 
A child can be at risk of malaria even if the parents have every inten-
tion to protect the child from malaria.
The state could instead ban parents from traveling to certain coun-
tries that are especially unsafe. This might involve, for example, banning 
travel to South Sudan, which has an 18 per cent school enrolment rate, 
an illiteracy rate above 50 per cent, and a child mortality rate of seventy-
four deaths per 1,000 live births.23 Under such a policy, the state would 
use physical force if a parent attempted to travel to South Sudan, either 
revoking their passports or imprisoning them as a last resort. Traveling 
would be permitted only if a parent proved that, due to their excep-
tional circumstances, they were able to provide security and education 
for their children. The burden of proof would be on parents to demon-
strate that they could mitigate risks substantially.
Some may feel that this policy would be overly harsh. It would pre-
vent even short trips to unsafe countries, as the state would be unable to 
differentiate between parents repatriating and those merely visiting. This 
would also confl ict with the liberal assumption that states ought not to 
interfere with individuals’ rights to leave the country they are residing in. 
Were the state to ban travel, this would prevent merely possible harm to 
children, while certainly undermining freedom for parents.
A less controversial policy would entail discouraging but not pre-
venting parents from repatriating. This would entail informing parents 
of the risks of returning and the benefi ts of remaining, which would 
be particularly helpful for parents who know little about the country 
they intend to return to. Importantly, the goal of information should 
be to persuade parents to stay, rather than to simply inform parents of 
the various risks.24 And for parents who are already aware of the risks, 
the goal should be to remind them that repatriating is unsafe, and that 
staying is preferable to protect the security and welfare of their children.
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6.3 COERCION
The policy recommendations above would be rejected by governments 
actively encouraging refugees to repatriate, requiring any who remain 
to live in destitution, detention, and enclosed camps. In some such 
cases, the government does not itself provide funds for repatriation, 
and refugees lack the funds to repatriate on their own. Organizations 
step in to help by providing transport to parents and their children.
In earlier chapters, I argued that organizations should help with 
return if there is little else they can do, if the return does not encour-
age further detention, and if refugees are informed and unlikely to feel 
regret. Even if these conditions are met, perhaps organizations should 
not help parents return with children, given the risks children will face.
This question is particularly relevant in Kenya, where in 2016 the 
government announced the intended closure of the Dadaab refugee 
complex, where over 260,000 refugees reside. It later closed the Depart-
ment of Refugee Affairs, refusing to register new babies as refugees,25 
and parents and their children began lining up at the UNHCR Return 
Help Desks, hoping to return to Somalia. Close to 70,000 refugees 
returned by the end of 2017, the majority children, and they struggled 
to access food, security, and education once there.26 Given the diffi -
culty children faced in both remaining and returning, it was not clear 
whether UNHCR ought to have helped them repatriate.
In Pakistan and Iran this issue has been relevant for several years, 
as the Pakistani government threatens to detain or deport many who 
remain, and the Iranian government restricts internal movement for 
refugees, conscripting thousands into the Syrian Army. Many wish to 
repatriate as a result, with over two million returning home since 2015, 
81 per cent of which are children. Children face considerable risks after 
returning, with mortality rates amongst them increasing, and access to 
schooling low.27 Despite these risks, UNHCR continues assisting with 
their return. It is not clear it should.
In Israel this question was relevant from 2012, when two immigra-
tion offi cials in Israel sat in their offi ces and printed out white Excel 
sheets, listing the names and addresses of several hundred South Suda-
nese children and their parents. They handed these sheets to dozens 
of policemen who traveled the country, visiting each family on the list, 
and using metal batons to bang on their doors. One door belonged 
to the family of Nyandeng, the fi fteen-year-old girl described in this 
book’s introduction. She had arrived in Israel six years earlier with her 
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mother, eventually settling in the northern town of Naharia. As police-
men arrived, Nyandeng and her younger brother were both wearing 
their backpacks, about to walk to school:
My little brother left the house and saw big men come and enter. 
They said to us, “Sit. You are not going to school.” They were 
very scary looking and huge. My mother wanted to call friends 
for help, and the three men said, “No you cannot call anyone.” 
The immigration police told my mother to just sign some papers 
and that’s all. She signed that paper that says she wants to go 
back. Everyone signs it. She needed to sign, otherwise we would 
go to prison.28
Nyandeng’s mother agreed to return, and describes how she felt before 
boarding the fl ight:
I was crying and crying. I did not want to go to prison, but I have 
nothing to do in South Sudan. I was not born in South Sudan and 
I have nothing here. Even my mother and father had spent most 
of their lives outside of South Sudan, and died in Port Sudan.29
When Nyandeng and her family returned they did not receive assis-
tance from OBI, as OBI had discontinued its program by the time they 
returned. But other families did, and returned under nearly identical 
conditions as Nyandeng.
There are two reasons we might suppose organizations like OBI 
should help with repatriation in such cases.
6.3.1 Freedom
The fi rst relates to freedom. Children have a right to freedom, and 
children cannot be free in detention. If children cannot be free from 
detention, and repatriation assistance does not contribute to detention, 
perhaps helping with repatriation is better than doing nothing at all. 
Even if repatriation will risk children’s health and safety, basic freedom 
is often more important than health and safety.
This reasoning is relatively weak. Even if children’s basic freedom is 
more important than health and safety, health and safety is more impor-
tant than general freedom, such as the freedom to leave a detention 
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center. If children will be able to run, play, and attend school in deten-
tion, their freedom is not suffi ciently undermined to justify repatriation 
to a country without education, security, or medical care. Repatriation 
is only justifi ed if children will face serious insecurity in detention, such 
that remaining is as dangerous as repatriating.
In many cases, remaining really is as dangerous as repatriating, to 
the best of our knowledge. Such is often the case for Somali children 
in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya, who will face similar 
risks in remaining and returning, as noted by single mother Sacdiya 
Noor. Noor repatriated with her children in 2015 and then crossed back 
into Kenya because, as she explains:
There was no security in [Mogadishu], no free services and noth-
ing special [to help] returnees. I left [Somalia] for the safety of my 
children . . . I am stuck [in Kenya] with no rights. It is like they 
are saying, “You either die of gunshot in Somalia or come back to 
starve in Dadaab.”30
In cases like that of Noor, organizations are morally permitted to help 
with repatriation if they have established that returning and remaining 
are equally as dangerous. This is because helping with return protects 
the rights of parents, without undermining the children’s welfare com-
pared to remaining. It is also because parents may have information 
about their children that organizations do not have, and so may be best 
placed to decide what is best when neither outcome is acceptable. In 
other words, while organizations should not help return when return-
ing will clearly undermine the rights of the child compared to remain-
ing, organizations should help with return if both options seem equally 
unsafe, but parents insist returning is safer.
6.3.2 Burdens
Even when remaining is safer than returning, there is a second rea-
son facilitators might help with return. They might feel no parent 
should be forced to accept certain burdens. No parent, for example, 
should be forced to work in a dangerous and demeaning job to feed 
their children, such as working in prostitution to pay for dinner. Sim-
ilarly, no parent should be forced to stay in detention or an enclosed 
camp to protect their children. Parents have certain rights as distinct 
from those of their children, and the right to be free is one such right. 
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This is one reason to help parents repatriate, even if this places their 
children at risk.
Though there are burdens parents should not be forced to accept for 
their children, there are burdens children should not be forced to accept 
for their parents. Were children forced to repatriate, because parents did 
not wish to remain in detention or a camp, children would be losing 
their own welfare for their parent’s freedom. Children’s welfare should 
be prioritized, given that children are more vulnerable than adults, and 
so deserving of special protection. Children should therefore not be pro-
vided repatriation by organizations, even if this is what parents desire.
There are cases, however, where children will repatriate regardless 
of whether organizations help. As noted in Chapter 2, organizations 
often exist alongside government-funded repatriation programs, and 
refugees can utilize these programs, or pay for their own fl ights home. 
When a given organization knows that parents will repatriate with 
children regardless, the organization is not making unsafe repatriation 
possible, and so helping with repatriation seems acceptable.
The problem with this logic is that an organization can never be 
certain a given refugee will leave if the organization refuses to help, 
because it can never be certain a refugee will have other means of 
leaving. There is always a possibility that, had the organization not 
helped, refugees would remain and their children would be safe. They 
should therefore avoid assisting with return, even if there is a likelihood 
refugees would return regardless. An exception should only be made 
when organizations can ensure a much safer return than would other-
wise take place. This might be the case if a parent will almost certainly 
return regardless and, if she does not receive help to return, she will use 
clandestine means to return home, placing herself and her child at risk. 
If an organization can provide a very safe passage home, then helping 
with return may be justifi ed.
The above cases involve parents returning to avoid insecurity, hun-
ger, and life in a camp or detention center. In reality, many refugees 
return because they are misinformed about what to expect, as noted 
in Chapter 3. Such was the case when Somali refugees in Kenya were 
told by UNHCR that return was safe, and when refugees in Israel were 
never told that education was of poor quality in South Sudan.
Sometimes parents are told misinformation not about conditions 
if they return, but about their rights if they remain. Of the 128 indi-
viduals I interviewed after return to South Sudan, fourteen believed 
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their children would have been homeless and hungry had they 
remained in Israel. These parents told me that, in South Sudan, they 
could at least ask relatives and friends for help. Importantly, of the four-
teen who believed their children would have no food in Israel, four left 
for this reason alone. Had these parents stayed, their children would 
have likely been placed in foster care, or detained with their parents, 
but still able to access food, shelter, and education. These parents told 
me that, had they known their children would have basic necessities 
if they remained, they would never have returned. To ensure parents 
are fully informed about what will happen to children who remain, 
organizations should inform parents of children’s rights, encouraging 
better decisions under coercive conditions.
6.4 CONCLUSION
Children often lack the capacity of adults, and so lack the right to 
decide where they will live. Parents decide on their behalf, taking into 
account children’s interests. To protect these interests, parents should 
avoid repatriating to a country that fails to provide suffi cient security or 
welfare. States should discourage such repatriation if it places children 
under risk that would be unacceptable for those remaining within the 
state. When states insist on encouraging unsafe repatriation, organiza-
tions should only assist if returning is safer for children than remaining, 
or much safer than returning via other means.
The analysis I raise may have implications beyond repatriation. As 
noted in the introduction to this chapter, states may have a duty to 
discourage all forms of migration unsafe for children, and not merely 
repatriation unsafe for children. Moreover, states suffering from inter-
nal strife should possibly deny visas to minors attempting to enter their 
territory, and perhaps have a duty to help evacuate children from their 
territory, or from unsafe regions within their territory. We might imag-
ine a government helping relocate families from high-crime cities to 
low-crime cities, or a government helping families relocate from com-
bat zones to areas at peace. Such policies may be the best option when 
children’s lives and education are at immediate risk, and change will 
not come in the near future.
The policies I have proposed address repatriation alone, but still 
have broad implications. Some of these implications are slightly dis-
turbing, such as states refusing to honor the choices of refugees, and 
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organizations refusing to help with return, even as minors and their 
parents are forced to live inside the barbed-wire borders of detention 
and camps. These policies, though disturbing, are still preferable to the 
alternatives. We may no longer see a child once she returns home, but 
she may be suffering nonetheless. We must account for such suffering 
in protecting children’s rights. Just as parents should protect children 
within a state, they should protect them when traveling between states, 
providing them the safety, education, and healthcare they need.
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Chapter 7
DISCRIMINATION
In 1972 a severe famine broke out in Ethiopia, leading to the deaths 
of roughly 60,000 individuals. Amidst unrest, the Marxist Derg assas-
sinated the Emperor Haile Selassie, leading to the start of civil war in 
1974.1 Three years later the war reached the town of Axum in north-
ern Ethiopia, where a toddler named Milka lived with her mother. 
Together, Milka and her mother walked into Sudanese territory where, 
she explains, she grew up learning:
English, Arabic, and Tigrinya in school . . . We would also get 
money every month from UNESCO, where we also studied. But 
[people] in Sudan . . . would swear at us, and they wanted us to 
dress like them. They would collect us some time and force us 
over the border.2
In 2003, frustrated by the xenophobia she had experienced her whole 
life, she paid smugglers to take her by bus to Wadi Halfa, and then by 
boat to Egypt, and then by Jeep to the Sinai Desert, eventually reach-
ing the border fence with Israel. She climbed the fence, dropped onto 
a mound of sand on the other side, and brushed herself off, hailing 
a cab to Tel Aviv an hour later. Once there, she worked on the black 
market for over a decade, cleaning rooms in hotels, and then sell-
ing fresh Ethiopian injera bread to locals in the surrounding neigh-
borhoods. She married, had two children, and divorced in 2011, the 
same year her injera business began fl oundering. She struggled to 
pay rent or purchase food for herself or her children, and considered 
returning to Ethiopia. She felt it would be safe, and had extensive 
knowledge about her hometown, her sister having moved back sev-
eral years earlier.3
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As Milka considered whether to repatriate, an Israeli Member of 
Knesset stepped onto a podium in South Tel Aviv. Standing before thou-
sands of anti-immigration protesters, she declared that Africans were “a 
cancer to the body,” an opinion shared by most in Israel.4 Shortly after her 
speech citizens smashed windows of African-owned shops, a protester 
threw a grenade at a nursery with African children, and three Eritreans 
were stabbed to death walking home from work.5 The prime minister 
condemned the attacks, but promised to decrease the number of Africans 
in the country. Three months later, he worked with the Ministry of Interior 
to offer free fl ights and money to almost all non-citizen Africans agree-
ing to repatriate or resettle to a third country in Africa.6 Non-Africans of 
comparable legal status, such as those from Myanmar or Ukraine, were 
never offered such assistance to repatriate. As a result, Milka was told she 
could receive a free fl ight and $14,000 if she left, money that would help 
sustain herself and her children in Ethiopia. “My dream,” she explained, 
is to open a restaurant in Ethiopia . . . where I hope to live a good 
life, an easy life, next to the church if possible, so I can pray every 
Sunday with my children, and so my children will be well.7 
She accepted the government’s offer of $14,000, and returned in 2014.
When Milka decided to return home, she was clearly wronged in 
many ways. Like other migrants, she faced violence and infl ammatory 
speeches, and would likely be deported without the right to apply for 
refugee status. But imagine she faced no violent attacks or infl amma-
tory speeches, nor likely deportation. Instead, she received a quiet letter 
from the Ministry of Interior offering her assistance to repatriate, part of 
a policy to encourage Africans to leave using no coercion or incitement, 
making return possible for some but not others.
This chapter considers whether such a policy would be wrong. More 
generally, it considers whether it is wrong to assist unwanted minori-
ties to leave. In addressing these questions, I move beyond discussing 
refugees, and address migrants not at serious risk from returning, but 
who are assisted in returning because of their race. Such migrants are 
not victims of coercion, but may be victims of discrimination.
If they are, it is not clear why. When we think of discrimination, we 
often imagine victims harmed, or at least not benefi ting. Victims are 
denied visas, jobs, apartments, places in universities, and equal rights 
before the law.8 Rarely do we imagine victims treated differently in a 
way that is benefi cial for them precisely because they are not wanted.
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Such benefi cial discrimination is not limited to immigration con-
trol in Israel. Over fi fty years ago in New Orleans, white segregation-
ists assisted African-American families agreeing to move to New York 
City.9 In a recent case in New York, a landlord offered black tenants 
$12,000 to leave their apartments, increasing the value of his prop-
erty as only white tenants remained.10 In 2009 Japan paid thousands 
of dollars to Latino migrant workers agreeing to repatriate, never 
paying other migrants to leave.11 A year later the British National 
Party promised to pay $78,000 to asylum seekers voluntarily leaving 
the country, making clear that only those not “White British” would 
qualify.12 Five years later British Prime Minister David Cameron dis-
cussed the refugee infl ux, and his only mention of African refugees 
was in the context of a ”return path,” implying that African refugees 
would receive assistance to repatriate, never mentioning similar 
return assistance for Syrian refugees.13 When Milka was paid to leave, 
her case was not exceptional. Like similar cases, it has simply been 
overlooked.
In the next section I will describe cases outside the sphere of immi-
gration, including cases where individuals pay minorities to leave towns, 
businesses, and apartment buildings. I address such cases outside immi-
gration to determine whether, more generally, it is permissible to pay 
minorities to leave. I will demonstrate that such payments are wrong 
in one sense: they demean recipients of the payments, who under-
stand how much they are not wanted. In Section 7.2 I argue that paying 
minorities to leave is not merely wrong, but can be morally impermis-
sible if certain conditions are met. In Section 7.3 I apply my arguments 
to cases of repatriation.
Before proceeding, let me clarify my focus and assumptions.
I assume that an act – such as paying minorities to leave – can be 
wrong but still permissible. When I write “wrong” I mean there are 
wrong-making features of the act, even if there are also right-making 
features of the act. When the right-making features outweigh the wrong-
making features, the act can be permissible and others have reason to 
permit and legalize the act. I assume that others have reason to permit 
an act that provides major benefi ts for victims.
Here is an example. Imagine an individual believes women are men-
tally inferior to men and so helps women in need by providing donations 
to women’s shelters. This man’s actions have wrong-making features: 
he has sexist motivations and his donations are perhaps demeaning. 
His actions also have right-making features: he is helping women in 
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need. These right-making features could render his actions permissible 
because of the benefi ts for women he assists. At the very least, it is worth 
considering when actions are permissible despite their wrong-making 
features. This is not to claim that actions are permissible based solely 
on consequences or that, if an individual acts permissibly, they are not 
worthy of moral criticism from others. I assume this man is worthy of 
criticism for his sexism. Nor do I assume that, if an individual benefi ts 
from a permissible act, they must be grateful: the women assisted by this 
man needn’t be grateful given his attitudes. Rather, my assumption is 
merely that benefi ts can create countervailing reasons for establishing 
permissibility.14
I shall demonstrate in Section 7.1 that paying minorities to leave is 
wrong in some ways, but potentially permissible because of the benefi ts 
for recipients like Milka. Only in Section 7.2 do I set out the conditions 
under which payments are impermissible despite the benefi ts accrued.
In addressing payments for minorities, I shall not distinguish 
between payments which make it possible to leave – as when a state 
pays for transport home – and payments which incentivize a person 
to leave – as when a state provides money to encourage repatriation. 
I refer to both cases as “paying minorities to leave.” I make no distinc-
tion primarily for simplicity, to focus on puzzles of discrimination that 
cut across both types of cases.
There are other forms of assistance, besides payments, which simi-
larly encourage minorities to leave. Minorities may be offered free 
housing far away, or food aid in a distant refugee camp. Though I focus 
on money to leave, the conclusions I reach are applicable for other cases 
involving benefi ts for the discriminated.
In describing minority members, I shall mostly focus on ethnic and 
gender groups, all of whom I shall call “minorities.” I will not signifi -
cantly address discrimination against other groups, such as poor, dis-
abled, or elderly individuals paid to leave institutions, companies, or 
states. This is for simplicity. If you believe that discrimination against 
other groups is similar, this is consistent with the argumentation I put 
forth. Finally, I put aside cases of structural injustice, where no agent 
has an explicit intent to exclude.15 In all of the cases I present, the dis-
criminator pays minorities with the intent of encouraging them to 
leave precisely because the discriminator thinks they are less valuable. 
The politician who paid Milka to leave had openly racist preferences, 
but was giving Milka an opportunity she otherwise would not have. 
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Given the opportunity for Milka, it is not clear if she was treated in an 
impermissible manner.
7.1 A THEORY OF WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION
Current theories of discrimination cannot establish whether paying 
minorities to leave is impermissible. To demonstrate this point, consider 
what different theories might say about an organization established in 
1954 called the White Citizens’ Council.
The White Citizen’s Council had one primary goal: to keep segrega-
tion legal in the American South. It spent a decade boycotting black-
owned businesses, lobbying congressmen to keep segregation legal, 
and producing a children’s book that taught heaven was segregated.16 
By 1962 it failed to keep segregation legal, and so changed its tactics, 
offering thousands of African Americans transport and money to leave 
southern states and move north. The fi rst family to accept this offer was 
Louis and Dorothy Boyde and their eight children, all living in New 
Orleans. Louis had recently lost his job after falling ill, and Dorothy was 
expecting another child. They quickly packed their bags and accepted 
the Council’s $50, food, and bus tickets out of town, boarding a bus 
for New York City, elated to start a life with more stability and employ-
ment.17 The Council had many goals in sponsoring their migration, but 
one was simple: to reduce the number of African Americans in New 
Orleans.18
There are four theories we might raise to establish whether the 
Council’s offer was permissible. The fi rst three theories struggle to 
establish if the Council’s offer was wrong at all, let alone impermissible. 
I take this as a point against such theories, given the intuitive feeling 
that something was wrong with the Council’s offer. The fourth theory 
establishes the wrongness of the Council’s offer, but does not establish 
if it was permissible, given the benefi ts for the Boydes.
7.1.1 Other Features
The fi rst theory is not quite a theory, but a claim: The Boydes were not 
wronged by the payments themselves, but by general inequality in 
New Orleans and the Council’s other racist actions. Because of general 
inequality and racism, they were essentially compelled to accept the 
free transport and cash.19 If ethnic minorities are compelled to leave 
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town, they are victims of forced discrimination, rather than voluntary 
offers. It is forced discrimination that disturbs us, rather than the pay-
ments themselves.
I do not believe racism and inequality in New Orleans fully explains 
the intuition that something was wrong with the payments. Imagine 
the Council consisted of only one white supremacist in a very toler-
ant city, and she spent her days approaching ethnic minorities, offering 
them money to leave, and recipients accepted the money without facing 
any coercion or other form of racism. Many may feel uneasy about such 
payments even though they entail no other forms of racism. Something 
seems wrong with the payments themselves, and a good theory will 
explain why.
7.1.2 Harm and Beliefs-Based Theories
Two common theories of discrimination struggle to explain why the 
Council’s actions were wrong, let alone if they were impermissible.
According to the harm-based theory, discrimination is wrong when 
it harms minority members, either by excluding them, denying them 
opportunities, or widening the gap between them and more advantaged 
groups.20 It is wrong, for example, if white business owners are biased 
against black job applicants, because this excludes many potential black 
employees from employment, denying them equal opportunities for 
employment, and widening the likely income gap between black and 
white job applicants.
This theory seems to imply that the Boydes were not wronged 
when paid to leave. Though they left New Orleans, they were not 
excluded in the traditional sense. They were never forced to leave, 
and the money helped them escape a society full of exclusion, and 
join one with less segregation and far more job opportunities. While 
it is true that leaving New Orleans was likely a diffi cult experience, 
prying them away from the home they knew, it also helped them 
obtain opportunities they preferred having. Nor did they just hap-
pen to benefi t from the Council’s discriminatory payment scheme, as 
when a person is denied a job opportunity, moves to another city, and 
happens to fi nd greater opportunities and advantages in this new 
city.21 The White Citizens’ Council specifi cally intended for African 
Americans to benefi t from migrating, to persuade them to leave and 
never come back.
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The Boydes, as members of a disadvantaged group, were also never 
made worse off by the payments, and the payments did not widen the 
gap between their position and the position of white residents of New 
Orleans. Precisely the opposite: As they boarded the bus, cash in hand, 
they were given an extra opportunity whites did not have, including 
poor white residents who wished to have funds to leave.
These harm-based theories also cannot explain why other forms of 
payments are wrong. Today, some attorneys claim women can receive 
higher severance pay if they prove they were discriminated against, 
including in the termination of their contracts.22 If this is true, some 
companies may essentially pay women to leave, offering generous sev-
erance to women who agree to quietly accept termination. We might 
imagine a woman paid to leave and made economically better off than 
if no discrimination had taken place at all, receiving more money than 
the men received in their salary. If there is something wrong with such 
severance pay, a good theory will explain why.
A second theory of discrimination is more promising. It holds that 
discrimination is wrong when the result of racist or sexist beliefs, regard-
less of whether victims are harmed.23 The Council paid the Boydes to 
leave because of racist beliefs, and companies may pay women to leave 
because of sexist beliefs.
This theory, however, is still limited, as sometimes it seems wrong 
to pay minorities to leave despite the payer holding no racist or sexist 
beliefs. In 2015, for example, a Brooklyn landlord paid $12,000 to black 
residents agreeing to vacate his apartments, never offering white resi-
dents this money. He did not act because of racist beliefs, but because 
of fi nancial interest: An all-white building increased the market value 
of his property, allowing him to charge more rent.24 His actions seem 
disturbing even if motivated by fi nancial gain alone.
Some may claim the landlord was acting on racist beliefs, as he was 
responding to the demands of white renters willing to pay more to live 
in an all-white building. These white renters had racist beliefs, or at 
least objectionable biases. It is wrong to discriminate in response to 
the racist beliefs or biases of others. For example, it is wrong for an 
employer to only hire white salespeople to successfully sell to white 
racist costumers. This would be wrong even if the employer herself held 
fi nancial motives alone.25
But even if racist beliefs can explain why the landlord acted wrongly, 
they struggle to explain the wrongness of payments in some fi ctional 
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cases. Consider a case by Deborah Hellman, in which a principal asks 
black and white children to sit on opposite sides of a classroom for aes-
thetic reasons alone, completely unaware of the history of segregation. 
His actions seem wrong even if he holds no objectionable beliefs, and 
is not intending to fulfi ll the objectionable preferences of others.26 We 
might similarly imagine a principal paying black students to leave the 
room, similarly for purely aesthetic reasons. His actions would seem 
wrong, even if his beliefs were not.
7.1.3 Expressivist Theory
“Expressivist” theories of discrimination best explain the wrongness of 
the payments, but do not establish whether they are permissible.
These theories hold that discrimination is wrong because it expresses 
the demeaning message that minority groups are “not fully human or 
. . . of equal moral worth.”27 One can express a demeaning message 
without holding racist or sexist intentions, and without being aware 
one is offending and demeaning others.28 For example, if I use a rac-
ist slur I can demean the recipient of the slur even if I am not aware of 
the meaning of my utterance. One can even demean someone who is 
not aware they are being demeaned.29 A girl with cognitive disabilities 
may be demeaned if taunted on the playground, even if her impair-
ment means she is not aware she is being taunted. Importantly, one can 
demean another even if they benefi t from an offer. It would be demean-
ing to go up to a stranger on the street and ask if she would be willing to 
take part in violent sexual acts in return for money, even if the woman 
accepted the offer and benefi ted from the money.
There are a number of reasons why offers can be demeaning, even 
if recipients benefi t. One reason is that offers objectify recipients, 
as in the case of the woman above, or because they are combined 
with an endorsement of racism or sexism, such as offering women 
extra severance pay to leave. Offers can also be demeaning because 
they imply a certain meaning due to historical practice. When the 
principal offers black students money to leave the classroom, he is 
engaging in the practice of segregation. Because segregation had a 
certain meaning in the past – in the past, it was used to dehuman-
ize minorities – the meaning still lingers today, explaining why the 
principal’s actions seem offensive.
Discriminatory offers can also be demeaning because they treat 
minorities as members of a group, rather than as individuals with their 
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own autonomous decisions, preferences, and talents. This is wrong 
even if the recipients of the offers benefi t. In an example demonstrating 
this idea, Benjamin Eidelson asks us to imagine an orchestra director 
selecting an East-Asian violinist despite her poor performance, because 
he is infl uenced by the stereotype that women of East-Asian descent 
are better at playing the violin. The director disrespects her because he 
treats her as a member of a group, rather than an individual with her 
own unique character and skills. He demeans her even if she is happy 
to pass the audition.30
This general theory of discrimination explains why the White 
Citizens’ Council’s actions were wrong. The Council treated the Boy-
des as members of a group, rather than as individuals to be judged 
according to their skills, character, and unique attributes. Because the 
Council was also openly racist, the payments also implied a particularly 
demeaning message: “We do not want you so much, that we are willing 
to give you money to leave.” Indeed, the more money a discriminator 
is willing to pay, the more strongly he expresses how much he is will-
ing to sacrifi ce personal resources to meet his racist preferences. In this 
sense, payments are distinct from merely requesting that another per-
son leave, without offering any money at all. The money is constitutive 
of the message, and so constitutive of the wrong.31
The idea that payments can be demeaning may be consistent with 
some harm-based accounts. If payments are demeaning, they often 
socially exclude, in the sense that individuals are told how little they 
are valued in society. If payments are demeaning, they also undermine 
equality of opportunity, in that individuals no longer have the opportu-
nity to be free from the demeaning message implied by the payments. 
Similarly, if payments demean the worst off in society, and harming 
the worst off is what makes discrimination wrong, then we can view 
demeaning payments as wrong in this sense. In other words, some 
harm-based theories, like the expressivist theory, can view demeaning 
others as wrong even when they benefi t. It remains the case that the 
expressivist theory is useful for establishing why certain types of dis-
crimination are wrong despite no reduction in wellbeing, resources, or 
preference-fulfi llment.
Though the expressivist theory establishes when discrimination is 
wrong, it does not establish when it is permissible. As Hellman herself 
notes, her theory does not “say when the wrongfulness of [discrimina-
tion] may be overridden by other considerations.”32 Other consider-
ations may include the benefi ts minorities gain, and their acquiescence 
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in light of these benefi ts. Were payments to cease, minorities would be 
denied access to money they could otherwise obtain, and which some 
feel is benefi cial.
Some might argue that benefi ts for victims – even signifi cant ones – 
are not competing moral considerations, and so ought not to make 
wrongful discrimination permissible. Hellman and Yuracko separately 
discuss a case evoking this intuition, involving a casino that forced 
female workers to wear makeup, forbidding male employees from 
doing so. For different reasons, Hellman and Yuracko both conclude 
that the casino wrongfully discriminated against the women.33 This case 
is interesting, I believe, partly because the employees gained a salary, 
were not forced to work at the casino, and possibly benefi ted compared 
to alternative forms of employment. I still feel the women were treated 
impermissibly for the reasons raised by Hellman and Yuracko. The ben-
efi ts they received seem irrelevant.
Even if this is true, the women were not benefi ting from the discrim-
ination itself; they would still gain a salary in a world where employ-
ers stopped requiring women to wear makeup, assuming the casino 
retained its customers when the women stopped wearing makeup. If 
the government banned sexist dress codes in casinos, women would 
not lose money. This is not the case with payments to leave: Minorities 
would lose money if this type of discrimination ceased, because the 
payments are precisely what the discrimination entails.
Some might argue that, even if minorities prefer the payments, pref-
erences are not strong reasons to permit otherwise wrongful discrimi-
nation. This is because, more generally, preferences hold little weight 
in establishing permissible discrimination. If most women in a country 
prefer banning the vote for women, their preferences are less impor-
tant than ensuring all women have freedom to vote. But there is an 
important distinction between preferences for forced exclusion and 
preferences for voluntary incentives. When individuals support forced 
discrimination, they are denying opportunities to others. When women 
support banning voting they deny other women the opportunity to 
vote, potentially harming them in the process. The same cannot neces-
sarily be said about the Boydes. When they boarded the bus, cash in 
hand, nobody else was forced onto the bus. It was their private choice 
alone, and one to which they consented.
Of course, perhaps it was not their private choice alone, and perhaps 
they never really consented. These are possibilities I shall now address.
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7.2 A THEORY OF IMPERMISSIBLE DISCRIMINATION
If payments are only permissible because recipients consented and no 
one else is harmed, payments are impermissible if recipients have not 
consented or third parties are harmed.
7.2.1 Consent
There are, broadly speaking, three groups of individuals who may fail 
to consent to the payments to leave, and so have been impermissibly 
wronged. One group is comprised of those offered money to leave who 
reject the offer. We might imagine women rejecting the offer of sever-
ance pay to leave, and black families rejecting funds to relocate. Such 
women and families have been exposed to a demeaning offer without 
benefi ting, given that they turned the money down. If they have been 
demeaned without benefi ting, they have been wronged without ben-
efi ting, and so have been impermissibly wronged.
Even when individuals do accept money to leave, they may still 
fail to give their consent. Some individuals accept money offered, but 
would rather money not be offered at all.34 Imagine a tenant in Brook-
lyn receives a call from her landlord offering her $12,000 to leave the 
apartment. She realizes that all black tenants received the same phone 
call, while white tenants did not, and decides it would be preferable 
to leave her apartment than remain in the building of a racist land-
lord. She accepts his offer, despite wishing he had never posed it at all. 
Such a woman has not consented being given the offer, even if she con-
sented to the offer itself. More generally, individuals may accept money 
because they feel that, once the demeaning offer is on the table, the 
expressive meaning has already been conveyed, and so they may as 
well accept the money and leave. Individuals may also accept an offer 
to be polite, or to avoid creating tension, while still wishing the offer 
was never posed.35 When individuals prefer not to be offered money, 
they do not feel they are benefi ting compared to no offer. If they are not 
benefi ting while being demeaned, they are not benefi ting while being 
wronged, and so are being impermissibly wronged.
Some may claim that, even if most minority members do not want 
the offer to leave, the offers should still be permitted. If offers are not 
made, no one will be able to accept them, including those who want 
them. Importantly, we cannot know if someone would have consented 
to being given the offer unless they are asked, “Do you want me to 
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offer you money to leave?” and this question would be tantamount to 
an offer. To address this concern, we may wish to distinguish between 
the ways in which offers are posed. Very public advertisements may 
be more intrusive compared to private ones, and more likely to offend 
those who would rather not receive these offers at all. If payments 
should ever be permitted, offers should be limited to discretely adver-
tised offers alone.
7.2.2 Third Party Harm
There is a third category of individuals who have not consented to 
payments. They are comprised of third parties never offered payments, 
but harmed by their provision.
In general, third parties harmed by a transaction have a complaint 
against parties to the transaction. For example, if an individual suffers 
from health conditions because others are buying and selling polluting 
cars, she has a complaint against those buying and selling polluting 
cars. If third parties are negatively impacted by payments for minorities 
to leave, they too have a complaint: they have been forced to endure 
harm against their will, without having consented to this harm.
This raises the question of how much weight we place on the harms 
these third parties face. While it is diffi cult to establish a precise rule, it 
seems the more disadvantaged the third parties are, and the more sig-
nifi cant the harms they face, the greater weight their interests hold. If 
paying minorities to leave creates signifi cant harm against those already 
disadvantaged, we have a weightier reason to view the payments as all-
things-considered impermissible, rather than just wrong in one way.
There are a number of ways paying minorities to leave can impact 
third parties.
One way is by increasing implicit bias, harming all members of a 
given group, including members never offered money to leave. If the 
public is unaware there is an exchange of payments, they may assume 
minorities are less willing to stay, reinforcing the stereotype that mem-
bers of this group are less committed to staying.36 Imagine, for example, 
a sexist chief executive offi cer offering women generous severance pay-
ments to retire, leading more women to retire early. Others may assume 
women choose to retire early because they are less committed to their 
jobs when, in fact, they choose to retire early because they are paid to 
leave their jobs. If this stereotype about women sets back the interests 
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of other women, including those never offered money to leave, then 
others are harmed without the corresponding benefi t.
Even if payments do not have these impacts, they may still demean 
all members of a minority group. The discriminator is sending a gen-
eral message: “I am willing to pay money to encourage members of 
this group to leave.” Other members of the group understand that, in 
a close possible world – a world where they lived in a particular build-
ing, or held a different position in a company – they, too, would be 
unwanted.
Indeed, payments can even demean individuals who are not of the 
group paid to leave, but of other disadvantaged groups, including other 
ethnicities, religions, genders or sexualities. These groups may under-
stand that, in a close possible world in which their group was targeted, 
they too would be unwanted. Being exposed to this possibility may be 
unsettling, and possibly offensive, without the fi nancial benefi t obtained 
by the parties paid to leave. Payments may even offend members of the 
majority who oppose the racist and sexist ideals being promoted by 
the payment schemes. If my employer paid minority workers to leave, 
this would be offensive towards the ideals I hold of creating a society 
where all are valued regardless of their race, ethnicity, sexuality, or gen-
der. A small part of my interests would be set back as a result of the 
payments, without any corresponding benefi ts.
Payments do not necessarily harm or demean others in the man-
ner described. They needn’t enhance biases if they occur sparingly, 
and needn’t be offensive if they occur privately. If the landlord in 
Brooklyn only offered these payments once, and if he never adver-
tised his actions, perhaps only those directly paid were demeaned 
and, if they benefi ted and consented, were not treated impermissibly. 
Moreover, even in cases where third parties are clearly harmed, we 
might still think payments should be permissible if the benefi ts for 
the recipients are substantial enough. The White Citizens’ Council 
provided the Boydes access to basic goods, including an income and 
schooling for their children, and perhaps these goods could outweigh 
the harms third parties faced, assuming these harms were limited. 
Harms might be limited when few know about the payments, and 
others feel no psychological offence by their provision. It remains the 
case that harms towards third parties can outweigh the benefi ts for 
recipients of payments, making the payments impermissible, rather 
than just wrong in one way.
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7.3 MIGRANT RETURN
Let us return to Milka, and consider whether she was treated imper-
missibly when paid to leave Israel. As with domestic cases, we can con-
sider whether she consented and whether third parties were harmed.
7.3.1 Consent
In domestic cases, individuals not consenting to payments are demeaned 
without benefi ting, and so impermissibly demeaned. We might sup-
pose this consideration is less relevant for cases involving immigration. 
In cases of immigration, perhaps states can permissibly deport ethnic 
minorities. If states can permissibly deport such minorities, paying 
them to leave seems permissible as well. In the private cases of the 
last section, we needn’t have delved into this issue; it seems obviously 
impermissible for a landlord to accept white tenants alone, and for an 
organization to force individuals to leave a city, so the question was only 
whether payments were also impermissible. But if states are permitted 
to deny visas based on race, even without migrants’ consent, perhaps 
they can offer payments based on race, even without migrants’ consent.
There are reasons to believe states are not permitted to deny visas 
based on race. Consider two common justifi cations for immigration 
control. One is that citizens have freedom of association.37 Citizens 
are members of states, and states are similar to private associations 
like clubs. If clubs can exclude, states can as well. Another justifi cation 
is that, if states have no control over who enters and stays, this can 
overwhelm welfare institutions, harming residents within the state. 
If these are the justifi cations of immigration control, it seems they do 
not permit racist exclusion. This is because, in general, freedom of 
association and welfare do not permit racist exclusion. Private clubs, 
though they have a right to exclude, do not generally have a right to 
ban members of a given ethnic group.38 Local municipalities, though 
they have a right to force some to sell homes for overall welfare, do 
not have a right to force only some ethnicities to sell their homes 
for overall welfare. For example, a municipality wishing to build a 
train line cannot build the line on the homes of unwanted ethnic 
groups, forcing only them to sell their homes to advance racist goals. 
If excluding unwanted ethnicities is wrong regardless of association 
and welfare on the domestic level, then such exclusion is wrong in 
immigration control.
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Why make this leap? One reason is that consistency is important in 
determining how states ought to act. If the justifi cation for immigration 
control is it upholds freedom of association, and we feel freedom of 
association does not justify discrimination, then freedom of association 
does not justify discrimination in immigration control. Similarly, if the 
justifi cation of immigration control is that it protects welfare for citizens, 
and if we feel welfare ought not to be protected with discrimination, 
then protecting welfare does not justify discrimination in immigration 
control. At the very least, freedom of association and welfare are not 
particularly good reasons for states to discriminate against visa appli-
cants based on their race. This conclusion is consistent with a range of 
theories on immigration ethics. Even David Miller, a strong proponent 
of states’ right to exclude, agrees that racist immigration control is gen-
erally wrong.39 It is wrong, presumably, because it demeans migrants, 
treating them as members of a group who have lesser worth.
If denying visas to ethnic minorities is wrong because it is demean-
ing, then offering payments is similarly wrong when it is demeaning. 
If it is wrong, then a question arises as to whether the payments are 
still permissible if migrants consent to their provision. As with domes-
tic cases, migrants have not consented if they would rather the offer 
never be given at all. If Milka would rather she was never offered money 
to leave, then she was treated impermissibly. There is some evidence 
this was the case. Milka felt that the government’s offer indicated how 
much she was not welcome in Israel, and felt she may as well repatri-
ate rather than remain in a country where she was not welcome. She 
preferred a world where she was welcome in Israel, and so may have 
preferred never being offered money to leave.
7.3.2 Third Party Harm
Some might disagree with my argumentation above. My argumentation 
assumed racist selection methods in private clubs are wrong, despite 
freedom of association, and so racist visa denials are wrong, despite 
freedom of association. Some might hold that private clubs do have a 
right to select membership based on race, 40 and so states have a right 
to provide visas based on race. By extension, states have a right to pay 
migrants to leave based on race.
Even if states have a right to deny visas based on race some of the 
time, it seems unlikely they have a right to deny visas based on race 
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when this harms their own citizens. Were a state to deny visas to black 
applicants, this would harm black citizens, communicating to them that 
their race indicates their lesser worth in the eyes of the government.41 
At the very least, it communicates that if they were not citizens, they 
would be unwanted because of their race.
Paying minorities to leave harms citizens in the same manner. When 
Milka was paid to leave, she was essentially told, “You are not wanted.” 
“You” referred to individuals of African descent. This demeaned citizens 
of African descent, who were communicated the following message: 
“If you were not a citizen, you would be unwanted because of your 
race.” The more race is used as an indicator of who receives money to 
leave, the more citizens of the same race understand that, in a close 
possible world, they too would be unwanted. This message additionally 
demeans members of other disadvantaged minorities who understand 
that, in a world where they were targeted, they too would be unwanted. 
And it demeans members of the majority who feel offended by the 
racist ideals promulgated by the payments offered.
As with domestic cases, payments may also reinforce stereotypes 
and biases, and so further harm citizens of the state. If the government 
pays minorities to leave because of their race, then race may be viewed 
as indicative of who is an outsider, causing the public to view citizens 
of the same race as outsiders. In some instances, this may place these 
citizens’ lives at risk. In Israel, shortly after the government began pay-
ing Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants to leave, assailants attacked two 
Jewish citizens of Ethiopian descent, mistaking them for non-Jewish 
non-citizens from Eritrea or Ethiopia.42 This not only harmed the men 
who were attacked, but members of the public who opposed discrimi-
nation against Ethiopian Jewish citizens. The more governments use 
race as a criterion for who should be encouraged to leave, the more 
citizens may view race as an indicator of who should be attacked or, at 
the very least, viewed as different, suspected as not belonging.
Of course, harms towards citizens could be avoided entirely if 
the government offered payments to all migrants, regardless of their 
race. Such payments would not be discriminatory, and so citizens not 
harmed in the manner I just described, and migrants would still access 
the benefi ts of being paid to leave. But if the government is unwilling to 
provide payments in a non-discriminatory manner – it insists on only 
paying unwanted minorities to leave – then payments may be imper-
missible if the harms towards citizens are substantial.
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The above general rule is not absolute. In some cases migrants 
may have very strong interests in accessing payments to leave so they 
can acquire more food, shelter, mobility, and freedom from violence. 
Their interests in accessing basic necessities may trump others’ inter-
ests in avoiding the harms of payments. Milka’s interests in accessing 
assistance for repatriation perhaps trumped the interests of citizens of 
Ethiopian descent to avoid harms arising from the prevalence of pay-
ments. At least, this is a possibility if the harms for citizens fell below 
a given threshold. It remains the case that, if the harms against citi-
zens are signifi cant enough, the benefi ts for migrants may be insuf-
fi cient to deem the payments permissible. Moreover, the benefi ts for 
migrants are not relevant if migrants would prefer to not be offered 
payments at all. If payments that harm citizens are only permissible 
when migrants’ interests trump those of citizens, and migrants feel 
their interests would be better met if never offered money to leave, the 
money is impermissible.
7.4 CONCLUSION
Milka was paid to leave partly because she was from Africa. She was a 
victim of wrongful discrimination, demeaned by the government that 
provided her assistance. But like other migrants, she preferred to accept 
assistance to repatriate than to face violence on the streets, incitement 
by politicians, and continued unemployment. Other migrants wished 
to repatriate not because they faced violence, incitement, or unemploy-
ment, but because they hoped to fi nd better opportunities elsewhere, 
only possible when handed a large amount of cash to board a fl ight 
home. While such payments may seem intolerable, they help minori-
ties escape intolerance, making it easier to resettle, start a business, 
and integrate into a new city or country. And while such payments are 
demeaning, they give resources to the demeaned, helping ensure their 
exit is smoother than it otherwise would be, at times enriching them 
more than if no discrimination took place at all.
Given the benefi ts for migrants, it is unclear if they are morally per-
missible. To establish if they are, we must appeal to two considerations, 
the fi rst relating to consent. Payments may be impermissible when they 
are given to migrants who have not consented to their provision, and 
wish they had never been available at all. Even if one holds that the 
consent of migrants is not relevant, payments may be still impermissible 
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when they harm citizens of the same minority, signaling to them that 
their race is indicative of their lesser worth.
Accounting for these considerations is essential for establishing a 
more complete theory of repatriation. It is true that Milka felt $14,000 
provided more opportunities then staying in Israel. But we ought to 
shift our gaze away from her and onto other migrants and citizens. 
In doing so, we can consider a broader array of people and outcomes, 
better determining when discrimination is permissible and when repa-
triation is wrong.
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RESTITUTION
In 1992 Kiden was a young Bari woman living in Juba when she was 
forced to move with her family to Khartoum. Once there she sold tea 
by the side of the road, later boarding a train to Wadi Halfa, a boat to 
Egypt, and a Jeep to Israel. In Israel she found work, managed to save 
over $10,000, and fl ew back home to Juba in 2012, investing her money 
in small businesses, making more money still. In 2013 she traveled to 
a land registry offi ce where she obtained the deeds to the land she had 
once owned, submitting them to a judge shortly after, and successfully 
winning her land back.1
Abdalla returned to South Sudan in 2010 and achieved similar 
success. Like Kiden he accessed the property he fl ed as a young boy, 
located near the Jebel Lado mountain north of Juba. He was largely 
successful because of his brother:
My older brother was here the whole war. He did not go to 
any place. He said, “this is my land” and protected it for us . . . 
Agriculture is important. I see they bring all of the vegetables 
from other countries. It’s important, more than offi ces. Offi ces 
are maybe something to think about after I succeed.2
He is based in Juba, where he established a bar near his home, and 
travels Friday to Saturday to his land, growing tomato, cucumber, and 
cabbage to support his wife and daughter.
Other returnees were less successful in re-obtaining their land. 
Daniel, as noted in Chapter 5, failed to obtain his parents’ land in Addis 
Ababa. Some returnees, such as Emmanuel, re-obtained their land but 
have little control over this land in practice:
5857_Gerver.indd   189 04/10/18   2:53 PM
190 The Ethics and Practice of Refugee Repatriation
I started working as a farmer when I came [to South Sudan]. You 
work and in the night people come and steal your things. The 
JIU – Joint Integrated Unit – is the integrated army. They were 
there stealing my things. This was my ancestor’s land. It was 
very big and near the river. Around 25 dumas.3
Kiden and Abdalla were more successful in their repatriation than 
Daniel and Emmanuel. They returned to the particular home they fl ed, 
and to the property they lost, experiencing what many consider a more 
just return.4
Though returning to property seems just, it benefi ts some refugees 
more than others. Kiden is settled comfortably on her land, and Abdalla 
is farming his, but their fellow returnees are living without basic shelter 
and food, having held relatively little property before their displacement. 
Such was the case for Peter and Nyanuer:
We were here a year and there was no school for the kids. There 
was malaria and no money. The school was too expensive here. 
It was $1,000. So I sent the children to Kakuma refugee camp 
[in Kenya] . . . To eat I come to this shop, have tea with milk, and 
then go home.5
No milk, no gas, nothing. If you don’t have money for something 
for cooking, like coal and dishes, then there’s nothing you can 
cook with. Just this nylon sheet we sit on, on the ground. There 
are just so many problems. I can deal with them, a little, but my 
kids just can’t.6
If most returnees are living without basic necessities, it is not clear if 
property ought to be returned to its original owners, rather than redis-
tributed to those most in need.
This issue is not merely academic. In the history of restitution, some 
governments have limited full restitution, instead redistributing prop-
erty to those in greater need. Such was the case in Guatemala, where 
the government redistributed land based on need, rather than return-
ing land to the original owners.7 In Hungary, following the end of the 
Cold War, the government sold refugees’ former property to the highest 
bidder, redistributing profi ts to social programs.8 In Rwanda, following 
the 1994 genocide, the government limited restitution to those who had 
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left in the last ten years, redistributing land in a manner deemed helpful 
for improving food security.9 The question of restitution is not merely 
whether refugees once owned the property they left; it is whether they 
ought to own this property today.
This chapter addresses this question. In doing so, I focus on property 
restitution alone, putting aside other forms of reparations. For example, 
I do not address whether returnees have a right to fi nancial compensa-
tion for the human rights violations they experienced. It may be that 
Kiden had a right not only to her family’s property in the suburb of 
Juba, but to reparations for being forced from her home as a small girl, 
and experiencing the trauma of being torn away from her family. I focus 
on restitution not because it is more important, but because it is more 
common,10 and clearly confl icts with the values of distributive justice.
When I write “values of distributive justice,” I refer to the value of 
bringing about a just distribution of goods. There may be value in the 
South Sudanese government redistributing Kiden’s land to Peter and 
Nyanuer. Of course, there is disagreement over what a just distribu-
tion entails. Some argue that this entails all having equal resources,11 
while others hold this entails all having equal opportunity to resources 
or happiness.12 Still others hold that a just distribution entails prioritiz-
ing the welfare of the worst off, rather than equality itself. This might 
involve the government investing more in the educational opportu-
nities of those from more disadvantaged families, or investing more 
money in ensuring those who have short life expectancies can live a 
few extra years, even if this comes at the expense of health amongst the 
general population. Others hold that a just distribution entails all hav-
ing a minimally decent standard of living, regardless of whether there 
is gross inequality.13 For example, the government could give some of 
Kiden’s land to Peter and Nyanuer, so that they can grow crops for their 
children, but needn’t ensure that Kiden, Peter and Nyanuer have exactly 
the same amount of land.
While there is disagreement over what a just distribution entails, 
there is broad agreement that redistribution from the very wealthiest to 
the very poorest is justifi ed, if this ensures the very poorest have enough 
to survive, while making the wealthiest only slightly worse off. My aim 
is to consider whether, if one supports such redistribution, one ought to 
support restitution that confl icts with this redistribution.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 presents common 
justifi cations for restitution which, I argue, cannot fully explain why 
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restitution is justifi ed when it confl icts with the value of distributive 
justice. In Section 8.2 I present a new and more promising justifi cation: 
property restitution avoids wrongful discrimination, which can express 
a demeaning message to both the wealthy and the poor. To avoid dis-
crimination, governments ought to return to refugees their former 
property, or also redistribute non-refugees’ property at the same rate. In 
Section 8.3 I respond to objections against this claim.
8.1 FOUR COMMON JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTITUTION
There are, broadly speaking, four common justifi cations raised for res-
titution. All four, I argue, fail to fully explain why restitution is justifi ed 
for wealthy refugees whose property could easily be provided to those 
in far greater need.
8.1.1 Harm
One common argument raised in favor of restitution is related to harm. 
It begins with the premise that those who are harmed from wrongdo-
ing ought to be given reparations for this harm. If a wealthy individual 
is violently punched in the stomach, and as a result is forced to give up 
her money, she loses wealth in a manner that is wrong. She is therefore 
owed reparations for this wrong in the form of the assets she lost.14 
When refugees are displaced and lose their property as a result, they are 
wronged and harmed as a result. They are therefore owed reparations 
to counteract this harm.15
This argument is relevant not only for refugees re-obtaining mod-
erate amounts of wealth, like Kiden, but for refugees re-obtaining 
large amounts of wealth, like Maria Altmann. Maria Altmann was 
a young Jewish girl living in 1930s Austria when her uncle’s paint-
ings were confi scated by the Nazis. They both fl ed the country, the 
paintings remained in the hands of the Austrian government, and 
sixty-four years later Altmann won a restitution case against the 
Austrian government, receiving her uncle’s paintings back. Shortly 
after she sold them for $150 million. Like Kiden, she was harmed in 
multiple ways when she fl ed, and so harmed multiple ways from a 
wrong. One way she was harmed was through the loss of property 
she would have inherited. Like Kiden, the restitution she received 
countered this harm.
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There are two objections commonly raised to this harm-based argu-
ment. One is that we cannot give someone reparations for what they 
would have had were they not wronged, because we cannot know what 
someone would have had were they not wronged.16 But this objection is 
not relevant if we can guess what they likely would have were they not 
wronged. If Kiden and Altmann would have likely had certain assets 
had they not been displaced, we can claim they were owed restitution 
for these likely losses.
The second potential objection is that this harm-based account will 
have absurd implications. Imagine an individual is wrongly displaced 
but, had they not been displaced, they would have died in a natural 
disaster, such that being displaced saved their life. This individual is not 
harmed from the displacement, given that she is alive as a result of the 
displacement, and would otherwise be dead.17 A harm-based theory of 
reparations seems to imply she is not owed reparations. If this seems 
odd, and we feel she is owed reparations, another theory of reparations 
must explain why.
This objection can be avoided if we expand the scope of harm 
to include non-counterfactual harms. As noted in Chapter 2, non-
counterfactual harms occur when an agent’s actions cause harm, and 
this harm would have occurred in the absence of the agent’s actions.18 
If I steal your laptop, you experience harm even if someone else would 
have stolen your laptop had I not stolen it fi rst. If I also wronged you in 
stealing your laptop, I ought to return the laptop even though you are 
not counterfactually worse off from my actions. Similarly, if a woman is 
displaced because of her ethnicity, and loses property as a result, she is 
harmed even if she would have died had she not been displaced. She 
is therefore owed reparations for the harm she experienced.
There is a third and more promising objection to the harm-based 
account. Even if a person has been wronged, and is harmed as a result, 
it does not follow she is owed reparations for this harm. This is because, 
in general, we cannot claim a person is owed reparations for the harm of 
losing assets they had no right to own, even if they experienced a wrong 
when losing these assets. Imagine I steal your laptop, and someone 
violently assaults me, taking the laptop from my possession. Though I 
have been wronged and harmed, given that I have one less laptop in my 
possession, this particular harm is not the sort that ought to be recti-
fi ed, because I had no right to the laptop. Instead, the laptop should be 
returned to you, assuming you are the rightful owner.
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A similar claim could be raised regarding Kiden and Altmann. If we 
think that Kiden and Altmann had no right to all of the assets they lost 
from displacement, then even if they were harmed from losing these 
assets, they had no right to having all of these assets back. One reason 
we might think Kiden and Altmann had no right to all of the assets 
is because nobody has a right to large amounts of wealth in a world 
where others lack basic necessities. Kiden had no right to all of her 
land when others were in desperate need, and Altmann had no right to 
paintings worth tens of millions of dollars, dollars she could easily give 
away to those in desperate need. If they had no right to all assets lost 
from displacement, they had no right to reparations for all assets lost 
from displacement.
Similar concerns arise with other cases of restitution. In the 1940s 
Czech royalty were displaced with the rise of communism, some forced 
into slave labor, others forced to fl ee the country to avoid death. With 
the fall of communism sixty years later, some began re-obtaining 
their castles, including the count Joseph Kinsky and the former prince 
William Lobkowicz. Though their restitution countered some of the 
harms from wrongful displacement, it is not clear they had a right to re-
obtain castles if they had no right to their castles prior to communism. 
Indeed, after obtaining their castles some political actors protested, 
feeling the castles should have been sold to the highest bidder, and 
profi ts distributed to social programs.19
Some might object to the above claims. Even if a person has no right 
to the property they lost, because others are in far greater need, they 
still have a right to not lose this property through persecution. This is 
because, more generally, even if a person has no right to property they 
lost, they have a right to not lose this property through wrongful means. 
Imagine, for example, that a prosecutor barges into my home with no 
evidence I had committed any crime, and begins using physical vio-
lence against me, forcing me to reveal a laptop I had stolen from you, 
and the evidence that I had stolen this laptop. She then bags the laptop, 
brings it to the police station, and stands before a judge several months 
later, using the evidence she had obtained through violent means. If 
the prosecutor’s only evidence was obtained through violence, the 
evidence would likely be inadmissible, and she would fail to obtain a 
conviction.20 After the trial, she would be forced to return to me the 
laptop I had stolen. This is true even though everyone knows, including 
the judge, that the laptop is rightfully yours.
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Just as a prosecutor should return me the laptop, perhaps the state 
should return refugees their assets, even if they had no right to these 
assets. The state ought to return assets taken through persecution, or 
another form of wrongful violence, because persecution and violence 
are wrongful means of obtaining property. For this reason, both Kiden 
and Altmann had a right to obtain restitution, regardless of whether 
they had a right to the assets they lost.
The above argument has sway in cases where the agent taking prop-
erty through wrongful means is the same agent returning the property. 
When the prosecutor returns the laptop she obtained through violence, 
she is returning goods she herself obtained through violence. Similarly, 
if a state takes property by persecuting a minority, it ought to return 
this property at a later point in time, because it is the agent that took 
the property wrongfully at an earlier point in time. This argument has 
less sway, however, when the agent who took property is different than 
the agent returning property. In the case of Kiden, it was the former 
Sudanese government that had taken her land, rather than the newly 
established state of South Sudan. If the new state is a separate agent 
from the one who wrongfully took her land, then the state is not utiliz-
ing violence or persecution when refusing to return her land.
To see the force of this claim, imagine that Svetlana barges into 
my home, using violence to obtain the laptop I had stolen from you. 
Svetlana is later arrested by the prosecutor who opens the laptop, and 
realizes it belongs to you. It seems the prosecutor does no wrong if 
she returns you your laptop, rather than giving it to me, because the 
prosecutor has done no wrong herself; it is Svetlana who has commit-
ted the wrong. If Sudanese militias took Kiden’s property in the 1980s, it 
does not follow that the new South Sudanese government must return 
this property to Kiden; it did no wrong itself, and so does no wrong in 
redistributing her property to those in greater need.
8.1.2 Right-Libertarianism
There is a second justifi cation for restitution. Refugees, some may claim, 
have a right to the property they fl ed if, prior to the atrocity, they justly 
acquired this property. One can justly acquire property, according to 
right-libertarians, by acquiring un-owned natural resources in a man-
ner that makes others no worse off compared to a world where these 
natural resources remained un-owned.21 If one accepts this claim, then 
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Kiden’s ancestors would have acted permissibly in acquiring their land 
if it was un-owned prior to the acquisition, and acquiring this land 
made others no worse off than had the land remained un-owned. Had 
her ancestors then provided this land to their children as gifts, and their 
children provided this land to their children as gifts, and Kiden’s par-
ents bequeathed her this land as a gift, then Kiden would have obtained 
this land through just means, and her ownership would be just. She 
therefore would have a right to re-obtain this land upon repatriation.
The above theory of property rights, however, is controversial. If 
Kiden’s ancestors happened to fi nd land before others, it is not clear 
they had a right to this land simply because others are not made worse 
off. In arriving fi rst, they not only grew wealthy compared to others in 
their generation, they helped their children grow wealthy compared to 
others in their children’s generation. If they did not have a right to create 
such inequality, the theory of property rights should be revised: Rather 
than claiming one has a right to acquire un-owned resources whenever 
others are no worse off, one has a right to acquire un-owned resources 
only when others have an equal or better ability to improve their wel-
fare,22 or at least live a minimally decent life. If Kiden’s ancestors left 
future generations without a chance of living a minimally decent life, 
Kiden had no right to this land. At the very least, she would have no 
right to keep all her land if some land could be redistributed to those 
who cannot currently live an even minimally decent life.
8.1.3 Plans
The third theory of restitution begins with the premise that humans 
often plan their lives around the assumption that a given state of affairs 
will persist. For example, a farmer toiling her land will often presume 
the land she toils will remain in her possession, because she is living 
in a system of property that allows her to keep land in her possession. 
She would have diffi culty planning for the harvest if she did not know 
whether the land she toiled now would be hers tomorrow. There is 
something morally desirable in individuals being able to plan their lives 
and follow through on these plans. Planning enables autonomy, giving 
individuals control over their lives, and planning creates certain utilitar-
ian benefi ts, such as helping economies function.23 Planning can also 
contribute to the development of a routine, which can make various 
tasks easier to fulfi ll. It is often easier for a farmer to harvest her crops if 
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she plans to wake up every day at 5 am, prepare breakfast at 5:15, rev up 
the reaper engine at 6, take a break at 12, and so forth. If her surround-
ings remain the same, this regular routine is easier to follow, becoming 
a habit with time, and requiring far less willpower to pursue.24
If the ability to plan has value, and a person cannot continue plans 
because their lives have been altered, something morally undesirable 
has occurred.25 This person ought to receive compensation to return 
to the status quo ante, allowing them to continue their plans. Or, at 
the very least, they ought to receive compensation to continue plans 
that were based on a reasonable expectation that the status quo would 
continue, or a reasonable expectation that the status quo ought to con-
tinue.26 If a farmer had a reasonable expectation that land would remain 
in her possession, or had a moral reason to believe it ought not to be 
taken through racism and violence, the farmer is owed restitution if her 
land is unexpectedly taken from her through violent racism.
When Kiden made her life plans in the early 1990s, she made these 
plans based on the reasonable expectation that her land would remain 
in her possession, and had a moral reason to believe it ought not to be 
taken through violent discrimination. When she suddenly lost her land, 
she could not continue plans she had created based on these reasonable 
expectations, and so she had a right to get her land back to continue her 
plans. When Maria Altmann was living in Vienna, she had a reasonable 
expectation that she would not be forcibly displaced because she was 
Jewish. Even if she had no reasonable expectation that this would be 
the case – and she suspected she would be displaced – she had a moral 
reason to believe displacement should be prevented, and so made life 
plans with this expectation in mind. Given that these expectations were 
dashed, she had a right to restitution to continue her plans once again.
There are a number of problems with the above argument. For one, 
it is only relevant when victims are given swift restitution for the prop-
erty taken, allowing them to realize the plans they created prior to 
displacement.27 Such swift restitution is rare.28 In Kiden’s case, swift 
restitution was not possible, because the Second Sudanese Civil War 
lasted for over a decade. When she fi nally received her land back, she 
could not continue the plans she had begun when last occupying her 
land. In Altmann’s case, she could not continue her life plans as a 
young girl in Vienna, nor would she likely wish to, given the trauma 
she experienced. If neither Kiden nor Altmann would be able or will-
ing to continue the plans they started prior to displacement, neither 
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woman’s restitution could be justifi ed by appealing to the plans they 
started prior to displacement.
Moreover, even when refugees can continue their previous plans 
through restitution, restitution can come at the expense of other indi-
viduals’ life plans. In many cases, secondary occupants have moved into 
refugees’ property, and begun forming life plans around the property 
they now inhabit. Those living in Juba without property titles were 
often forced to fi nd empty lots and build homes on them. They hoped 
to obtain squatters’ rights as secondary occupants, but in 2009 thou-
sands of these squatters were left homeless when the government 
destroyed their homes, considered illegally built on the land of previous 
refugees.29 These squatters – many of them returning refugees them-
selves – could not continue their plans because of restitution. If their 
plans were cut short, we cannot claim protecting life plans is suffi cient 
to justify restitution.
A similar issue arose in Burundi when, in 1972, 120,000 Hutu civil-
ians were killed, and tens of thousands fl ed, their land left to Tutsi citi-
zens. These Tutsi citizens used this land for agriculture, grazing, and 
building homes for themselves and their children. Thirty years later, 
over half a million Hutu refugees demanded their land back, hoping to 
continue growing crops on the land they had left behind, continuing the 
plans they had begun prior to the atrocity. The new government faced 
a dilemma: it could return land to original owners, or allow secondary 
occupants to remain.30 Given that secondary occupants had developed 
life plans dependent on this land, we cannot claim that former refugees’ 
plans provide decisive reasons to support restitution.
More importantly, even when there are no secondary occupants, the 
claim that life plans matter confl icts, once again, with certain principles 
of distributive justice. It seems unfair if wealthy individuals are able to 
create plans dependent on vast amounts of wealth, while the poor are 
not. This is especially true if the poor have unequal access to assets that 
can ensure a minimally decent life. If this is unjust, then we can correct 
for this injustice by redistributing assets to the poor, rather than return-
ing assets to the wealthy. Even if this interrupts wealthy individuals’ life 
plans, it is not clear they had a right to plans dependent on assets to 
which they had no right, given the needs of others.
To see the force of this claim, return again to the stolen laptop. 
Imagine that I steal your laptop and pursue life plans around the lap-
top I stole. One day I am suddenly attacked by Svetlana who steals 
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the laptop. It does not seem that I have a right to obtain this laptop 
back, even though re-obtaining the laptop would help me realize my 
life plans. I have no right to realize life plans that were dependent on 
a laptop I stole, as this was not an asset to which I had a right. If we 
take seriously the idea that the wealthy often have no right to all of the 
assets they lost, in the same way I have no right to the laptop I lost, then 
protecting plans seems like a poor reason to provide restitution.31
We could stop here, concluding that many victims of displacement 
have no right to all of the assets they lost. Some philosophers have 
reached versions of this conclusion. Jeremy Waldron argues that, even 
if a population faced an injustice when displaced, they no longer have 
a claim to their former property if others have become dependent on 
this property to live a minimally decent life, and those displaced have 
more than enough to live a minimally decent life.32 Anna Stilz argues 
that individuals do not have rights to occupancy over territory if they 
are not dependent on this territory for subsistence or wellbeing, while 
others are.33 This suggests that former refugees do not have a right 
to return to their former property simply because it was once legally 
theirs; they have no such right if others require this territory for subsis-
tence and wellbeing. Christopher Kutz, Pablo Kalmanovitz, and others 
have reached similar conclusions: dispossessed individuals like Kiden 
do not necessarily have a right to all of the assets they lost, assuming 
they can maintain a minimally decent life, while others cannot.34 Even 
if Kiden was wronged, and perhaps owed funds to compensate for the 
psychological harm she felt from displacement, she was not owed the 
assets she would have likely had were she never wronged at all.
8.1.4 Ties
Perhaps restitution is not justifi ed to protect plans, but to protect ties. 
Many refugees feel ties to their lost property, feeling it has personal 
cultural resonance, or evokes memories of their lives prior to displace-
ment.35 Such was the case when South Sudanese farmers re-obtained 
land they worked prior to the war, and when Czech princes re-obtained 
castles they lived in prior to fl eeing. This was also the case when Bosnians 
re-obtained their homes in the 2000s, a decade after being expelled by 
Serb forces.36 More recently, Greek Cypriots requested restitution from 
the Turkish government for property they left during the violence of the 
1960s and 70s, feeling a personal connection to this property.37
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Such personal connections are important. Just as our connections to 
friends and family are important to us, and essential for our identity, so 
are the homes we live in and the objects we possess. If this is true, then 
refugees ought to re-own homes they once occupied and the objects 
they once possessed.38
One potential criticism of the above argument is that, in reality, 
refugees rarely view their property as essential to their identity; if 
they did, they would not quickly sell it once re-obtained. Bosnians 
repatriating often sold their homes quickly after repatriating, and 
Maria Altmann sold her favorite painting for $135 million after it was 
returned. Indeed, some humanitarian workers discourage refugees 
from selling their restituted property, feeling this undermines the 
justifi cation of restitution.39
I do not believe this criticism is valid. Humans can feel strong 
ties to that which they sell, as when painters sell their paintings and 
authors their books. Indeed, humans sometimes sell their prop-
erty because of their ties; they want others to feel a similar tie, and 
benefi t from its value. More often, individuals prefer money to con-
tinuing ownership despite their strong ties, as when an artist sells her 
artwork to pay rent. Refugees are no different. They can feel ties to 
former property, even if they feel it is preferable to sell this property 
than keep these ties.
There is a more serious objection to the claim that ties justify resti-
tution. It seems unfair that individuals with ties to greater wealth are 
given this wealth back, especially when this wealth is substantial and 
non-essential. When Bosnians repatriated, some used their restituted 
homes for weekend purposes while others – including displaced Roma 
– remained homeless.40 It seems unfair that their ties provided them an 
extra home for the weekend while others were provided no homes at 
all. When Greek Cypriots requested restitution from the Turkish gov-
ernment, one claimant asked for twenty-six properties.41 It seems unfair 
that this claimant’s ties gave him a legal right to far more homes than 
others, while others were left with no homes at all. Ties seem a problem, 
rather than a justifi cation: a world where individuals feel their identities 
are tied to their property is a world of special inequality, where indi-
viduals have a hard time envisioning themselves with less, and so are 
reluctant to let go of the properties they own when others are in need. 
There may be value in a world where individuals learn to have identi-
ties that are not tied to this wealth. Such a world would not encourage 
property restitution in its current form.
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If restitution cannot be defended by appealing to harm, libertarianism, 
plans, or ties, we might suppose restitution is unjust when refugees hold 
considerable wealth and others are in far greater need. This is the conclu-
sion reached by some governments. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Hungary provided refugees no more than an upper threshold of 
the value of their lost property, limiting their claims to small personal 
homes, rather than the castles and corporations they fl ed.42 Guatemala 
in the 1990s did not provide refugees full access to the land they fl ed, 
instead redistributing land partly based on need.43 Perhaps Hungary and 
Guatemala acted more justly than Austria and South Sudan.
There remains nonetheless something appealing about restitution. 
After fl eeing her home Kiden spent decades abroad, traveling from 
country to country until she fi nally returned to the land she remem-
bered as a young girl. Maria Altmann fl ed the Holocaust, never caring 
about the materials she left behind, but felt an injustice arose when 
her family’s paintings remained in the hands of the Austrian govern-
ment. There is something inspiring about a South Sudanese refugee 
obtaining her childhood home, and a Holocaust survivor obtaining the 
artwork she remembers as a child.
Indeed, some refugees garner their strongest support for restitution 
from those most supportive of redistribution. Holocaust survivors seek-
ing restitution in the 1950s received their strongest support from the 
Socialist party in Germany,44 and subjects I interviewed in South Sudan 
received their strongest support from those identifying themselves as 
communists. The socialists in Germany and the communists in South 
Sudan felt restitution for the wealthy was important despite valuing 
redistribution from the wealthy.
Maria Altmann recalled similar support for restitution while visiting 
Austria shortly after receiving her paintings: 
I thought people were going to say, “It’s disgusting what you 
are doing,” but out in the streets, people said: “Are you Mrs. 
Altmann? We are so happy that justice prevailed and you got the 
pictures back.”45
8.2 EXPRESSIVE HARMS
Here is one reason justice prevailed when Mrs. Altmann got her pictures 
back. The reason begins with a premise regarding discrimination from 
the last chapter: Discrimination against a member of a minority can be 
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wrong because it demeans others of the same minority. For example, 
if an elite members’ club rejects dark-skinned members, this sends a 
demeaning message not only to dark-skinned individuals hoping to join 
the club, but to dark-skinned individuals with no interest in joining the 
club. The latter understand that their skin color is viewed as indicative of 
their worth, even if they never seek membership.
If discrimination against one minority member can demean other 
members of the same minority, discrimination against one wealthy 
minority member can demean other members of the same minority. 
Consider the following case:
Racist Robin Hood steals from wealthy individuals of a histori-
cally-disadvantaged ethnic minority blamed for the ills of soci-
ety, and redistributes this to all poor individuals. She never steals 
from the ethnic majority.
Racist Robin is giving an advantage to the preferred ethnic majority, 
allowing them to keep their wealth intact. In doing so, she demeans 
all members of the minority, including those not wealthy enough to 
lose property themselves. Those not wealthy understand that a charac-
teristic they hold – their ethnicity – is indicative of their lesser worth.46 
To counteract this harm, the government would have good reason to 
institute the following rule: If Racist Robin steals from wealthy minor-
ity members, the government will force wealthy majority members to 
give up wealth at the same rate. If this is not possible, the government 
has a weighty reason to return the property back to the wealthy minor-
ity members. Were the government to not return the property back, it 
would be allowing Robin to demean not only the wealthy, but poor 
minority members as well. Regardless of whether the wealthy have a 
right to the wealth they lost, all have a right to be free from the demean-
ing message implied by Robin’s actions.
This has implications for cases involving refugees. Just as Racist 
Robin demeans all members of a minority when taking the property 
of the wealthy and redistributing it to the poor, a government or militia 
demeans all members of a minority when taking the property of the 
wealthy and redistributing it to the poor. And just as we have reason to 
adopt a rule with Robin that avoids this demeaning message, we have 
reason to adopt a rule for refugees that avoids this demeaning message. 
I call this the Restitution Rule: if a government or militia confi scates the 
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property of wealthy minority members, then future governments have a 
weighty reason to either (a) confi scate the property of majority members at 
the same rate, or (b) return property to the original members.
Option (a) in the above rule does not involve restitution, but instead 
confi scation of property owned by majority members. If the Nazi govern-
ment confi scated the property of Jews, blacks, and Roma in the 1930s and 
40s, then future governments could confi scate the property of non-refu-
gees at the same rate. For example, if the Austrian government established 
Maria Altmann’s wealth at $1 million without her uncle’s paintings, and 
the paintings were worth $150 million, it could refuse to return her paint-
ings and then tax all non-refugee Austrians worth $151 million at $150 
million. Similarly, if the South Sudanese government established Kiden’s 
wealth at $15,000 without her land, and the land was worth $10,000, it 
could refuse to return her land and tax all non-refugees worth $25,000 at 
$10,000. This policy would ensure that the demeaning message of dis-
crimination was avoided, as ethnic minorities would not lose property at 
a greater rate than ethnic majorities.
In reality, it is often easier for a government to redistribute what it 
already controls compared to taxing what it does not. When the govern-
ment controls refugees’ former property, it can more easily redistribute 
this property compared to taxing non-refugees’ property at the same rate. 
The South Sudanese government had control over Kiden’s land, and 
the Austrian government had control over Maria Altmann’s painting, so 
redistributing their assets was easier than taxing wealthy individuals at 
similar rates.
In such cases, the government has a weighty reason to return prop-
erty to those returning, even if those returning have no right to the 
property they seek. Providing restitution is justifi ed to mitigate the 
demeaning messages arising from discrimination, a message effecting 
not only the wealthy, but poor individuals of the same minority.
Though the government has a weighty reason to return property, 
this reason is not absolute. If the number of lives saved by refusing 
restitution is considerable enough, this may provide a decisive rea-
son to not return property. If the South Sudanese government refused 
to facilitate restitution, and instead allowed secondary occupants to 
remain, the benefi ts of helping the worst off may trump the benefi ts of 
avoiding discrimination. It remains the case that, if the benefi ts for the 
worst off fall below a given threshold, there is good reason to return 
property to the original owners even if these owners have no right to 
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the property they lost. In other words, there is some amount of prop-
erty that the wealthy have no right to own, and which therefore usually 
ought to be given the poor, but which ought not to be given to the poor 
if this expresses a demeaning message of discrimination. In such cases, 
the value of avoiding the expressive harm of discrimination outweighs 
the value of ensuring a more just distribution of property.
This leaves open the question of how governments weigh the value 
of avoiding the expressive harm of discrimination against the value of 
helping those in need. I shall not attempt to provide a set of precise 
rules, but there are some useful rules of thumb. The fi rst is that, if tak-
ing property through discrimination is preferable to no redistribution, 
then redistributing property taken via past discrimination is preferable 
to no redistribution. Imagine, for example, that a government took the 
property of ten members of an ethnic minority, saving hundreds of 
lives in the process. Though the confi scation was impermissible, given 
that the discrimination demeaned all members of the minority, per-
haps it was preferable to no taxation at all, given the lives saved. If this 
is true, then when a government inherits property confi scated from 
ten individuals, and can save hundreds of lives by redistributing the 
property, redistribution may be preferable to returning the property to 
its original owners.
The opposite may not be true: If a government in the past con-
fi scated property, and no confi scation would have been preferable, it 
may still be preferable to redistribute this property today. The earlier 
government’s wrong of confi scating property through discrimina-
tion was worse than a current government’s wrong of distributing 
property taken via discrimination. The Nazis confi scating Altmann’s 
paintings and Sudanese militias confi scating Kiden’s land were worse 
than the Austrian government keeping Altmann’s paintings and 
the South Sudanese government keeping Kiden’s property. This is 
because the fi rst two governments acted through intentional racism, 
while the latter two governments do not. Assuming racist confi sca-
tion of property sends a more demeaning message than inheriting 
property confi scated by others, current governments should adopt a 
discount rate: If a government confi scates property from 100 ethnic 
minority members to provide necessities to fi fty individuals, it may be 
acting wrongly, but if a current government inherits the property of 
100 ethnic minorities members, it may be acting rightly in redistrib-
uting this to fi fty individuals. At least, this is a possibility I leave open.
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There is an additional consideration we ought to account for when 
weighing the value of avoiding discrimination against the benefi ts of 
redistribution. We ought to account for the rights of secondary occu-
pants. It may be that secondary occupants have greater rights than the 
rights of other poor individuals. When secondary occupants are both 
dependent on property for basic needs and also have strong ties to this 
property, their ties may matter. This is because, while having ties is not a 
suffi cient condition to justify ownership – princes do not have a right to 
return to their castles simply because of their ties to these castles – ties 
combined with great need can perhaps jointly create suffi cient condi-
tions for ownership. If so, we can adopt a type of discount rate here, 
as well. For example, if a government refuses to provide restitution to 
100 ethnic minority members, instead letting fi fty secondary occupants 
remain, it may be acting rightly, but if it refuses to provide restitution to 
100 ethnic minority members, instead redistributing this to fi fty indi-
viduals who never occupied this land, it may be acting wrongly.
Regardless of how we weigh various values, the conclusion remains: 
Avoiding the expressive harm of discrimination can provide a decisive 
reason to support restitution to refugees, even when the refugees have 
no right to the property they seek.
This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that refugees lost 
their earlier property because they fl ed ethnic, religious, social, or polit-
ical-based persecution. Such refugees were victims of discrimination, 
creating the need for the Restitution Rule I described. But many refu-
gees were not victims of discrimination when they fl ed, but of general 
violence, or an environmental or economic disaster. If such refugees 
leave behind property because they fl ed, and this property is given to 
others, there seems to be no expressive harm towards other members 
of a given ethnic, religious, social, or political group. Unlike in the case 
of Kiden, where other Bari members might have suffered an expressive 
harm when she lost her property, or Altmann, where other Jews may 
have suffered an expressive harm when she lost her paintings, there 
are no other members of a group harmed when refugees lose property 
fl eeing general violence or disasters. If so, perhaps there is no need for 
the Restitution Rule.
Even when refugees fl ee general violence or disasters, rather than 
persecution, they can still be members of a defi ned group. If they are 
members of a defi ned group, the group might include poorer mem-
bers who are offended if their wealthy co-members cannot obtain their 
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property back. Consider, for example, economic refugees born into pov-
erty who are forced to leave to fi nd employment abroad, their property 
used by secondary occupants the moment they leave. Were the gov-
ernment to refuse to return them their property upon return, on the 
grounds that they were wealthy upon return, the government would be 
disadvantaging them compared to those never forced to leave because 
they were born into wealth. The government would therefore be disad-
vantaging individuals born into poverty compared to those born into 
wealth. This can be demeaning towards all individuals born into pov-
erty, signaling to them that their poverty at birth indicates their access 
to property rights.
It might be comparable to a state that only taxed those who grew 
up poor and were now wealthy, while not taxing those who had been 
born into wealth. This would send a message to those who were born 
poor and remain poor: “If you ever become wealthy we will disadvan-
tage you compared to your peers born into wealth.” The state ought to 
change the tax code so that all of equal wealth are taxed at the same 
rate, regardless of their economic status at birth. The same holds true 
for restitution: the government has good reason to provide restitution to 
the former poor who are now wealthy as a result of migration, assum-
ing it is unable or unwilling to confi scate the property of the wealthy 
never forced to migrate.
This leaves open the possibility that a state refusing to provide res-
titution sometimes expresses no demeaning message. It expresses no 
demeaning message if there is no clear group that is more suscepti-
ble to disaster. Imagine everyone is born into life-threatening poverty, 
some leave in search of basic necessities abroad, and some who leave 
grow wealthy. If these wealthy individuals cannot access the property 
they left behind, the government would not be sending a demeaning 
message to any group, as all individuals in society were born into the 
same poverty. The government would merely be sending the message 
that, if one chooses to leave the state, and grows wealthy abroad, one 
will lose property to those in greater need.
Moreover, the government would not be sending a demeaning mes-
sage if it refused to return property that was owned by those who were 
members of particularly privileged social groups. The princes who fl ed 
Czechoslovakia may have been disadvantaged compared to other princes 
around the world, but they were advantaged compared to most others in 
Czechoslovakia. If such refugees are not truly members of a disadvantaged 
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group, it is unlikely that their inability to access restitution will create an 
expressive harm towards other group members. In such cases, restitution 
is less important than in the cases of Kiden and Altmann.
8.3 OBJECTIONS
Some might reject my conclusion that restitution is justifi ed to counter 
the demeaning messages arising from discrimination. They might raise 
one of three objections.
8.3.1 No Expressive Harm
Some object to my claim that, if wealthy refugees are not given restitu-
tion, this will create an expressive harm towards others. They might 
claim that, so long as refugees are only given that to which they have a 
right, no expressive harm will arise.
To see the appeal of this claim, consider the following fi ctional 
case: Bob is a racist prosecutor who dislikes Russians. He therefore 
assumes that Svetlana is guilty of stealing Jamal’s laptop and pur-
sues her as a suspect. By chance, the laptop is found in Svetlana’s 
home, along with evidence that proves Svetlana stole Jamal’s laptop.
Bob acted wrongly when pursuing Svetlana, but the state should not 
right this wrong by letting Svetlana keep the laptop, as she is not the 
rightful owner. Instead, Bob should himself be fi red, due to his racist 
intentions, or perhaps he owes Svetlana an apology or compensation 
for the discrimination she faced. If he refuses to let her keep the laptop, 
this does not communicate an expressive harm toward other Russians, 
because Svetlana is not denied that to which she has a right.
The same can be said about refugees. A government ought not to 
return property for which refugees have no right. The government, if it 
wishes to right the wrong refugees experienced, should provide repara-
tions for the wrong of discrimination or displacement, distributed equally 
amongst all refugees. If it refuses to provide restitution, this does not com-
municate an expressive harm, any more than Bob refusing to let Svetlana 
keep the laptop communicates an expressive harm towards others.
The above objection holds in a world where the state redistributed 
all wealth for which individuals had no right. In such a world, refugees 
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would not receive their property back, and non-refugees would be taxed 
at the same rate, such that refugees would no longer be disadvantaged. 
However, if such a scheme is not implemented – if the government 
refuses to return property to refugees but also allows non-refugees to 
keep their property intact – then the government is allowing discrimi-
nation to occur. When the discrimination negatively effects the wealthy 
of a given group, this can express the idea that being a member of 
this group is indicative of one’s rights, offending the poor members of 
this group.
It would be comparable to Bob pursuing suspects who are Russian, 
while avoiding the pursuit of suspects who are non-Russian. If nei-
ther group of suspects is entitled to stolen goods, it seems wrong to 
give Russian suspects only what they are entitled to – goods they did 
not steal – while allowing other suspects to keep what they are not 
entitled to – goods they stole. When Bob lets non-Russian suspects 
off the hook, he is communicating an expressive harm towards all 
Russian individuals: that their nationality indicates their lesser rights. 
If the state must decide how to respond, it has good reason to begin 
pursuing non-Russian suspects to a greater degree, or Russian sus-
pects to a lesser degree, avoiding the discrimination that arose, and 
the expressive harm arising from this discrimination.
Similarly, if a government refuses to return wealth to the refugees 
who fl ed, allowing those who remained to keep their wealth intact, the 
government would be giving refugees what they deserve – no more 
than an upper threshold of wealth – while giving non-refugees that 
which they do not deserve – wealth above this threshold. Doing so 
demeans members of the minority forced to fl ee, including poor mem-
bers of this same minority. This provides one reason for the government 
either to take the wealth of non-refugees at the same rate, or to provide 
restitution to refugees returning.
8.3.2 The Discrimination is Indirect
Some might claim that, when a government refuses to provide restitu-
tion, it is merely engaging in permissible indirect discrimination. Per-
missible indirect discrimination occurs when an agent disadvantages a 
given minority, but does not explicitly target this minority, nor intends 
to disadvantage this minority. Doing so creates no expressive harms 
against other members of this minority. Consider the following case:
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Firm I: A fi rm selects applicants for promotion based on their 
score on a test. Members of ethnic minorities tend to score less 
well because they are also new immigrants without the relevant 
educational background. As a result, they are disadvantaged.
According to some, the above is not a case of wrongful discrimination, 
as the fi rm does not directly target minorities, nor intends to disadvan-
tage minorities. Minorities just happen to hold characteristics disqualify-
ing them for promotion. Similarly, when the government redistributes 
refugees’ former property, it does not target refugees or the group which 
refugees are members of. It intends to merely redistribute the property of 
those who left the country and, by chance, refugees have left the country.
Even if indirect discrimination is not wrong, there is reason to believe 
refugees are victims of direct discrimination, rather than indirect dis-
crimination. Or, more specifi cally, they are victims of what I call Direct 
Indirect Discrimination (DID).
DID occurs when a policy disadvantages a minority with character-
istics obtained from direct discrimination by a third party.
Here is an example based on an actual case:
Firm II: Throughout the 1950s the Duke Power Company, based 
in North Carolina, required that employees pass an aptitude test 
and have a high school diploma. This disadvantaged African-
Americans, more likely to fail the test, having been banned from 
attending adequate schools under North Carolina’s policy of 
forced segregation.47
The Duke Power Company did not (ostensibly) intend to prevent 
African Americans from being promoted. It intended to prevent all 
individuals from being promoted if they failed the test or had no high 
school diploma. But the reason African Americans failed the test or 
had no high school diploma was because of direct discrimination by 
the state.
If direct discrimination is wrong, there is reason to avoid DID, which 
enhances the negative effects of direct discrimination. The Duke Power 
Company enhanced the negative effects of direct segregation by creat-
ing yet another barrier to those who faced direct segregation as chil-
dren. Even if a given African American employee managed to pass the 
test and obtain a diploma despite the negative effects of segregation, 
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the company would be requiring him to do what white employees need 
not: pass an exam despite a childhood of segregation. For this reason 
Firm II has a stronger moral reason to avoid the test compared to Firm 
I. The same holds for cases involving refugees. When states refuse to 
return refugees their property, they institute a policy indirectly impact-
ing victims of persecution, a form of direct discrimination. In doing so, 
they reinforce disadvantages that members of the persecuted group 
face, potentially offending other victims of this persecuted group.
Some refugees, of course, are not victims of direct discrimination, 
having fl ed natural or economic disasters. They are therefore victims 
of indirect discrimination alone. But even indirect discrimination can 
send a demeaning message to members of the group discriminated 
against. For example, imagine that a state required lower taxes for pri-
vate homes, on the grounds that one’s home is a necessity, and neces-
sities ought not to be taxed at the same rate. Imagine, also, that those 
born into wealth tended to have more of their assets placed into homes, 
such that those lucky enough to be born wealthy were taxed at a lower 
rate than those born poor. Even if such a tax code is only indirect dis-
crimination, it could still send a demeaning message towards those 
born poor: “Your wealth at birth determines how much taxes you will 
pay.” Similarly, there is something demeaning about a tax code that dis-
advantages individuals who were unlucky enough to have had to fl ee 
because of a natural or economic disaster. Refusing to return refugees 
their property back would be such a tax code. It would be better, all else 
being equal, for the government to take the property of all individuals 
at the same rate, regardless of whether they were victims of bad luck 
in the past. When this is impossible, the government has one reason to 
implement restitution.
8.3.3 Refugees Redistributing Property
There is a fi nal objection. We might suppose there is no demeaning 
message when the bodies redistributing property are run by refu-
gees themselves. Such was the case in 1950s Germany, when chari-
ties run partly by refugees were in charge of administering property 
confi scated during the Holocaust, and in 1990s Rwanda when the 
refugee-led government took charge of property restitution.48 If refu-
gees are in control of property that wealthy refugees lost, and choose 
to redistribute wealthy refugees’ former property to those in greater 
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need, they are engaging in collective decision-making. Such collective 
decision-making ought to be respected, rather than viewed as a form 
of demeaning discrimination.
In some cases, the above is true. If refugees redistributing property 
receive the consent of the previous owners, they are not engaging in 
wrongful discrimination against these previous owners, but are engag-
ing in collective decision-making. But if refugees redistribute property 
without the consent of the previous owners, they are disadvantaging 
a minority against their will, and so reinforcing a demeaning message 
against members of this minority. It does not matter if the refugees dis-
advantaging the minority are also members of this minority.
This is because, more generally, it does not matter if agents disad-
vantaging a minority are members of the same group discriminated 
against. Imagine Racist Robin was also sexist, and steals from women 
alone. Her actions are demeaning towards women even if she is a 
woman herself. Even if the government was headed by a woman, it 
would also have good reason to return the property she stole, or tax 
men at the same rate to ensure women are not disadvantaged. In taking 
either approach, the government avoids expressing the idea that one’s 
gender indicates one’s rights.
Refugee-headed governments similarly have good reason to return 
property or tax non-refugees at the same rate, avoiding similar expres-
sive harms. While this reason is not always decisive – the need to help 
the poor may triumph in some cases – it is a reason nonetheless, and 
decisive in a range of cases.
8.4 CONCLUSION
When states provide restitution to refugees, they help princes access 
castles, collectors their artwork, and the wealthy their land. It is not 
clear if such restitution is justifi ed, when others are in far greater need. I 
considered four common reasons to believe such restitution is justifi ed. 
The fi rst was related to wrongdoing: we might suppose that if a person 
is wronged and loses property as a result, they are owed restitution for 
this harm. I rejected this claim: if a person has no right to the property 
they lost, they are not owed restitution for this property, even if their 
loss was the result of a wrong. I then considered the claim that refugees 
have a right to property that their ancestors obtained, rejecting this as 
well: just because one’s ancestors obtained property, it does not follow 
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that one has a right to this property, especially when others are desti-
tute. The third justifi cation for restitution was related to plans: refugees 
have a right to property they once possessed to continue the life plans 
they began. This justifi cation, however, is rarely relevant for refugees, 
who often cannot continue the plans they began because they fl ed their 
property decades prior. The fi nal justifi cation was related to ties: indi-
viduals have a right to property to which they feel strong ties. I rejected 
this justifi cation, arguing that ties seem like a poor justifi cation when 
others are in great need.
There is a more promising justifi cation for restitution: Restitution 
prevents the expressive harms arising from discrimination. If a govern-
ment refuses to give victims of persecution their property back, it dis-
advantages the persecuted compared to those who never fl ed, as those 
who never fl ed can keep their property intact. This sends a demeaning 
message not only to the persecuted seeking to obtain their property 
back, but to poor individuals of the same group persecuted against. 
These poor individuals understand that a characteristic they hold – 
their ethnicity, religion, or social or political group – grants them fewer 
rights. To avoid this demeaning message, the government has a weighty 
reason to either tax the property of non-refugees at the same rate, or 
return property to refugees returning home.
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CONCLUSION
At 1:35pm on January 15, 2013, Nhial boarded Ethiopian Airlines fl ight 
491 from Juba to Addis Ababa. He wore a hat to cover his Nuer tribal 
scars, settled into his seat, and landed two hours later in Ethiopia. He 
took off his hat, strode into the sunlight, and asked a Nuer stranger for 
help. Together, they drove into town.
When Nhial was a small boy, Northern Sudanese militias entered his 
village, grabbed his leg, and pulled him into a truck. They took him to their 
home in the north of the country, where he worked as a slave into adult-
hood, eventually escaping to Khartoum, and then Egypt, arriving in Israel 
in 2007. Once there he worked in a hotel in Jerusalem, saved money, and 
read extensively about the risks of living in modern-day South Sudan. 
In June 2011 he bought a ticket for Juba, arriving on July 2, 2011, a week 
before South Sudan became an independent country. He rested for a day, 
and then sought employment in the oil industry, but his applications were 
ignored, even as his Dinka friends were hired. Instead, he opened a small 
stall in a market, selling sweets, making just enough to live.1
In 2013, a day after the outbreak of the civil war, Dinka soldiers arrived 
at his market stall, grabbed his sweets and money, and demanded that 
he leave. He did, jogging to the IDP camp, where we ran into each other 
a week later, recognizing each other from Jerusalem. He told me he did 
not regret his choice to return, despite being forced to fl ee to the camp. 
We met again on January 16, by chance on the same fl ight to Addis, 
him fl eeing the country, me returning home. He still did not regret his 
choice and, half a year later, joined the opposition military in South 
Sudan. In 2014 I visited him in Gambella in Ethiopia, where he was still 
satisfi ed with his choice to repatriate.
OBI never assisted Nhial in returning, but if they had, they would 
have done no wrong. He was never coerced into leaving nor paid to 
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leave, saving up money himself. He researched the risks of living in 
South Sudan before he returned, thought about his decision exten-
sively, and endangered himself alone when boarding the fl ight. Nor 
was he likely to regret his choice. The year he returned, past returnees 
in Juba were happy with their decisions, and it was likely he would be 
happy as well.
Unlike Nhial, most refugees leaving Israel were coerced into their 
decisions, either threatened with deportation or living in destitu-
tion. Such coercion is common around the globe, with governments 
insisting that refugees live in enclosed camps, often threatening to 
deny aid to those who stay. In such cases, humanitarian organizations 
should refuse to help with return unless they also lobby for the end 
of these coercive practices, and unless their assistance does not caus-
ally contribute to more coercion. Organizations should avoid being 
necessary for repatriation when repatriation contributes to coer-
cion, and they should avoid increasing the probability of repatriation 
occurring, when doing so increases the probability of coercion occur-
ring. Humanitarian organizations should only help with return that 
increases the probability of coercion if they can ensure a much safer 
return than would otherwise take place, and can warn refugees of the 
risks of returning.
In providing information on risks, organizations should disclose 
what they already know, but they should also strive to know more, con-
ducting their own post-return evaluations when no such evaluations 
exist. Such organizations have a duty to fi nd information because they 
have a duty of care, given that they were created to assist vulnerable 
populations. Governments may have no duty of care, but they have 
a duty to conduct research on repatriation if this is necessary to ful-
fi ll duties unrelated to repatriation. If, for example, governments have 
duties to help prevent atrocities abroad, they have a duty to research 
data on atrocities abroad. If they do not, they are culpable for failing to 
inform refugees of the risks of atrocities abroad.
Even if repatriation facilitators do warn refugees of risks, they still 
have reason to discontinue return if most who return regret their deci-
sion, while those who remain do not. More specifi cally, facilitators 
should discontinue return if returnees could not comprehend what 
returning would be like prior to their choice, and now feel that the 
best life they can live is worse than the worst life they could have lived 
had they remained. Even when such regret is not widespread, and so 
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assisting with return justifi ed, facilitators should not encourage return 
through payments, assuming payments motivate refugees to return 
unsafely.
The above conclusions suggest that some repatriation assistance is 
morally permissible even if return is unsafe. It is permissible if facili-
tators do not encourage return, fully inform refugees of risks, ensure 
refugees will be unlikely to feel regret, and do everything possible to 
end coercion. Such return may involve risks, but adults have a right to 
take such risks.
Children, in contrast, do not have a right to take such risks. Of the 
over 500 children who returned from Israel, at least seven died within 
the fi rst three months, and in my own sample of forty-eighty children, 
fi ve died within the fi rst two years. Regardless of how informed and 
voluntary return is, children should not be assisted in repatriation that 
places their lives at considerable risk compared to remaining.
Even when return is completely safe, or when only adults are return-
ing, governments and organizations should avoid only assisting a given 
racial group to return. When the goal of this assistance is to decrease 
the number of members of racial minorities in a country, the assistance 
is demeaning towards citizens of the same racial group who under-
stand that, in a close possible world, they too would be unwanted.
After refugees have repatriated, their newly adopted governments 
will face their own set of dilemmas. I lacked the space to list them all, 
but one concerns restitution: governments must decide whether to 
return to refugees their former property, or distribute this property to 
those most in need. I argued that, were a government to redistribute 
refugees’ former property, it would be disadvantaging refugees com-
pared to non-refugees who never fl ed. This disadvantage is a form 
of discrimination, which can be demeaning towards all refugees of 
the same persecuted minority forced to leave. Governments can avoid 
this form of discrimination by either providing restitution, or taxing 
non-refugees’ property at the same rate, ensuring refugees are not 
disadvantaged.
In light of these conclusions, repatriation facilitators should intro-
duce a number of policy changes. One is related to coercion: when 
governments coerce refugees to repatriate, humanitarian organiza-
tions should invest resources in lobbying for the end of such coer-
cion, meeting with policymakers to explain the risks that refugees 
will face if they return, and raising court petitions to free refugees 
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from detention. Such efforts will often mean organizations have 
fewer resources for repatriation itself, but the repatriation that 
does take place is more likely to be voluntary, rather than forced. 
Organizations should also invest resources in evaluating the outcome 
of repatriation, fi nding information on the mortality rate, rate of dis-
placement, rate of education, and access to healthcare amongst those 
who returned. This requires traveling to IDP camps and to surround-
ing countries, interviewing returnees who have migrated or fl ed, and 
interviewing relatives to fi nd out if returnees have died after return-
ing. The fi ndings from such interviews must be clearly communicated 
to refugees who have yet to return. If the fi ndings include evidence 
that past returnees have severely regretted their decisions to return, 
there are strong reasons to discontinue repatriation until conditions 
in countries of origin improve.
In addition to gathering and disclosing more information, facilita-
tors should discontinue providing payments that encourage unsafe 
repatriation. To determine if payments encourage repatriation, facilita-
tors should determine if there are strong correlations between return 
rates and payments, even while detention rates and conditions in home 
countries remain the same. If they determine that payments do encour-
age unsafe return, payments should be discontinued. They may still 
provide aid to those who have already returned, if there is no evidence 
that such post-return aid encourages future unsafe returns.
When parents wish to return with their children, or when unac-
companied minors are returning on their own, facilitators should only 
assist if return is safe or as safe as remaining. To determine safety, 
facilitators should consider the mortality, literacy, and numeracy rates 
amongst children in the country of origin. If facilitators determine 
that the country is insuffi ciently safe, they should deny repatriation 
assistance, and states should possibly block families from attempting 
to pay for their own fl ights, stopping them at the airport and revok-
ing their passports. At the very least, governments and organizations 
should implement campaigns to discourage such returns. When pos-
sible, NGOs and social workers should meet with parents, try to per-
suade them to not repatriate, and provide them detailed information 
on the lack of clinics, schools, and safe locations in the country of 
origin. Facilitators should also communicate to parents their rights 
in the host country, explaining what will happen to their children 
if they are detained or forced into enclosed camps. In cases where 
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children will not have access to basic services if they remain, and will 
likely go without suffi cient food, shelter, and security, organizations 
should ultimately help with repatriation, but only if remaining is no 
safer than returning.
When return is perfectly safe, facilitators should avoid supporting 
programs aimed at reducing the number of unwanted minorities in the 
country. When programs entail paying unwanted minorities to leave – 
as when Israel paid East African refugees and migrants to leave – the 
payments are wrongfully discriminatory, and are only morally permis-
sible if recipients prefer to have been offered the payments than not, 
and no third parties are demeaned or harmed. To avoid discriminatory 
payments, governments should provide equal payments to all, rather 
than to unwanted minorities alone.
In addition to the policy conclusions above, there are three broad 
theoretical conclusions, relevant beyond the scope of repatriation. The 
fi rst regards consent.
We should not assume that coerced consent is invalid. We must 
fi rst consider whether agents obtaining consent have a duty to stop 
the coercion. To do so, we must consider whether they have the ability 
to stop the coercion, and whether they have great enough resources 
to do so.
We should similarly not assume that individuals must be fully 
informed to give their valid consent. We must consider whether agents 
obtaining consent have a duty to provide information. I provided one 
novel reason why they do: because they have other unrelated duties 
giving them a duty to know. If I have a duty to not collide with anyone 
in my car, I have a duty to know if my brakes are faulty. If I do not know 
they are faulty, and sell you my car without informing you of the faulty 
brakes, I am culpable for your uninformed consent. Importantly, culpa-
bility for uninformed consent can arise even if the recipient of a service 
would have consented had they been more informed. Even if Yasmin 
would have consented to repatriate to South Sudan had she known 
about widespread poverty, she still lacked control over her consent at 
the time she returned, for she did not know what she was consenting 
to. To ensure that individuals have control over their decisions, provid-
ing information is essential.
There is a fi nal general conclusion regarding consent: sometimes 
it is not enough. When an individual consents to a service they will 
likely regret, there are good reasons to deny them this service. This 
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is especially true for services that are “epistemically transforma-
tive,” where individuals cannot know the nature of the risks they are 
accepting. This is relevant not only for refugees returning home, but 
for other life-altering services, most notably medical interventions. If 
a hospital learns that most patients regret accepting a given medical 
intervention, this can provide a reason to discontinue providing this 
intervention.
In addition to general conclusions regarding consent, I have attempted 
to contribute to the broader discussion of children’s rights. It is widely 
accepted that children have a right to education that provides them the 
capacity to function within an economy. I argue, more specifi cally, that 
children have a right to education necessary for upholding an economy 
that protects basic welfare. This would entail a right to fl uent literacy and 
numeracy, in addition to the more basic rights of immediate security, 
shelter, and healthcare. Parents have a correlative duty to avoid moving 
to a country without these necessities, and should be dissuaded from 
doing so.
The fi nal major conclusion concerned discrimination. While harm-
ful discrimination is often wrong, it is less clear whether benefi cial dis-
crimination is right. If a landlord, organization, or government pays a 
minority to leave a building, city, or country, perhaps this is acceptable 
if the minority members benefi t. I argued that such payments can be 
unacceptable because they imply an offensive message to recipients: 
“We do not want you so much, that we are willing to pay you a large 
amount of money for your exit.” This demeans not only minority mem-
bers who reject the payments, but minority members who accept pay-
ments they wish had never been offered at all. The latter are demeaned 
by the money’s implied message without actually benefi ting, and so 
are impermissibly wronged.
In reaching the above theoretical conclusions, I have attempted to 
draw upon a diverse array of examples, reaching a methodology con-
clusion: Fieldwork is essential for making us realize what we overlook, 
rather than just applying what we already know. If we wish to make 
robust and specifi c rules in ethics, we must consider a broader range of 
cases. This is only possible if we learn of cases we might otherwise not 
consider, which is easier when speaking to individuals we might other-
wise not meet. This is especially true in studying the ethics of immigra-
tion, an area involving millions of individuals crossing borders annually, 
and hundreds of organizations that hinder or help.
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In exploring these agents, qualitative fi eldwork is particular helpful. 
Through in-depth interviews, refugees described the coercion they expe-
rienced, their reasons for their actions, and their current judgments about 
their past decisions. Organizations similarly explained to me the dilem-
mas they faced, and the choices they made. Such interviews included 
details often missing in aggregate data on immigration, helping better 
formulate informed, relevant, and ethical policies for refugees.
NOTES
 1. Interview with Nhial, Juba, January 4, 2014.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINING REFUGEES
This book assumes what I call the Life Claim: an individual is a refugee 
if their right to life is threatened in their home countries, regardless of 
whether it is threatened from persecution, violence, poverty or other 
life-threatening conditions.1 All such refugees have a right to asylum, 
assuming they have no other mechanism for accessing protection, and 
assuming states have the capacity to accept such individuals.
The Life Claim is limited in scope, establishing a suffi cient but not 
necessary condition: it is suffi cient that a refugee’s right to life is under-
mined, but not necessary. It is not necessary because those suffering 
other harms, such as life-long detention, are likely refugees as well.2 
The Life Claim is also neutral as to when, precisely, states no longer 
have the capacity to accept refugees, and so can ethically turn them 
away. It may be that a state lacks capacity if the costs of accepting more 
refugees are very high,3 or if accepting refugees endangers citizens’ 
access to basic rights and liberal institutions.4 My aim here is merely 
to demonstrate that, however we measure capacity, states ought not to 
differentiate between those fl eeing persecution, those fl eeing general 
violence, and those fl eeing other life-threatening conditions.
Importantly, I do not claim that all individuals fl eeing life-threat-
ening conditions are refugees. A ninety year old without access to very 
costly cancer treatment does not necessarily have a right to asylum 
abroad to obtain treatment, because the right to life needn’t entail the 
right to access costly life-saving treatment at age ninety. In contrast, 
an individual who cannot access basic medical care does have a right 
to asylum, assuming an individual’s right to life is violated if they lack 
access to basic medical care. Determining who precisely has their right 
to life violated would require a broader discussion of rights, but this is 
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not necessary for my purposes: I merely wish to demonstrate that those 
fl eeing persecution do not have a special right to asylum as compared 
to those fl eeing other equally life-threatening rights violations.
There are two common claims that are inconsistent with the Life 
Claim. I describe them below, along with my objections.
1. The Aid Claim
According to the Aid Claim, states have a duty to protect the right to 
life of individuals outside of their borders, assuming such protection 
does not rise above a given cost. States can often protect the right to 
life by sending aid, as when states send food aid to individuals suf-
fering from severe malnutrition. For such individuals, states can fulfi ll 
their duties without granting asylum. States must only grant asylum to 
those who cannot be saved any other way. In general, those who are 
fl eeing persecution and general violence cannot be saved any other 
way.5 Sometimes individuals suffering from hunger also cannot be 
saved any other way, because their home government is blocking the 
provision of international aid, and such refugees simply must obtain 
asylum to obtain food.6 Regardless, most individuals who fi nd their 
right to life threatened can be helped with aid, and so states needn’t 
grant them asylum.
The problem with the Aid Claim is that it confuses what states can 
do with what they will do. States can send aid, but they often do not – at 
least, they do not send nearly as much aid as they have a duty to send. 
In 2016 wealthy states’ total aid was $142.6 billion, averaging only 0.32 
per cent of gross national income, far less than states can afford to send, 
and far less than the minimum necessary to secure poor individuals’ 
right to life.7 If states are not sending suffi cient aid, then those living in 
poverty can only save themselves through asylum. They therefore have 
a right to asylum.
Importantly, even if states do fulfi ll their duties to provide aid, in 
that they are sending as much aid as they can before the costs become 
too high, they may still have a duty to provide asylum. This is because 
asylum does not necessarily incur costs. If asylum does not incur costs, 
states cannot claim they have no duty to provide asylum because they 
have already incurred costs in sending aid. It would be comparable to 
a philanthropist donating most of her life savings to charity, and then 
failing to save a drowning child whom she can save at no cost. If the 
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philanthropist can save the child at no cost, she has a duty to do so, 
even if she has donated money already.
There are a number of instances where asylum involves no costs, as 
when refugees arrive with savings which they pay as a tax to the gov-
ernment, receiving services equivalent in value to what they pay. We 
might also imagine refugees paying into a type of insurance scheme 
upon arrival, with each refugee paying a given sum, and only some 
refugees receiving services more than this sum, such that the group as 
a whole is given asylum without costs. Just as well-run health insur-
ance involves no net costs, a well-run refugee scheme – with refugees 
paying into the scheme – needn’t involve net costs. Similarly, if a group 
of highly-skilled refugees is given asylum, the predicted cost of each 
refugee may be less or equal to the predicted sum they will pay in 
taxes while given asylum. If such refugees will contribute more than 
they gain in services, states cannot claim that costs justify no asylum. 
Therefore, even if states have already accepted their fair share of costs 
in sending aid oversees, they still have a duty to provide asylum to 
these no-cost refugees. This is consistent with the Life Claim, which 
holds that all individuals are refugees if their right to life is threatened, 
and states have an obligation to accept refugees if the costs fall below 
a given threshold.
2. The Membership Claim
There is a second claim inconsistent with the Life Claim, which I call 
the Membership Claim. It holds that refugees are those who are no 
longer members in their home countries, and so holding a right to 
membership elsewhere. True membership entails eventual citizen-
ship, and so true refugees have a right to eventually obtain citizenship. 
Some individuals fl eeing life-threatening conditions are still members 
of their home state, and so have no right to citizenship in another state. 
They merely have a right to temporary protection until returning home 
is safe.
The Membership Claim is similar to the Life Claim, because it accepts 
that all those fl eeing life-threatening conditions have a right to asylum. 
It simply does not call individuals “refugees” if they will eventually be 
required to return home. If one accepts the Membership Claim, then 
replace my use of the word “refugees” with “those who cannot currently 
return to their home country because their lives will be at risk.”
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However, I still believe the Membership Claim is wrong, and that 
all those whose right to life are at risk at home ought to be called 
refugees, and that we ought not to prioritize those fl eeing persecution 
in granting citizenship. Let me briefl y present the Membership Claim, 
and why it is faulty.
The Membership Claim begins with the premise that all individu-
als have a right to be members of a state. An individual is no longer 
a member if her membership has been repudiated by the state. Her 
membership can be repudiated when a core feature of her identity is 
rejected, and this can occur if she is persecuted because of her religion, 
race, politics, or social membership. She therefore has right to member-
ship in a new state, rather than mere temporary asylum. In contrast 
to those who are persecuted, those fl eeing purely natural disasters or 
general violence are not living in states that have rejected a core feature 
of their identity. Their membership has therefore not been repudiated 
by their government, and so they are not in need of new membership 
elsewhere. They have a right to merely temporary protection in another 
state until returning home is safe.8
Below is a summary of this general argument:
1. All have a right to membership in a state.
2. Those who are persecuted are targeted for a core feature of their 
identity.
3. Therefore, their membership has been repudiated by their gov-
ernment.
4. Therefore, they have a right to obtain membership in another 
state.
5. Those who suffer from famine or general violence never had their 
membership repudiated by their government.
6. They therefore do not have a right to membership in another 
state.
One problem with the above is the second premise. It is not true that 
those persecuted because of their race, religion, social membership, or 
political opinion are necessarily targeted because of a core feature of 
their identity. Many individuals do not feel that their race is a core fea-
ture of their identity, and some do not feel that their religion is a core 
feature of their identity. An agnostic may not strongly identify with her 
agnosticism, but she is still persecuted if the government threatens to 
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kill her unless she stops being agnostic. More generally, a person may 
be targeted for being of a given race, religion, or social group they do 
not identify with, as when individuals with one Jewish grandparent 
were targeted during the Holocaust, because it was presumed they were 
Jewish, and individuals with glasses were targeted during the Cambo-
dian genocide, because it was presumed they were part of the suspect 
class of intellectuals.9 If being persecuted does not indicate that a core 
feature of a person’s identity is rejected, there is no reason to believe 
persecution indicates a special severing of membership compared to 
other forms of life-threatening treatment.
There is another problem with the Membership Claim. A person 
can be persecuted but remain a member of the state, so long as they 
are persecuted by independent militias who do not represent the 
state. Such a person’s bond with their government can remain intact 
if their government is doing everything to stop the militias’ actions. 
Once the government succeeds, they can return home. If this is true, 
there is no reason to distinguish all those fl eeing persecution from all 
those fl eeing general disasters: both could be in need of only tempo-
rary protection.
Lister, a proponent of the Membership Claim, addresses this objec-
tion. He argues that when militias target individuals, the militias usurp 
the state’s authority, essentially becoming the state. The state is there-
fore repudiating victims’ membership, because the state has become 
the militias engaging in persecution.10 For example, when Hutu mili-
tias targeted Tutsi citizens, the power of the original Rwandan govern-
ment became usurped, and the true state was represented by the Hutu 
militias. The state – represented by the Hutu militias – repudiated the 
membership of Tutsi residents, and these residents therefore had a right 
to citizenship elsewhere.
Such an explanation, however, rests on a view of the state rejected 
by many refuges themselves. When a refugee fl ees a militia that has 
usurped the government, the government may remain in exile. When 
refugees feel a strong bond to such governments-in-exile, and feel 
this government is the true representative of the state, they may plan 
to return to their homelands when these governments-in-exile gain 
power. From the refugees’ own perspective, their bond with their state 
remains strong. Just as those fl eeing famine or natural disasters still 
maintain a bond with their state, even if the government is powerless to 
stop the famine and natural disaster, refugees fl eeing persecution from 
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militias can maintain a bond with their state, even if the government is 
powerless in preventing these militias from functioning.
Importantly, when one’s bond remains intact, one might still have a 
right to citizenship in another state. This is because, even when one’s 
bond remains intact, one cannot always experience one’s citizenship 
in practice. All those who cannot live in their home countries, because 
their lives will be at risk from hunger or ill health, cannot vote in their 
home countries, engage in public debate in their home countries, work 
in their home countries, or enter and exit their home countries safely. 
Assuming such a circumstance will continue for a prolonged period of 
time, their access to citizenship is severed in practice, providing a com-
pelling reason to access citizenship elsewhere.
We might claim, as Lister does, that those who are directly tar-
geted by their government are more likely to require protection for an 
extended period of time, in contrast to those fl eeing natural disasters 
and general violence, who can safely return home after a shorter period 
of time.11 But that is not necessarily true: those fl eeing life-threatening 
poverty may fi nd that their home country cannot ensure their food 
security for decades, while those once targeted for their ethnicity may 
be able to return safely to their home states soon after. The relevant cri-
teria for new citizenship, then, should not be based on whether one was 
targeted, but on how long one is required to remain abroad. If this is 
true, then those fl eeing persecution, and those fl eeing non-man-made 
disasters, ought to obtain similar conditions for asylum: all individuals 
have a right to initial protection, and then eventually obtain the right 
to citizenship if they have been unable to return home for a signifi cant 
number of years.
There is a fi nal objection to the Membership Claim. It is not true that 
one can only have one’s membership repudiated by being persecuted. 
A person can have their membership repudiated if they are no longer 
benefi ting from the state, even if they are not targeted by this state. 
This is because, more generally, a person can lose membership when 
no longer receiving a benefi t constitutive of membership. For example, 
if a member of an insurance plan receives a letter informing her that no 
pay-outs would ever be provided, due to insuffi cient funds in the plan, 
she would no longer be a member of the insurance plan in any relevant 
sense. The same can be said about those leaving states unable to protect 
their rights to life. Assuming that being a member of a state is constitu-
tive of receiving minimal protection from the state, these individuals are 
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no longer members of the state. They therefore have a right to member-
ship elsewhere.
To account for some of the objections above, we might adopt another 
version of the Membership Argument. Shacknove’s Membership Argu-
ment, one of the earlier versions, begins with the empirical premise 
that individuals experience insecurity from other humans when living 
outside the confi nes of society. They experience theft, murder, and rape 
in the absence of protection from clans, tribes, and states. The purpose 
of the state today, he argues, is to mitigate these insecurities, ensuring 
that citizens are not harmed by outsiders, nor harmed by each other. 
When the state fails to protect citizens in this manner, it no longer has a 
special bond with its citizens, and those harmed are no longer true citi-
zens. Because all individuals have a right to citizenship, such individuals 
have a right to citizenship abroad as refugees.
Shacknove emphasizes that only those fl eeing man-made harms 
are refugees, because the function of the state is to protect humans 
from other humans. He notes, however, that many natural disasters are 
caused by humans: humans are responsible for the failure to build infra-
structure to counteract fl oods, responsible for a failure to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions to counter climate change, and responsible for a fail-
ure to create an economy that can withstand droughts. Nearly all those 
fl eeing economic and natural catastrophes, then, are refugees.12
Shacknove’s account nonetheless implies that, if an individual is 
fl eeing a disaster caused by no other human, they are not refugees. An 
individual suffering from a fl ood, virus, or drought for which nobody is 
responsible, and which nobody could prevent, keeps their bond with 
their home government according to Shacknove’s account. They there-
fore have no right to citizenship in a new state.
Shacknove’s account suffers from weaknesses similar to those plagu-
ing the fi rst Membership Claim. Even if one is fl eeing harms from other 
humans, it does not follow that one’s membership has been repudiated; 
one can retain membership if one is attacked by a militia, and one’s 
own government remains committed to protection. Just as those fl eeing 
a virus can retain their bond with the government, even if the govern-
ment is temporarily powerless in the face of the virus, those fl eeing a 
militia can retain their bond with the government, even if the govern-
ment is powerless in the face of the militia.
More importantly, one can cease to be a member of a state that is 
unable to prevent entirely non-man-made disasters. Perhaps the best 
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example of this is an individual on a sinking island. Assuming the island 
is sinking for reasons unrelated to human actions, and assuming there 
is no way to prevent the island from sinking, and assuming there are 
no other territories where the state can be reconstituted, the island’s 
residents will soon no longer have citizenship in a state. If all individu-
als have a right to citizenship in a state, then such individuals have a 
right to citizenship in another state, rather than being forced to drown 
as the island sinks, or living the rest of their lives as stateless people in 
other countries.13
In short, the Life Claim remains more compelling than alternative 
claims, which is why I adopt this claim throughout the book. And, as 
noted above, one can still accept the arguments throughout the book 
while rejecting the Life Claim. The arguments simply become narrower 
in scope, limited to a narrower range of individuals.
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APPENDIX B: TOTAL RETURNING, MONEY, 
AND DETENTION IN ISRAEL











May–June 2012 1,200–3,000 to 
South Sudan
$1,5001 South Sudanese 
told they will 
be detained 
indefi nitely or 
deported if they 
do not repatriate.
July–August Unknown 0–100
September Unknown 0–100 On September 
16, 2013, the 








then issues a new 
procedure allowing 
the state to arrest 
anyone suspected 
of criminal acts, 
without trial.3
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March 2013 53 $1,5005 UNHCR submits 
a request to fi le a 
friend of the court 
brief with the High 
Court of Justice on 
March 7, 2013.6
In an initial hearing 
at the High Court of 
Justice on March 12, 
an order is issued 
for the government 
to explain why the 
amendment to the 
Anti-Infi ltration 




June 75 $1,500 State prosecutor 
announces that the 
state is unlikely to 








in living conditions 
in detention 
facilities.9
September 89 $1,500 Nullifi cation of 
Anti-Infi ltration 
amendment which 
allows detention of 
asylum seekers.10
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October 180 $1,500 Interior Minister 
Gideon Saar 
proposes plan to 
Prime Minister 
Netanyahu to raise 
grant from $1,500 
to $5,000. No fi nal 
decision reached 
and no asylum 
seekers released, 
despite High Court 
order.11






petition to the 




from $1,500 to 
$3,500 in mid-
November.12











$3,500 Asylum seekers 
continue to be 
detained.15
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